



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THE CLASSIFICATION OF RELIGIONS

Its Relation to
the History of Religions

✓
Fred Louis Parrish

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PREFACE

Many attempts have been made in the past to provide a scientific classification of the religions of history. All such attempts have resulted in failure. The first stage of this study, which sought out past classifications together with their limitations, ended with the discovery of basic historical defects which invalidated them all. Such a result created another inquiry, a second stage to be pursued, if the problem of classification were to be brought any nearer to a solution. This second stage, which was undertaken and carried through, called for nothing less than an entirely new survey of basic religious interpretations embedded in the materials of the field of historical religion as a whole. The results of this survey furnished the outline and content of a genetic type of classification, which, by its very nature, could not violate the integrity of the historical faiths. This study which follows, is therefore, in its first part a brief history and digest of past classifications; in its second part it opens up the history of religion sufficiently to expose and to set forth the main features of a genetic classification of religions in the entire historical field.

The study is published in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Yale University. The author is indebted to a number of scholars, but he wishes here to acknowledge his deepest gratitude and heaviest obligation to Dr. John Clark Archer and Dr. Douglas Clyde Macintosh of Yale University, whose counsel, guidance, and helpful criticisms contributed so much to the promotion and completion of this study. Grateful acknowledgment is also made to The National Council on Religion in Higher Education for its assistance through a Fellowship which in a large measure made this investigation possible.

F. L. P.

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PART ONE

The Past Search for Order Among the
Historical Religions

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I. The Nature of the General Problem, Approach, and Method

Religion as a science has long been retarded in its development because it has lacked an adequate classification of the phenomena constituting the field of the history of religions. As a science religion is not concerned with the individual religions as such, but with kinds or classes of religion.¹ An acceptable grouping of the historical religions into kinds or classes is requisite to a scientific study of religion. Since no classification thus far has been developed, which has been able to gain general acceptance, the users of the historical materials have been obliged to devise their own, or borrow some sort of a classification from another. Under such a condition a wide diversity of schemes and patterns appeared. Whatever sort of classification was appropriated and used seriously the user was committed at the outset to the practical acceptance of the historical accuracy of the basic interpretations of the phenomena which his classification provided.² Classifications of the religions of history have uniformly failed in that they have impaired more or less the integrity and wholeness of the cults and 'systems' of the past. They have emphasized the qualitative aspects of the religions at the expense of the quantitative. They failed to show with sufficient clearness what it was in religious history that definitely marked off a 'religion' as a historical whole; and what it was that determined the historical unity and individuality of a single religion within the entire field.

P. must satisfy

In view of this need for a more satisfactory classification of the historical religions, our problem will be: (1) to survey briefly the accomplishments of past classifiers, in which survey an attempt will be made to classify the criteria of the classifiers; to examine critically the outstanding 'types' of criteria; and to discover what among them constitutes the most potent criterion for the handling of historical religions; (2) to examine, in a survey of history, the relation which the most potent criterion bears to the influential concepts found

¹ This is after the manner of sciences generally. To recognize a class is to recognize the unity of the essential attributes in a multiplicity of instances; it is the recognition of the one in the many. See A. Wolf, *Essentials of Scientific Method*, Sec. Ed., p. 30.

² The Ninth (1875), Eleventh (1910), and Fourteenth (1929) Editions of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*—the all-new editions—gave prominence to the classification problem; Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* ignored the subject.

among the great historical religions at different periods of time, in order to discover the nature of the evolution of historical religion; and (3) to point out, in view of the character of the evolution of historical religion, an outline of a genetic classification for the entire field of the history of religions.

But if one is to undertake such a problem he must have an approach which is adequate for it. If the religions were evolved from the experiences of different peoples, in different ages and localities; if they changed perceptibly within particular areas during known periods of time; then, it is quite apparent that the investigator is obliged to work upon a very large canvas. It is necessary for him to assume as his scientific frame of reference a time and space frame of rather definite historical proportions, within which are found the bodies or streams of human experience, the interpretations of which are available to us to the extent of the records. And he assumes, further, that peoples within that historical frame of reference, both in their individual and group experiences, faced constantly the universal problem of religious adjustment, and continually modified their interpretations under the pressure of their varying experiences and circumstances.

Not only the approach but the method also must be adequate. It must be equipped to deal with such materials as carried the record of the changing interpretations of mankind, and adequate to deal with the religious concepts which arose within such a historical frame of reference. Such a method we find in the genetic or evolutionary method, sometimes called also the 'comparative method.' If we apply this genetic method to the field of the history of religion it means that we are directed to the task of discovering the main stages and developments through which religion has passed; and also to the task of discovering the causes which brought about the various changes in the course of the developments. Although this method involves, when fully applied, both the discovery of stages and the discovery of the causes of such stages or changes, the former only,—the discovery of stages—is sufficient for us to follow in order to indicate what steps or stages there were, and such results may go far toward aiding the classifier in determining the sequence of religions in history. The tracing of causes, although part of the genetic method, will not need to be used to any considerable extent for our purpose; and, further, such a process would extend the bounds of our investigation beyond the necessary and practicable limitations.

The genetic method shall be used to the extent of making possible the determination whether religions having superficial resemblances and superficial differences actually and basically do possess

such characteristics. The scientific spirit of our time persuades us that, in the classification of our historical phenomena, the objects or units for classification should be treated as naturally and objectively as possible.

In our assumption that a genetic classification of the historical religions is possible there is involved the notion that there is a unity of character in the multiplicity of religions; that there is an order among them; that there is a definite relationship between any one religion and the others; and that the integrity of a religion is to be sought in its relation to a common criterion with which the religion's dominant concepts and attitudes integrate.

In our investigation we also assume that religious concepts have a prominent place. While it is possible to think of the historical religions as actual direct expressions of a religious factor in the world, that is, to think of religions as actual expressions of the religious 'power' in its immediacy in the great process of experience, we do not present ourselves before the history of religions with such an approach. On the contrary, we look upon the historical religions, for our purpose in this investigation, not as the direct expressions of the religious factor, but as the varying *interpretations of the direct expressions* of the religious factor in the world. Religion is not only a 'power' object; it is also, and for us here, a 'knowledge' object. We look upon interpretations as of the nature of knowledge rather than of the nature of religious 'power' which is natural to the world in which we live. *Historical religions are to us interpretations of religious power and not religious power.* History will not be able to tell its own story if it cannot be allowed to contribute its own interpretations.

It is not assumed that concepts in a historical religion contain anything like all there is, which is of the nature of knowledge, in a religion. However we depend upon them to guide us: they possess a remarkable utility for our purpose in that they are creatures of time, are endowed with discoverable ranges of influence, and each of them is a class term which holds a wealth of meaning, as devices used in the interpretation of the meaning of human experience.

Thus far we have attempted to do no more than to call attention to the general problem of the classification of historical religions, the general approach, and the method. In order that we may determine, more narrowly, the nature of our specific problem, approach, and method requisite to the task of obtaining a more adequate classification of historical religions, we must first examine what others have done, and then proceed from that point.

This will include a survey of past efforts at classification, a classification of the criteria used by the classifiers, and a close examination of the outstanding 'types' to determine the relative amount of 'control' such types have over the historical materials. In the light of these results we should then be in a better position to fix upon the nature of our specific problem, approach, and method necessary to proceed further. To these matters we shall now proceed.

II. *A Brief Survey of Classifications Before Hegel and Schleiermacher*

Only sporadic attempts at classification were made before about the beginning of the nineteenth century. One of the earliest is that of Marcus Terentius Varro³ (116-27 B. C.), who lived in the last century of the Roman republic when a marked Hellenization of Roman religion, from matured Greek religious interpretations, was taking place. He distinguished religious differences about him by noting the type of persons belonging to each. There were: (1) poet-religion, expressed by fable, myth, and drama; (2) philosopher-religion, expressed by the reflections upon nature; and (3) folk-religion, expressed by the customs and regulated for the masses by the Roman government.

Of historical significance to Moslems was the classification of the prophet Mohammed⁴ (c. 570-632 A. D.), which placed an evaluation upon the new religion of Islam in relation to the religions existing at that time in the neighboring territories. In the view of Mohammed there were two kinds of religions, each based upon a kind of knowledge: (1) religions without revelation, the religion of 'idolaters'; and (2) religions with revelation. This second group he further divided: there were (a) 'People of a Book,' which included Judaism, Christianity, Zoroastrianism, and any others which possessed a 'book' revelation; and (b) Islam which possessed a revelation that was not recorded in formal literature.⁵

A wider range of religions appeared in the classification of Roger Bacon (1214-1294), who graded religions on the basis of their relative completeness, thus admitting that there was something of real religion in all of them:⁶

³ Heinrich Scholz, *Religionsphilosophie*, p. 260. Taken from Augustine's *Civitas Dei*, vi, 5; iv, 27.

⁴ For the prophet's views see J. M. Rodwell's translation of the *Koran*, sura xiii, v. 43; Maulvi Muhammad Ali's *Holy Qur'an*, the same reference, and footnote p. 1295. Also see Sir Wm. Muir, *The Life of Mohammed*, (rev. ed.), p. lxiii; and D. S. Margoliouth, *Mohammed and the Rise of Islam*, p. 41.

⁵ During the lifetime of Mohammed the revelations were not written down and preserved in a book.

⁶ L. H. Jordan, *Comparative Religion: Its Genesis and Growth*, p. 128. Taken from Bacon's *Opus Majus*.

- (1) Religions which are preparatory or incomplete:
 1. Pagans dependent upon the order of priests;
 2. Idolaters and polytheists, including Buddhists;
 3. Tartars, who believe in the unity of God;
 4. Saracens or Mohammedans;
 5. Judaism of the Jews.
- (2) Religions wholly complete, possessing the host necessary to bring mankind into unity with God and Christ:
 1. Christianity.

A widely-accepted division of religions, developed in the Middle Ages, was that endorsed by Thomas Aquinas⁷ (1225-1274), who sought earnestly for a mutually exclusive domain for 'faith,' i. e. church doctrines, dogmas, and assumptions, as against 'reason.' He tried to draw a distinct line separating 'revealed religion' and 'natural religion.' Both 'religions' continued to flourish within the body of western religious tradition. Aquinas held 'revealed religion' to be more fundamental than 'natural religion.'

Another widely-used but uncritical classification was that which divided religions into the 'true' and the 'false.' Martin Luther (1483-1546) placed the religions of the Moslem, Jew, and Roman Catholic Christian in the 'false' category, and his own faith in the 'true.'⁸ The same division appeared in the preface of a *Dictionary of All Religions*, published by Broughton about 1745. In the preface Broughton remarked that the chapters on 'false' religions occupied more space in the work than the chapters on 'true' religions.⁹

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries no progress was made toward a more adequate classification. One of the chief obstacles was the domination of the system of scholastic philosophy which put 'revelation' above 'reason.' Before anything very outstanding could be accomplished for classification it was necessary for some significant influences to come in to alter the attitudes of scholars toward religion. There was need for a new method by which to arrive at new facts and new interpretations of human experience.

Some progress in this direction came with Francis Bacon (1561-1626) and Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679); but the emphasis of Hobbes, carried further by Descartes and others, placed such a stress upon the living individual man's 'reason' that such 'rationalism' allowed too little place for the influence of the past, i. e. *history*. This had the effect of divorcing religion from history; and deism—a sort of 'natural religion'—gained considerable acceptance. Thus

⁷ A. K. Rogers, *A Student's History of Philosophy*, (rev. ed.) pp. 13-14.

⁸ M. Jastrow, Jr., *The Study of Religion*, pp. 13-14.

⁹ J. E. Carpenter, 'Religion,' *Enc. Brit.* (Eleventh Ed.).

far the improved method—if such was an improvement—led to a negative result: this abandonment of history resulted in a loss of content and significance to religion through over-emphasis upon the individual. ‘Reason’ however was itself finally called into judgment. After an examination of the ‘organ of knowledge’ by John Locke (1632-1704), and the use of logic by Hume (1711-1776), ‘reason’ was found to produce only uncertainty and skepticism.

There was more to the mind’s life than the logical; there was also a vital or ‘feeling’ aspect in ‘natural religion’ which was emphasized by Rousseau (1712-1788), and very greatly deepened by doctrines of the French Revolution. This development profoundly impressed German thinkers, some of whom had already become strongly influenced by contributions surviving from the classic Greek history. Something of the ‘naturalness’ in the ancient Greek ways of life, carried down in the literary and artistic traditions, took lodgment in the minds of men like Lessing and Winckelmann. This Hellenic naturalness, etc., combined with the ‘feeling’ emanating from France, produced in the German thinkers a way of looking at things which contrasted sharply with the abstract freedom of man which the cold intellectualism of the Enlightenment had provided.

Lessing (1729-1781), who had preceded the French Revolution, brought into religious thinking again the old notion of the relativity of religious knowledge, and helped to restore history to its rightful role again. ‘Early religions are steps in the progressive revelation by which God educates mankind; the true religion of reason can only come as the result of a long process leading up to it, and so positive religions have a relative justification.’¹⁰ His application of the concept of development to the history of religions again directed attention to the resources of religious history. There were now new possibilities for the growth of the ‘natural religion’ movement. Herder went further with Lessing’s idea of development, pointing out that the whole life of man is subject to it; that even language itself is subject to growth; and that the achievements of primitive peoples are worthy of respect.

This newer point of view made possible the re-opening of the whole problem of the classification of the religions of history on a plane unused before. For if religions of the past were steps in the progressive revelation by which God educates mankind, then a question looms up ahead: *What are the steps in this progressive revelation?*

Lessing, therefore, stood upon the threshold of the period in modern times when the classification of the religions of history first

¹⁰ Rogers, op. cit. p. 410.

became a definite problem. Since his day the field of the history of religions has been very greatly extended, and the knowledge of that field remarkably increased. Such developments brought into view not only a body of religions not previously known but also a more intimate acquaintance with the religions of peoples already known. Materials providing a more complete story of 'God's progressive revelation,' as reflected in the religions, continued to accumulate ever to greater proportions. Under such conditions it became increasingly more imperative, if past religions were to make their contributions to the religious knowledge of the men of today, that an adequate and a generally acceptable classification of the historical religions be developed.

Not only has the field of the history of religion been greatly expanded since Lessing, but the scientific spirit has grown also, and with it an improvement in the method used upon historical bodies of knowledge. However, the making of classifications did not wait for the expanded field nor the improved method to appear, but got under way at once, and has continued unabated from about 1800 onward. Among the first to develop classifications were Hegel and Schleiermacher.

In order that such past classifications, developed since 1800, may be seen in relationship with each other, and to the basic problem at hand, we shall give attention first to a brief survey-digest of the criteria, and then examine more critically the outstanding 'types' of such criteria in order to determine their utility toward the desideratum of setting forth an 'order' which actually existed among the religions of history.

We shall begin with a presentation of a classification of the classifications in briefest outline, and then proceed to the examination of the criteria as they appear in this pattern.

CHAPTER II

A DIGEST OF CLASSIFICATIONS WHICH ACCORD WITH ASPECTS OF THE 'RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS'

I. A Classification of Classifications Since Hegel and Schleiermacher

Criteria of classifications from the time of Hegel and Schleiermacher onward divide into three groups according to the general purpose served by each classification. These three groups were:

- ✓(1) Those which classified religions to accord with the aspects of the 'religious consciousness' of man; (2) Those which classified religions to accord with the aspects of the 'man-god' relationship; (3) Those which classified religions to accord with the aspects of the religions' environments.

A digest of these classifications, from the standpoint of their ordering criteria, will be taken up in the order mentioned above. This chapter will deal with the first group, and the next two chapters with the other two groups.

For convenience in this survey of the criteria and the classifications of the first or 'religious consciousness' group, it appears advantageous to subdivide the criteria as follows: (1) Criteria depending upon the character of the 'absolute consciousness'; (2) Criteria depending upon the differences and similarities in 'religious consciousness'; (3) Criteria depending upon the differences and similarities in 'religious feeling'; (4) Criteria depending upon the character of the thoughts, acts, and feelings; (5) Criteria depending upon differences in persons themselves.

II. The 'Absolute Consciousness'

1. G. W. F. Hegel, the outstanding classifier in this group, approached the history of religion with Lessing's concept of development, and Herder's idea of incorporating with this development the whole life of man. For Hegel, 'reason' is objective and is expressed in history; the experience of the past is rational, and the reality of a thing is the meaning a thing has in the great process of experience. The history of religion is an expression of the unfolding of the rational;¹ and the course of history is the process, not simply

¹ See Chapter VI for criticism of Hegel's dependence upon history. Although Hegel's understanding of religion in history was grounded in his allegiance to a

by which man comes to a consciousness of God and of the world, but that by which God comes to a consciousness of Himself.² God is Spirit; Spirit is the real essence of the universe, and everything is to be understood in terms of the laws of Spirit.

Hegel introduced his dialectic method which he assumed to be grounded in the very character of Spirit itself. Development in history was to him an evolution marked by the unfolding of the inner 'logical' character of Spirit.

How did all this affect Hegel's view of historical religions? Instead of allowing each religion to tell its own meaning through its own basic concepts of the religious factor, he disregarded each religion's own basic quantitative interpretations; placed a quality valuation upon each religion—that is, what he recognized to be individual religions—so as to show that each historical religious phenomenon expressed a portion of the unfolding character qualities of the universal Spirit. Spirit, following its 'inner logic' marked out its historical evolution through stages of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, by actual historical religions which expressed such evolution and such stages. Each historical religion had a validity as religion, and its validity was relative to the growth of the 'religious consciousness.' The growth of this 'religious consciousness' was manifest earliest in religions of 'nature,' later in religions of 'spiritual individuality,' and finally in 'absolute' or 'revealed' religion in which the religious consciousness of Spirit as Spirit was complete.³ His classification follows:⁴

I. The religion of nature.

- (1) Immediate religion (magic).
- (2) The division of consciousness within itself.
 - (a) The religion of measure. (China)
 - (b) The religion of imagination. (India)
 - (c) The religion of being-within-itself. (Buddhism)
- (3) The religion of nature in transition to the religion of freedom.
 - (a) The religion of the good or of light. (Persia)
 - (b) The religion of pain. (Syria)
 - (c) The religion of mystery. (Egypt)

great historical concept of the religious factor provided by Hellenic religion, he disregarded it in his classification of religion, and made use of a speculative concept—the Absolute—which caused him grossly to misuse the materials of the history of religions.

² Rogers, *op. cit.* p. 449.

³ G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. I, pp. 21-85.

⁴ *Ibid.* vol. I, p. 261 ff., vol. II, and vol. III to p. 151.

- II. The religion of spiritual individuality.
 - (1) The religion of sublimity. (Jews)
 - (2) The religion of beauty. (Greeks)
 - (3) The religion of utility. (Romans)

- III. Absolute religion.
 - (1) Christianity.

2. Wilhelm Vatke undertook to make corrections, though not fundamental ones, in Hegel's classification: to humanize and moralize it for theological ends. In order to make room for moral freedom for man within the Absolute, Vatke conceived freedom as a dialectical process in which God and man are not externally placed in opposition. While he approved Hegel's three stages of religion, he held that all three were classified 'forcibly and improperly.'⁵ In particular, he criticized Hegel (1) for failing to assign a definite religion answering to the direct action of magic; (2) for overlooking the belief in ghosts, which savages have; (3) for putting Judaism, which is 'much more spirit,' in the second division instead of the third where it belongs with Christianity; and (4) for leaving out Islam. This last named religion should be placed in the third division. The three monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, should be classified chronologically as they originated in history.⁶ His classification follows:⁷

- I. Nature religions.
 - (1) Religion of nature-peoples.
 - (2) Chinese religion; Japanese religion.
 - (3) Vedic religion; Brahmanism; Buddhism.
 - (4) Religion of the Zend-Avesta.
 - (5) Semitic religion; Babylonian and Syrian.
 - (6) Egyptian religion.
- II. Religions of finite spirit, or of spiritual subjectivity.
 - (1) Greek religion.
 - (2) Roman religion.
- III. Religions of monotheism.
 - (1) Religion of Hebrews; later Judaism.
 - (2) Christianity.
 - (3) Mohammedanism.

3. Gustave Biedermann also aimed to correct the Hegelian classification. His aim was to extract the ideal content of religions, and to set forth this content in logical categories in a form which represented to him 'pure thought.'⁸ The result was a three-fold grouping of curious abstract entities, following somewhat the He-

⁵ Wilhelm Vatke, *Religionsphilosophie*, p. 299.

⁶ 'Mohammedanism' is so placed because it appears 'als Protest gegen die endlichen Elemente des Christentums.' Ibid. p. 300.

⁷ Vatke, op. cit. p. xvi (adapted).

⁸ O. Pfleiderer, *The Philosophy of Religion on the Basis of Its History*, vol. III, p. 272.

gelian dialectic, but listed under the three main 'religionsphilosophie' divisions of paganism, Christianity, and 'philosophy':⁹

- I. Religionsphilosophie des Heidenthums.
 - (1) Naturgottheiten
 - (2) Menschengötter
 - (3) Geistige Götter
- II. Religionsphilosophie des Christentums.
 - (1) Gott der Geist
 - (2) Der Gottmensch
 - (3) Der Dreieinige Gott
- III. Die Religion der Philosophie.
 - (1) Natur als Gott
 - (2) Menschegeist als Gottesgeist
 - (3) Der Gottesgeist an sich

4. The classification of E. von Hartmann brought together as one the Hegelian criterion of a rational Absolute, and Schopenhauer's emphasis upon the will. Evil in the world is due to irrational willing; this evil may be corrected and completely overcome by a rational will. The world, both as it has been and may be, is the outcome of this rational strife present in the Absolute which Hartmann called 'the Unconscious.' World strife is a continual struggle between the logical and the illogical. Man, related to the Unconscious, is in the struggle. The goal will be reached when the logical overcomes the illogical. Will and intelligence combined will remedy the cosmic error. The more wilfully logical a man is in religion the more the illogical is being remedied in the world. The Unconscious is gaining its battle through man's assistance in logical living.¹⁰

The history of religion is involved in the process of the awakening of the religious consciousness. It is divided into religions of naturalism and religions of supranaturalism. Animals have no religion, although one is inclined to see in them the beginnings of it.¹¹ His complete classification, in translation, formalizes as follows:¹²

- I. Naturalism.
 - (1) Naturalistic henotheism.
 - (2) Anthropoid spiritualization of henotheism.
 - (a) Aesthetic refinement. (Greeks)
 - (b) Utilitarian secularization. (Romans)
 - (c) Tragico-ethical profoundness. (Teutons)
 - (3) Theological systematizing of henotheism.
 - (a) Naturalistic monism. (Egyptians)
 - (b) Semi-naturalism. (Persians)

⁹ Gustave Biedermann, *Religionsphilosophie*, adapted from pp. xiii-xxi.

¹⁰ E. von Hartmann, *Ausgewählte Werke*, Bd. V. pp. 1-55.

¹¹ Ibid. p. 1.

¹² Ibid. pp. vi-xii (adapted).

II. Supranaturalism.

- (1) Abstract monism or idealistic religion of salvation.
 - (a) Acomism. (Brahmans)
 - (b) Absolute illusionism. (Buddhism)
- (2) Theism.
 - (a) Primitive monotheism. (Israel; prophets)
 - (b) Law religion. (Mosaism; Judaism; Five reforms—the last being Islam)
 - (c) Realistic religion of salvation. (Christianity)

5. Somewhat the same beaten path was followed by August Dorner. To him, Spirit progresses through distinct stages. Religious consciousness proceeds along the unfolding process of Spirit itself, from stage to stage the religious relationship becoming ever more perfect. The process continues until from immanent and consistent necessity it completes itself.¹³ If Dorner's views are condensed and adapted to our purposes here, his classification of historical religions follows the 'evolution of Spirit' after the following manner:¹⁴

1. Religion of sensuous preoccupation: Spirit is not as yet divided from, but is dominated by, nature.
 1. Primitive religions.
 2. Chinese religions.
 3. Egyptian religion.
 4. Babylonian religion.
 5. Teutonic religion.
- II. Religion in which Spirit divides from nature. Abstraction sets in and runs to the limit in the All-One or monism.
 1. Brahmanism (monistic and abstract).
 2. Buddhism (at first not metaphysical).
 3. Persian religion. (Dualistic; Spirit not 'Herr' over 'Machte.').
 4. Greek religion. (Spirit here is a wise harmonious power in nature).
 5. Roman religion (will is emphasized).
 6. Semitic religion. (Higher will; unity of the ideal and real).
- III. Ideal Religion.
 1. Christianity alone binds together immanence and transcendence.

6. J. Caird endorsed a classification as true which showed the extent to which each religion had the 'essential idea of religion itself.'¹⁵ He did not set forth a formal application of his criterion to the historical religions, but he did say that Christianity takes up completely in its revelation that which is found as broken and scattered 'rays of light' in other religions.¹⁶ E. Caird set forth 'three ideas' which circumscribe the general nature of man's conscious life.

¹³ A. Dorner, *Grundriss der Religionsphilosophie*, p. 57.

¹⁴ Ibid. pp. 58-122.

¹⁵ J. Caird, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, p. 313.

¹⁶ Ibid. p. 343.

These three are: the idea of the object or not-self, the idea of the subject or self, and the idea of unity.¹⁷ Religions of history classify under kinds of religious consciousness, as follows:¹⁸

- I. Religion of objective religious consciousness.
Examples: Vedic religion; Greek religion.
- II. Religion of subjective religious consciousness.
Examples: Buddhism; Philosophical Greek religion; Judaism.
- III. Religion having consciousness of the 'Idea of God.'
Example: Christianity.

7. Few persons have given as much attention to drawing up classifications as O. Pfleiderer. One of his earliest classifications is built upon stages in the developing God-consciousness. These stages were:¹⁹

- I. Naturism: primitive mythical consciousness of man.
- II. Spiritism: belief in a world of ancestral and nature spirits.
- III. Spirit-world idea, developed in a three-fold manner:
(a) Polytheism (b) Spiritism (c) Henotheism

Another classification of Pfleiderer, more elaborate than the one above, is based in his 'Idea of God,' which he held to contain 'two sides' corresponding to man's practical relation to God as being that of 'dependence' and 'freedom.' In a formal statement of the two sorts of religion, given below, it may be seen that the religions listed are either religions of dependence or religions of freedom, except for Christianity which he claims to incorporate both aspects of the relation to God:²⁰

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>I. Dependence</p> <p>(A) Extreme partiality</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">(1) Nature religions</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(a) Egyptian</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(b) Semitic</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">(2) Culture or humanitarian religions</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(a) Chinese</p> <p>(B) Unequal recognition</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">(1) Supernatural religions</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(a) Brahmanism</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(b) Buddhism</p> <p>(C) Balancing</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">(1) Monotheistic religions</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(a) Islam</p> <p>(D) Blending</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">(1) Monotheistic religions</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(a) Christianity</p> | <p>II. Freedom</p> <p>(A) Extreme partiality</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">(1) Nature religions</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(a) Early Indian</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(b) Germanic</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">(2) Culture or humanitarian religions</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(a) Greek</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(b) Roman</p> <p>(B) Unequal recognition</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">(1) Supernatural religions</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(a) Zoroastrianism</p> <p>(C) Balancing</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">(1) Monotheistic religions</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(a) Judaism</p> <p>(D) Blending</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">(1) Monotheistic religions</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(a) Christianity</p> |
|--|--|

¹⁷ E. Caird, *Evolution of Religion*, vol. I, p. 64.

¹⁸ Ibid. pp. 187-196 (adapted).

¹⁹ O. Pfleiderer, *The Philosophy of Religion on the Basis of Its History*, vol. III, p. 34.

²⁰ O. Pfleiderer, *Philosophy and Development of Religion*, vol. I, p. 35. Adapted in part from D. J. H. Ward's *Classification of Religions*, p. 47.

Late in life Pfleiderer expressed a preference for classification along ethnological or chronological lines, but admitted there were limitations in such methods.²¹

8. The question of the classification of historical religions offered no problem of consequence to recent philosophers of religion, Josiah Royce, John Watson, and W. E. Hocking. With Royce, religion anywhere is constituted of 'do, feel, and believe.' 'These three elements . . . go to constitute any religion.'²² 'A religion is therefore practical, emotional, and theoretical; it teaches us to do, to feel, and to believe.'²³ Watson held that the primary condition for spirituality and rationality is the consciousness of a unity which embraces all distinctions, and more particularly the fundamental distinction of the world and the self.²⁴ Man adopts the attitude of religion when, as a rational subject, he finds or thinks he finds 'the world to be a cosmos and human life intelligible, and refers both object and subject to a supreme principle.' The elements involved in all religions are reverence, belief, and ritual.²⁵ Hocking sought to avoid the psychological subjectivism in which absolute idealism had found itself, through the use of religious mysticism. 'Religion is the mother of the arts.' 'At the beginning of history, religion is the whole of culture; at its end, it may seem, culture is the whole of religion.'²⁶ The unitary character of historical religions, and the real contributions they have to offer, are lost to view in 'culture.'

9. Summary. Thus the problem raised in the days of Lessing and Herder, that there were historical stages in the development of religions, remained unsolved so far as the group of classifiers we have examined are concerned. Hegel's failure to base his classification upon actual historical concepts of the religious factor, and his use of speculative concepts instead, led the philosophers who trailed him to set forth religions in terms of qualities when they were never able to determine what a religion was in terms of historical quantity. It is no cause for wonder that the philosophers did not solve the problem. For the problem, as a matter of fact, was not a philosopher's but a historian's problem. If religions of history are to be allowed to make their contributions to religious interpretation, they must be allowed to do so in terms of their actual historical interpretations.

²¹ O. Pfleiderer, *Religion and Historic Faiths*, p. 88. For his discussion of these and other methods see page 37.

²² J. Royce, *The Religious Aspects of Philosophy*, p. 3.

²³ *Ibid.* p. 4.

²⁴ J. Watson, *The Interpretation of Religious Experience*, vol. I, p. 2.

²⁵ *Ibid.* p. 6.

²⁶ W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, pp. 14-15.

Philosophers and theologians in the foregoing group made earnest and bold attempts to find the key to the classification lock. We can now see that the case was hopeless for them from the beginning. But should the historian *discover* in the body of the actual interpretations of the religions themselves the solution to the classification problem, will not the philosopher and the theologian then be enabled to obtain a fresh start, begin this time with a more realistic picture through a genetic classification of the religions of history, and acquire through its use a more valuable exploitation of the resources of historical religion?

III. The 'Religious Consciousness'

1. F. Schleiermacher (1788-1834) maintained that each definite historical religion began with a specific religious element of 'original intuition' which was rooted in the common ground of all religions. Judaism is held to contain a central 'intuition' of recompense; Christianity, an 'intuition' of corruption and redemption.²⁷ But beyond this his search for intuitions among the historical religions does not appear to have borne fruit.

From Spinoza and Herder, Schleiermacher had gained a view of an immanent God in nature. In his view, 'The whole of religion is nothing but the sum of all relations of man to God, apprehended in all the possible ways in which any man can be immediately conscious in his life. In this sense there is but one religion. . . .'²⁸ His celebrated definition of religion as a feeling of absolute dependence, which he arrived at in later studies, applied to the highest development of religion, and not to all stages of consciousness.²⁹

He gradually moved away from the criterion of 'intuition' to that of 'feeling.' In his first edition of *The Christian Faith* he included feeling with intuition; in the later editions of 1806 and 1821, intuition is omitted, leaving only feeling.³⁰ Centering religion in the feeling of dependence he arrived at the view that religions show three stages of human consciousness, each stage having an identifiable feeling of dependence. There were:³¹ religions of animalistic consciousness, religions of sensuous consciousness, and religions of full-fledged consciousness or absolute dependence.³²

²⁷ F. Schleiermacher, *On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers* (Tr. by J. Oman), pp. 234-241. 'Intuition' appeared in the First Edition published in 1799.

²⁸ Ibid. p. 217.

²⁹ George Cross, *The Theology of Schleiermacher*, p. 122. This is a condensed presentation of Schleiermacher's chief work, *The Christian Faith*.

³⁰ Ibid. p. 107.

³¹ Ibid. pp. 122-123.

³² Schleiermacher affords still another division of religions—that which accords with views of the religious 'object': I. Idolatry and fetishism; II. Polytheism; and III. Monotheism (Judaism, Christianity, Islam). Ibid. pp. 128-131.

The basic need to seek out the individuality of a historical religion was felt by Schleiermacher. One of the classifications current in his day listed religions according to ways of being conscious of existence and its totality: religions of 'chaos'; religions of 'system'; and religions of 'elemental diversity.' He rejected this arrangement because he held that such religions were 'far from being so many single and distinct religions. . . . They are types . . . but not religious individualities, and the need to seek for this individuality is by no means satisfied . . . in this three-fold way.'³³

2. A. M. Fairbairn also sought in the religious consciousness for a 'religious sense' which he believed existed and was different in character in each of the great 'race' families. Following the lead offered by a division of peoples into the linguistic groups known as Indo-European, Semitic, and Turanian, he set out to find that in religion which is 'no product of the reasoning or reflective consciousness.'³⁴ He claimed to have found in the consciousness itself what, when it is fully isolated, is a religious 'faculty'; and each race had a characteristic faculty. By applying the criterion of 'faculty,' found in the religious consciousness, he divided the historical religions thus:³⁵

- I. Creative and conservative religious faculty. (Semitic)
 - (1) Mosaism
 - (2) Judaism
 - (3) Christianity
 - (4) Islam
- II. Receptive and progressive religious faculty. (Indo-European)
 - (1) Zoroastrianism
 - (2) Brahmanism
 - (3) Buddhism
- III. Attenuated religious faculty. (Turanian)
 - (1) Chinese

IV. 'Religious Feeling'

1. From still other viewpoints, feeling offered the measurable datum in historical religious experience, for Hermann Lotze and Rudolf Otto. Lotze tried to find out how much of religion may be 'discovered, proved, or at least confined, agreeably with reason. . . .'³⁶ Experience comes not only by the senses, but also by inner states which are available for the acquisition of truth. Feelings

³³ Schleiermacher, op. cit. p. 221.

³⁴ A. M. Fairbairn, *Introduction to the Philosophy and History of Religion*, p. 44.

³⁵ Ibid. pp. 266-274.

³⁶ H. Lotze, *Outlines of Philosophy of Religion* (Tr. by G. T. Ladd), p. 2.

which constitute the data of religion are of three kinds: feelings of fear, aesthetic feeling, and ethical feeling. The first is crudest, the second is purer, but the ethical feeling is the purest of all in religion.³⁷ Lotze made no attempt to schematize the historical religions on any such basis as his criterion suggests.

2. Rudolf Otto appealed to evidences in historical religions in his endeavor to isolate a non-rational element in the religious consciousness, an element he called the 'numinous.' This element, accepted by him as the genuine datum of religious experience, is held to contain a number of definite identifiable feelings or attitudes toward the 'holy' factor in religion. The most fundamental element in the religious feeling is what he called the 'mysterium tremendum.' This differentiates into the 'tremendum' and the 'mysterium' and each of these is further differentiated. If his findings are formalized his 'numinous' factor is found to account for the following elements of feeling:³⁸

- I. The 'tremendum'
 - (1) The element of awefulness; recognized by that hallowed feeling, dread, etc.
 - (2) The element of 'overpoweringness,' 'Majestas.'
 - (3) The element of 'energy' or 'urgency.'
- II. The 'mysterium'
 - (1) The Wholly-other than the ego of the individual.
 - (2) The element of fascination, and of attraction.

Otto drew upon the materials of the history of religion for his data. Such a treatment of the historical concepts of the religious factor brought out certain qualitative features, but there is here no utilization of the above criterion to show the individuality of the religious interpretations by the historical religions.

V. Religious Mental Products and Activities

1. Auguste Sabatier held that religions should be classified not according to the feeling of revelation of God but according to the form in which the feelings of revelation are expressed. Men have always had some sort of relationship with God, but the manner of expressing the revelation has varied. In history the conception of revelation has progressed as man became more intelligent. The idea of revelation has passed through three phases in the course of history: the mythological, the dogmatic, and the critical. These phases are:³⁹

³⁷ Lotze, *op. cit.* pp. 5-6.

³⁸ Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy* (Tr. by J. W. Harvey), pp. 8-12.

³⁹ A. Sabatier, *Outline of a Philosophy of Religion*, p. 36.

- I. Religions with the mythical notion of revelation.
Examples: Hebrew traditions; Egyptian myths; and Greek myths.
- II. Religions with a dogmatic notion of revelation.
Example: Roman Catholic Christianity.
- III. Religion with a psychological or critical notion of revelation.
Example: The religion of Jesus.

For all the value he attributed to his classification, he admitted that the classification of religions is a complex matter: there are in the world of religions 'differences of degree and differences of kind': the former mark the successive movements of the religious consciousness in time; the other express the diversity and simultaneity of religions in space.⁴⁰ In fact he all but considers the problem incapable of solution: there are differences of kind which cannot be classified in a single scale; there are religions which it is 'impossible to compare,' and it is impossible to put into one category the religious forms which their history presents.⁴¹

2. According to G. M. Stratton it is possible to characterize the stages or developments in religious thought. There is a dawn, later a high-noon, and finally a twilight in religious thinking. Religions have passed through (1) an uncritical stage of thought; (2) a self-conscious stage of thought; and (3) a mystical stage of thought. The first is mythical, spontaneous, uncritical, and naive; then thinking moves ahead through the theological stage of right beliefs and conceptions; finally thought reaches its limit when meditation touches a concentration that borders on complete absorption.⁴²

3. Stages in the evolution of the religions, according to John Dewey, are marked by the character of the religious manifestations: (1) The first important stage is identified by such primary elements as rites, cults, ceremonies, myths, and magic; (2) There follows the development of religion until it is characterized by emotional beliefs which cluster about the primary elements; (3) The final stage in the cycle of religious evolution is the development in which philosophy and secular morals have appeared upon the background of the emotional beliefs.⁴³

4. A. N. Whitehead finds 'order' in the world of religions by approaching it through his 'analysis of the various factors in human nature which go to form a religion. . . .' In his analysis four factors

⁴⁰ A. Sabatier, op. cit. p. 94.

⁴¹ Ibid. pp. 94-95.

⁴² G. M. Stratton, *Psychology of the Religious Life*, pp. 191 and 203.

⁴³ John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, pp. 25, 41-42.

of human nature are found to have emerged in history, and each one has had its own period of supremacy in a historical sequence:⁴⁴

Religion, so far as it received external expression in human history, exhibits four factors or sides of itself. These factors are ritual, emotion, belief, rationalization. There is definite organized procedure, which is ritual: there are different types of emotional expression: there are definitely expressed beliefs: and there is the adjustment of these beliefs into a system internally coherent with other beliefs.

One factor is supreme at a time, and never are they all at the same time equally emphasized. First ritual emerged, then emotion, then belief; and—if the development is completed—rationalization. The evolution of religions is therefore something like this: religions of ritual; religions of emotion; religions of beliefs; and religions of rationalization.

VI. Differences in 'Religious Persons'

1. William James. All religions are religions of adherents: religions are embodied in religious persons. Religions of men may be differentiated according to the kinds of persons there are who experience religion. James held that all of the specific religions agree (1) in the intellectual element of uneasiness, indicating that something is wrong about a person; and (2) in the provision of a solution which saves the person from the uneasiness. Religions differ according to the differences in the temperaments of men. 'The sanguine and healthy-minded live habitually on the sunny side of the misery-line, the depressed and melancholy live beyond it, in darkness and apprehension.'⁴⁵ Some persons are hard, some soft; some are proud, some are humble. It appears that there are different functions in the organism of humanity allotted to different types of men, so that some may really be the better for a religion of consolation and reassurance; others are better for one of terror and reproof.⁴⁶ But who is to tell how many types of temperament and 'sthenic affection' there are? James' classification of men into the 'tough-minded' and the 'tender-minded' is no respecter of the unity of historical religions: for such religious persons are to be found, probably, in all religions.

2. If it be assumed that the mystical element is to be counted as present to some extent in the religion of every man, then may not all religious persons in the world be grouped, conceivably, into types

⁴⁴ A. N. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, pp. 18-19.

⁴⁵ William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 135.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* p. 333.

of mystics? Something of this sort is suggested to us by Evelyn Underhill, who groups persons into the following types of mystics:⁴⁷

The temperamental mystic or symbolist

The quietistic mystic

The nature mystic

The transcendental mystic

3. 'Living forms' of religion, in the view of Heinrich Scholz, were brought into the world by the temperament and character of human individuals. 'Character on the one hand and temperament on the other are the final attainable facts upon which the origin of the religious forms of life may be reduced.'⁴⁸ Scholz does not admit that religion as a whole is the subject matter for his philosophy of religion, but only religion in the sense that it offers a philosophical problem.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ E. Underhill, *The Essentials of Mysticism and Other Essays*, pp. 2-5.

⁴⁸ Heinrich Scholz, *Religionsphilosophie*, p. 263.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* p. vii.

CHAPTER III

A DIGEST OF CLASSIFICATIONS WHICH ACCORD WITH ASPECTS OF THE 'RELIGIOUS RELATIONSHIP'

I. Foreword

For convenience in the survey of the criteria and classifications of this 'religious relationship' group, it is advantageous to divide them into three groups, and take them up in the following order: (1) Those criteria which relate closely to the religious object; (2) Those criteria which are closely linked with the religious subject, whether the individual or the group; and (3) Those criteria which are closely related to the religious needs, ideals, wants, desires, help, salvation, etc.

II. The Religious Object

1. Max Müller, the first outstanding exponent of a 'science of religion,' divided religion into three sections to conform with what he termed three forms of thought. A close examination of these three forms of thought discloses that for him the real differences among the three divisions of religion depended upon whether the view of the religious object is given in terms (1) of the phenomena of physical nature; (2) of man himself as a phenomenon; or (3) of the human self as differentiated from the phenomenal nature of man. There are, therefore, three divisions of religion:¹

- I. Physical religion
- II. Anthropological religion
- III. Psychological religion²

Müller did not arrange the individual historical religions into a scheme through the use of the foregoing criterion.

He had also other views of the classification problem. Holding that classification offered a real problem for the 'science of religion' he said:³

All real science rests on classification, and only in case we cannot succeed in classifying the various dialects of faith, shall we have to confess that a science of religion is really an impossibility.

¹ Max Müller, *Physical Religion*, pp. 1-3.

² Of all the classifiers previously reviewed in our survey, only Schleiermacher and Pfleiderer appear to have produced classifications based on views of the religious object. See pages 15-16 and footnote 32 on page 17.

³ Max Müller, *Introduction to the Science of Religion* (Collected Works) vol. XIV, p. 68.

After reviewing several old classifications and rejecting them as unsatisfactory, he advocated the use of language as a criterion: 'The only scientific and truly genetic classification of religions is the same as the classification of languages.'⁴ This meant that religions were divided into Indo-European religion, Semitic religion, and Turanian religion. However, in spite of these views he used yet another classification which, like the first one mentioned above, depended upon views of the religious object: religions were polytheistic, dualistic, monotheistic, henotheistic, and atheistic; but he placed less value on this grouping than he did upon his language classification.⁵

2. Sir John Lubbock (Lord Avebury) pointed out that the usual way to classify religions in his day was according to the nature of the object worshipped. This usual way he amended to mean 'the estimate in which the Deity is held.' His arrangement of religions was as follows:⁶

1. atheism
2. fetishism
3. nature-worship; totemism
4. shamanism
5. idolatry or anthropomorphism
6. deity, the author of, but not a part of, nature.
7. deity in which morality is associated with religion

3. According to Frank Sargent Hoffman there is an evolution in religion which is marked by the nature of the objects in man's worship—man being so made that he must worship something. The stages in the evolution of religion were:⁷ spiritism, fetishism, ancestor-worship, nature worship, polytheism, and monotheism.

4. Stages in the development of the conception of God provided the criterion of Goblet D'Alviella. The four principal stages were:⁸

- I. Nature worship; worship of the dead. The genesis of the idea of God.
- II. Polydaemonism and polytheism.
 - (a) Spiritism; fetishism; idolatry.
 - (b) The divine hierarchy.
- III. Dualism.
 - (a) The struggle for order.
 - (b) The struggle for good.
- IV. Monotheism.

⁴ Müller, op. cit. p. 82.

⁵ Ibid. p. 80.

⁶ John Lubbock, *On the Origin of Civilization and the Primitive Condition of Man*, p. 119.

⁷ F. S. Hoffman, *The Sphere of Religion*, pp. 9-36.

⁸ Goblet D'Alviella, *The Origin and Growth of the Conception of God*, (Sec. Ed.) pp. xii-xv.

5. One of the most complete classifications of the foregoing type under survey was that of Albert Reville. Having taken over the Hegelian philosophical notion of religion which he said 'best accords with the facts of history,'⁹ he deliberately sought out from the body of the history of religions what he considered to be the important elements and features of the religions, especially those related to the views of the religious object. He divided the religions as a whole into the polytheistic and the monotheistic, with subdivisions and examples as follows:¹⁰

I. Polytheistic religions.

- (1) Primitive religion of nature.
- (2) Animistic and fetishistic religions:
Eskimos; Finns; Tartars; American Indians.
- (3) Great national mythological religions.
Greeks; Babylonians; Japanese; Chinese; Egyptians; Ninevites; Gauls; Italians; Germans; Mexicans; Peruvians.
- (4) Polytheistic-legalistic religions.
Brahmanism; Mazdaism; Religion of Confucius and Laotzu.
- (5) The religion of redemption: universalistic or international.
Buddhism: in principle non-polytheistic but actually polytheistic.

II. Monotheistic religions.

- (1) Judaism, descended from Mosaism, legalistic and nationalistic.
- (2) Islam, legalistic and international.[?]
- (3) Christianity, a religion of redemption, and international.

6. According to George Galloway, 'on a large view religion passes through three great stages.' These are spiritism, polytheism, and monotheism.¹¹ However, to show the 'historic evolution of religion itself,' he also makes use of the division into tribal, national, and universal religions.¹²

7. T. H. Robinson depends, for his basic divisions, upon the views of the religious object, but attempts to compare and classify religions after the manner of the biological classification of living things, thus arranging them but without 'ultimate definition.' His resultant scheme is somewhat as follows:

⁹ A. Reville, *Prolegomena of the History of Religions*, p. 20.

¹⁰ Ibid. pp. 100-101.

¹¹ G. Galloway, *Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 242-243.

¹² Galloway, op. cit. pp. 88-152. Galloway reviews the question of classification in the article 'Religion' in the Fourteenth Edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. He mentions the classifications of Hegel, E. Caird, Tiele, and Siebeck; admits that 'there is no generally accepted scheme,' then offers, as of some value, the division into tribal, national, and universal religions. However, in the article itself he treats the subject of religion under such headings as polytheism, prophetic religion, and redemption religion. (vol. XIX, p. 11).

Parent	Divisions	Further Differentiations
	(A) Totemism	1. Egyptian religion (?)
	(B) Fetishism	
	(C) Polydaemonism	1. Nature worship
		Egyptian religion (?)
		Teutonic religion
		Celtic religion
		Greek religion
		Greek philosophy
		Persian religion
		Zoroastrianism
		Indian religion
		Buddhism
		Hinduism
		2. Local or tribal monolatry
		Judaism
		Islam
		Christianity
		Mesopotamian religion
		Egyptian religion (?) ¹³

8. Conrad von Orelli, after reviewing the classifications of Hegel and Pfeleiderer, formulated one on the order of what he called 'a theological step-ladder.' It combined the attitudes toward the religious object with the Hegelian interpretation of the religious factor in nature and man.¹⁴ Although he drew up the theological classification below, and incorporated it in his history of religion, he actually made use of another for the presentation of his history: one based upon 'sprache,' 'ethnographie,' and 'geographische Gesichtspunkt.'¹⁵ This is the step-ladder classification:

I. Nature-encompassed or heathenish religions.

- (1) Worship of fortuitous things in nature: fetishism. Africa.
- (2) Worship of nature powers and spirits: animism. America; Africa.
- (3) Worship of general powers of nature: polytheism. Egypt; Canaan; Babylonia, and others.
- (4) Worship of nature according to general decrees: star worship; Babylonia; Egypt.
- (5) Worship of nature as such: pantheism. Brahmanism; India.
- (6) Worship of nature's undoing: Buddhism.
- (7) Worship of the physio-ethical power of goodness: Parseeism.
- (8) Worship of aesthetico-moral powers: Greeks.
- (9) Worship of politico-moral powers: Romans.

¹³ T. H. Robinson, *An Outline Introduction to the History of Religions*, pp. xii; 1-2. Since he did not know what to do with Egyptian religion, he placed it tentatively in three places.

¹⁴ Conrad von Orelli, *Allgemeine Religionsgeschichte*, (Sec. Ed.) pp. 16-17.

¹⁵ He grouped religions, in his history, under seven general heads: Turanian, Hamitic, Semitic, Indo-European, African, American, and Oceanic. For religions listed under each of the seven heads, see his classification in full on pages 39-40.

II. Nature-free religions.

- (1) Worship of the supernatural according to his exaltedness over the creature: Mosaism.
- (2) Worship of the supernatural according to his reconciliation with the creature: Christianity.
- (3) Worship of the supernatural according to his law in nature: Islam.

9. The eminent historian George Foot Moore holds (1) that religions are to be divided for their historical presentation into two groups—civilized and uncivilized or ‘primitive’—because ‘each group requires its own method’;¹⁶ (2) that there are spiritual epochs in religious history;¹⁷ (3) that there is a difference between a ‘history of religions’ and a ‘history of religion’;¹⁸ and (4) that there is a general trend of evolution which warrants the more comprehensive conception of a ‘history of religion.’ This trend in the ‘history of religion’ is marked by

- (1) Local and natural religions;
- (2) National polytheisms.

Developments toward unification of creative power of first principle; demand for moral order of the world tends toward monotheism.

- (3) Monotheism. Increased interest in the after life, immortality, consequences for deeds and desire to escape. A new kind of religion arises:
- (4) Universal religion, which is addressed to the individual. Salvation lifts man to the sharing of blessedness with the gods.¹⁹

10. C. H. Toy, Alban G. Widgery, and Martin Schlunk believe it possible to deal with historical religions through the discovery or selection of points which are common to all religions. Toy held that classification according to any one principle is inadequate; that differences and resemblances are often beyond explanation; and that since principles of classification impair the individuality and unitary character of cults that the best way out is to compare each common feature. His five points²⁰ selected for comparison are all aspects of the ‘man-god’ religious relation: i. e. they deal with the religious object, religious subject, religious needs and satisfactions. Under such a plan no formal classification of religions is provided. Widgery selected six points²¹ or considerations for his ‘typical’ classification; Schlunk had five points.²² All of these points are aspects

¹⁶ G. F. Moore, *History of Religions*, vol. I, p. v.

¹⁷ Ibid. pp. viii-ix.

¹⁸ Ibid. pp. vii-viii.

¹⁹ Ibid. p. viii (adapted).

²⁰ C. H. Toy, *Introduction to the History of Religions*, pp. 569-570.

²¹ A. G. Widgery, *The Comparative Study of Religions*, p. 20.

²² M. Schlunk, *Die Weltreligionen und das Christentum*, Part II.

of the religious relationship. Again, no classification for religions as wholes is provided.

11. Of little influence is the division into 'deistic religion' and 'theistic religion' selected by Raoul de la Grasserie in preference to twenty-two other principles of classification. Although he made no application of his chosen principle to the religions of history, his imposing list of principles which he rejected gained considerable publicity. His list follows:²³

1. Religions human and divine: depending on whether 'le cult s'adresse a l'homme plus ou moins divinise ou a des dieux plus ou moins humaines.'
2. Religions revealed or non-revealed.
3. Religions of individual, family, nation, or international.
4. Religions legalistic or non-legalistic.
5. Religions concrete or abstract. (primitive is concrete)
6. Religions anthropomorphic and non-anthropomorphic.
7. Religions pantheistic and theistic.
8. Religions polytheistic and monotheistic.
9. Religions egoistic and altruistic.
10. Religions mythical and non-mythical.
11. Religions moral and non-moral.
12. Religions open and occult.
13. Religions of the educated and uneducated.
14. Religions of civilized and uncivilized.
15. Religions political and non-political.
16. Religions for men and religions for women.
17. Religions natural and religions founded.
18. Religions pure and religions syncretic.
19. Religions indigenous and imported.
20. Religions with literature and without literature.
21. Religions sacerdotal and non-sacerdotal.
22. Religions individualistic and socialistic.

If the above-listed principles are grouped with reference to aspects of the religious relationship the result is as follows:

- I. Those pertaining to the religious object:
Numbers 1, 6, 7, 8.
- II. Those pertaining to the religious subject:
Numbers 3, 17, 19, 22: Individual and group reference.
Numbers 4, 15, 21: Political reference.
Numbers 9, 11: personal-ethical reference.
Numbers 2, 5, 10, 13, 14, 18, 20: cultural and literary reference.
- III. Those pertaining to religious needs, etc.:
Numbers 12, 16.

In group I above only number eight has had any considerable influence among classifiers; and it has been highly elaborated, as we have seen in the survey. In group II above only number fourteen,

²³ Raoul de la Grasserie, *Des Religions Comparées au Point de vue Sociologique*, pp. 352-370.

usually with the meaning of number twenty, has been used to any extent. Those in group III are without consequence. In the entire list of La Grasserie not one offers a criterion of influence other than those which had already been more adequately presented by someone else.

III. *The Religious Subject*

1. C. P. Tiele (1830-1902) was much impressed by the moral and ethical qualities in religions. However he viewed those qualities through a frame of reference represented by a 'religious idea' which he held had expressed itself in an evolutionary manner throughout history. Religions with their moral and ethical qualities—or without them—were to him but the steps in the evolution of this 'religious idea.' His major divisions of the field were: 'nature religions,' in which the ethical elements are either absent or practically so; and 'ethical religions,' in which man reaches to a full consciousness of the superiority of the human mind over nature.²⁴ The great transition in the religions of history makes its first appearance when the ethical is seen in polytheism. Tiele's classification enjoyed a world-wide influence for a considerable period. It passed through several revisions but the main features remained the same. The most complete and latest revision is the classification given below.²⁵

I. Nature religions.

- (1) Polyzoic naturalism (hypothetical).
- (2) Polydemonistic-magical religions under the control of animism (religion of savages).
- (3) Purified or organized magical religions.
Therianthropic polytheism.
 - (a) Unorganized. Religion of the Japanese, Dravidians, Finns, Esths, ancient Arabs, ancient Pelasgi, old Italian peoples, Etruscans (?) and the ancient Slavs.
 - (b) Organized religions of the half-civilized peoples of America, ancient Chinese state-religion, and religion of the Egyptians.
- (4) Worship of beings in human form, but of superhuman power and half-ethical nature. Anthropomorphic polytheism. Religions of the Vedic Indians, Assyrians, advanced Semites, Kelts, Germans, Hellenes, Greeks, and Romans.

II. Ethical religions (spiritualistic ethical religions of revelation).

- (1) National nomistic (nomothetic) religious communions. Taoism, Confucianism, Brahmanism, Jainism, Mazdaeism, Mosaism and Judaism, the last two already passing into—

²⁴ C. P. Tiele, *Elements of the Science of Religion*, p. 105.

²⁵ J. E. Carpenter, 'Religions,' *Enc. Brit.* (Eleventh Ed.).

- (2) Universalistic religious communions. Buddhism, Christianity, Islam with its particularistic and nomistic elements only partially belongs to this group.²⁶

2. Some classifications followed the method of using as a criterion the various social aggregates which the world affords, particularly those which embodied political and cultural allegiances. These aggregates were believed to correspond closely with the human aggregates in the history of religion. A movement in this direction appeared first in the 'national' and 'universal' division of religions offered by A. Kuenen: 'There certainly are universal religions; and it surely needs no proof that they are at least as worthy of our full attention as the national religions are.'²⁷ National religions are confined to a single people or nearly related group of people, whereas the universal religions are not so limited.²⁸ Examples of national religions are Islam and the religion of the Hebrews; examples of universal religions are Buddhism and Christianity.

3. A variant of the foregoing division is that of 'minor' (or non-universal) and universal religions, offered by W. Boyd Carpenter:²⁹

By universal are to be understood those which have overlapped the borders of the country of their birth, and have proved themselves capable of ministering to men of different races and lands; in distinction from those the history of whose life has been within the limits of the land which gave them birth.

Included in the 'minor' religions are the religions of Mexico, Israel, and Greece; universal religions are represented by Islam, Buddhism, and Christianity.

4. The most fully-developed classification of the foregoing type was that of Allan Menzies: religions of history are tribal, national, and universal, and are grouped as follows:³⁰

I. Tribal religion.

The religion of the early world.

II. National religion.

(A) Isolated national religions.

1. Babylonian and Assyrian religion.

2. Chinese religion.

3. Religion of ancient Egypt.

(B) Semitic religion.

1. Canaanite and Phoenician religion.

2. Religion of Israel.

3. Islam.

²⁶ An early form of this classification appeared in Tiele's article 'Religion' in the Ninth Edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

²⁷ A. Kuenen, *National Religions and Universal Religions*, p. 2.

²⁸ *Ibid.* p. 5.

²⁹ W. B. Carpenter, *The Permanent Elements of Religion*, p. 63.

³⁰ A. Menzies, *History of Religion*, (Sec. Ed.) See table of contents.

(C) Aryan religion.

1. Teutonic religion.
2. Religion of Greece.
3. Religion of Rome.
4. Religion of India.
Vedic; Brahman; Buddhist.
5. Religion of Persia.

III. Universal religion.

1. Christianity.

5. This classification given above, at least so far as the criterion is concerned, was accepted by Galloway,³¹ D. Miall Edwards,³² and E. D. Soper.³³ Hastings Rashdall substituted 'personal' for 'universal.'³⁴ G. W. Cooke expanded the conventional three to include five divisions: communal and tribal religion, feudal religion, national religion, international religion (which overflows birth boundary), and universal religion, which exists only as a social idea. Cooke held the view that 'religion is of social origin, and, in its beginnings, is an emotional expression of the relations of a group to its environing world.'³⁵

IV. Religious Needs, Satisfactions, etc.

1. According to G. T. Ladd, religions bear a close relation to the rational ideal, and have passed through two stages: (1) The stage of 'differentiation' into religions, when differences are caused by physical environment and by psychical differences in the races; (2) The stage of 'unification' in religions, when contradictions are eliminated by amalgamation and syncretism.³⁶ Albert Schweitzer and R. E. Hume found their criterion in the 'Christian Ideal.' Schweitzer grouped religions into rivals and non-rivals of his own faith, which leaves Christianity out of the list:³⁷

I. Non-rivals of Christianity

1. Zoroastrianism
2. Islam
3. Israel

II. Rivals of Christianity

1. Brahmanism
2. Buddhism
3. Hinduism
4. Religions of China

³¹ G. Galloway, *Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 88-152.

³² D. M. Edwards, *The Philosophy of Religion*, (Sec. Ed.) p. 94.

³³ E. D. Soper, *The Religions of Mankind*, (Third Ed.) p. 40.

³⁴ H. Rashdall, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 157.

³⁵ G. W. Cooke, *The Social Evolution of Religion*, p. 1-ff.

³⁶ G. T. Ladd, *Philosophy of Religion*, vol. I, pp. 165-168.

³⁷ A. Schweitzer, *Christianity and the Religions of the World*, pp. 35-37; 79-80.

Hume approached the subject of classification with a review of eleven of them, three of which he described as 'unscientific'; and the remaining eight as 'various matter-of-fact classifications.' The purpose in his comparative study of the religions is to rate religions according to the value and outlook each has for the human individual and society. However the order which he uses to present the religions as a whole is that of 'geographical origin,' which is one of the eight 'matter-of-fact' criteria mentioned above.³⁸

2. Georg Wobbermin measured religions according to the relative purity of their expressions of theistic belief.³⁹ Harald Höffding evaluated them according to the methods each used to satisfy religious wants: one group of religions sought its values by means of 'desire,' and the other by means of 'faith.'⁴⁰ The field of religion is interpreted thus:

- I. Religion as desire: animism.
 - (a) Fetishism: spirit bound to a certain object; fetishes are gods of a moment.
 - (b) Spiritism: spirit not bound to a certain object; gods are 'special.'
- II. Religion as faith: polytheism and monotheism. Gods are full-fledged, personal, and each have a name.
 - (a) Unorganized polytheism.
 - (b) Organized polytheism.
 - (c) Dualism: the 'world,' 'flesh,' and the 'devil.' 'Trinity.'
 - (d) Strict monotheism: Vedantists, Eleatics, Spinozists.

In commendation of the classification of C. P. Tiele, Höffding said:

The transition from nature religions to ethical religions has rightly been called the most important transition in the history of religion. It is far more significant than that from polytheism to monotheism, to which too great importance has often been attached.

However Höffding quickly qualified his allegiance very much when he added: 'And yet even nature religions have their ethic, for they make definite claims on man.'⁴¹

3. A. C. Conger regarded the history of the earth as epitomized in the ethical experiences of the individual; the conservation of values is cosmic; and the life and death of great religious personalities may have cosmic significance. Outstanding religions are of two kinds: those possessing great personalities, and those which possess none, and are 'racial' religions: the former include Bud-

³⁸ R. E. Hume, *The World's Living Religions* (Rev. Ed.) p. 16. See also the arrangement of materials in table of contents.

³⁹ G. Wobbermin, *Christian Belief in God* (Tr. from Third Ed. by D. S. Robinson), p. 137.

⁴⁰ H. Höffding, *The Philosophy of Religion* (Tr. by B. E. Meyer) pp. 131-157.

⁴¹ Ibid. p. 325.

dhism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity; the latter, Hinduism, Hebraism, and Confucianism.⁴²

4. Ernst Troeltsch and W. K. Wright divided religions on the basis of the type of wants exhibited by the adherents. In one group, according to Troeltsch, the wants are mostly 'material,' and in the other group the wants are strongly 'ideal.'⁴³ To Wright, the division is marked by 'concrete' wants, and 'abstract' wants as found in 'ethical religions.'⁴⁴

5. 'Salvation is the dominant note in the criteria of Bousset, Siebeck, and Eucken. For Bousset the religions group as follows:⁴⁵

- I. Religion of savages. Tribal religion.
- II. National religion.
- III. Religion of the prophets.
- IV. Religion of the law.
 - (a) Judaism
 - (b) Zoroastrianism
 - (c) Islam
- V. Religions of redemption.
 - (a) Buddhism ?
 - (b) Platonism
- VI. Religion of morality and redemption.
 - (a) Christianity

For Siebeck there is within the religious consciousness of man 'the co-operation and inner activity of two conceptions. . . . One of them is the conviction of the existence of God upon whom the good or evil condition of man depends, and to whom men in a definite, purposeful relationship can place themselves . . . ; the other is found in the consciousness and comprehension of the reality of misery.'⁴⁶ There stands out in the history of religions a thorough-going difference as between religions of 'world-affirmation' and religions of 'world-denial.' There is a reciprocal action (*Wechselwirkung*) of the two definite fundamental ideas (*Grundgedanken*) in the unfolding of history. Religions represent this action, and are of three types:

- I. Nature religions: world affirmation, and without ethical significance.
- II. Morality religion. This includes religions of Mexicans, Peruvians, Akkadians, Chinese, Egyptians, East Indians, Persians, Teutons, Romans, Greeks (highest), and Judaism, which is at the point of transition to the next stage.

⁴² A. C. Conger, *A Course in Philosophy*, p. 537.

⁴³ E. Troeltsch, *Christian Thought*, pp. 22-29. Christianity is not absolute but 'relative.'

⁴⁴ W. K. Wright, *A Student's Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 4-6.

⁴⁵ W. Bousset, *What is Religion?* (Tr. by F. B. Low) p. 27.

⁴⁶ H. Siebeck, *Lehrbuch der Religionsphilosophie*, pp. 48-50.

III. Redemption religion. This is the stage of world-denial. Buddhism is one-sided and negative in outlook. Christianity is positive and redemptive and overcomes the world. Islam is a reversion (Rückfall) toward the stage of morality religion.

And Eucken says: 'He who wishes to ascertain the intrinsic truth of religion need neither trace its blurred beginnings . . . nor pursue its slow ascent, but may take his stand upon the summit of its development.'⁴⁷ Having taken his stand among the 'higher' religions, Eucken differentiates two groups among them: (1) religions of law, and (2) religions of redemption. The religions of redemption include (a) the religion of India, and (b) Christianity.⁴⁸

This concludes a brief survey of the criteria which were rather closely related to the aspects of the 'man-god' relationship—the religious object, the religious subject, religious wants, salvation, etc. In the preceding chapter we examined those criteria which were rather closely related to the 'religious consciousness.' In the following chapter the survey will be concluded, after which a critical appraisal of the criteria as a whole, and as to the most prominent types, will be made. Then we shall be in a position to conclude what future course is to be used to carry our enterprise to completion.

⁴⁷ R. Eucken, *The Truth of Religion*, (Tr. by W. T. Jones), p. 1.

⁴⁸ Ibid. pp. 10-11.

CHAPTER IV

A DIGEST OF CLASSIFICATIONS WHICH ACCORD WITH ASPECTS OF THE RELIGIONS' ENVIRONMENT

The group of classifiers which follows includes those who seek order among the religions through the use of the criteria of language, race, geography, and culture—either singly or in combination.

I. Language

According to Max Müller 'the only scientific and truly genetic classification of religions is the same as the classifications of language.'¹ To him this meant that the historical religions are Indo-European, Semitic, and Turanian. In making such a claim for language Müller stood almost alone among classifiers. His own enthusiasm for the language criterion did not grow with the years however; in fact he found other classifications to be useful.²

II. Race, Ethnology

1. Religions of the group and religions of individual founders, were the kinds set forth by Whitney:³

There is no more marked distinction among religions than the one we are called upon to make between a race religion,—which, like a language, is the collective product of the wisdom of a community, the unconscious growth of generations—and a religion proceeding from an individual founder, who, as leading representative of the better insight and feeling of his time (for otherwise he would meet with no success), makes headway against formality and superstition.

2. J. F. Clarke held that each of the religions either belonged to one race or transcended one race. The former group he termed 'ethnic' and the latter 'catholic.' The line-up is:⁴

I. One-race or ethnic religions.

1. Brahmanism
2. Confucianism
3. Buddhism
4. Persian religion
5. Scandinavian religion.
6. Religion of Egypt

¹ Max Müller, *Introduction to the Science of Religion*, vol. XIV, pp. 13-14.

² See pages 23-24.

³ Whitney, *Princeton Review*, May 1881; M. Jastrow, Jr., *The Study of Religion*, p. 90; J. E. Carpenter, 'Religion,' *Enc. Brit.* (Eleventh Ed.)

⁴ J. F. Clarke, *Ten Great Religions*, pp. 2; 15-24.

7. Religion of Greece
8. Religion of Rome
- II. Transcending one race, or catholic religions.
 1. Temporary and local forms
 - Judaism
 - Mohammedanism
 2. Permanent and universal form
 - Christianity

3. In an early work, Chantepie de la Saussaye reviewed the classifications of Hegel, Müller, Tiele, Whitney, Reville, and Kuenen, and rejected them all as unsuitable for the purpose of presenting the story of the history of religions.⁵ In a later work he added Siebeck to the list criticized, presented in full the classifications of Hegel, Hartmann, Tiele, and Siebeck, but added none of his own of a similar character. Instead, he pointed out that what he needed for the purpose of his *Lehrbuch* should accord, not with the 'point of view of the essence of religion, but according to the ethnographical and historical cohesion of the peoples of the earth.'⁶ Religions appear in his work under six divisions as follows:

- I. Religion of primitive or nature peoples.
 - Africans, Americans, South Sea peoples, Mongolians.
- II. Religion of the Chinese.
 - Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism.
- III. Religion of the Japanese.
 - Buddhism, Shintoism.
- IV. Religion of the Egyptians.
- V. Religion of the Semitic peoples.
 - Babylonians, Assyrians, Canaanites, Syrians, Phoenicians, Israelites, Islam.
- VI. Religion of Indo-Europeans.
 - Religion of Indians, Jainism, Buddhism, Hinduism; religion of Persians, Greeks, Romans, Teutons, Celts, Slavs.

4. D. J. H. Ward made a special study of the problem of classifications, and then classified the classifications. He was in search of a classification which could best facilitate the study of religion. His conclusion was that Max Müller's linguistic classification was the best; but Ward interpreted it, however, as one way of classifying religions on the basis of 'racial relationship.' Defining Müller's criterion as genealogical, he proceeded to develop for himself a classification which accorded with 'ethnological relationships and historical connections.' His result is a pattern of five 'race' tables⁷ to which the religions of the world are linked. The

⁵ Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Manual of the Science of Religion*, pp. 50-56.

⁶ Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, p. 16. Christianity is omitted both from the *Lehrbuch* and the classification.

⁷ D. J. H. Ward, *The Classification of Religions*, pp. 67-70. This booklet of Ward, published in 1909, appears to be the only study in existence which deals exclusively with the problem of classifications.

five race tables, which arrange the religions, are for the Oceanic, African, American, Mongolian, and Mediterranean races.

In Ward's classification of classifications his own appears along with that of Max Müller's, under the criterion of 'racial relationships'.⁸

5. Otto Pfeiderer illustrates still further for us the tendency of classifiers to get away from criteria of the 'essence' type toward criteria of ethnology, chronology, and historical connections. Approaching the necessity of dividing the materials of the history of religions Pfeiderer had this to say:⁹

According to their extent, the religions may be divided into tribal, national and universal (world) religions. According to their nature, they fall into two main groups: nature religions and historical or moral or personal (prophetic) religions: the first of these groups may be subdivided into henotheistic (tribal) and polytheistic (national) religions; the second main group may be subdivided into religions of law and redemption. Little as may be urged against this division in theory, its practical application throughout is difficult, because it is not possible without frequent violent disruption of the historical connections. Hence, in the presentation of the history of religion, I prefer a more modest division, either the ethnological (according to race and people) or the chronological; naturally, even with this division a certain latitude must be retained for the sake of fitness.

Thus by the time he gets around to a final arrangement of the historical religions we find that he has nothing of significance for the interpretation of the field of the religions as a whole: here is his arrangement:

1. Chinese religion
2. Egyptian religion
3. Babylonian religions

⁸ Ward's classification of classifications took the following form:

- I. Classifications from preconceived assumptions or standards of authority based on philosophical or theological dogma:
 - (1) true and false
 - (2) natural and revealed
- II. Classifications from external characteristics of the religions, i. e., from the character of their individual, objective features and beliefs, or their mere names and number of adherents:
 - (1) according to the nature of the object worshipped
 - (2) according to the worshipper's estimate of their deities (Lubbock)
 - (3) according to the part played by men in their development (Whitney) (Fairbairn) (Tiele)
 - (4) geographical and statistical method
 - (a) geographical distribution
 - (b) statistics
- III. Classifications based on philosophies of religion:
Subjective (Pfeiderer)
- IV. Classifications based on racial relationships.
 - (1) genealogical relationship: linguistic affinity (Max Müller)
 - (2) ethnological relationships and historical connections (D. J. H. Ward)

⁹ O. Pfeiderer, *Religion and Historic Faiths*, p. 88. For his earlier classifications see pages 15-16.

4. Religion of Zarathustra and Mithra cult
5. Brahmanism and Gautama Buddha
6. Buddhism
7. Greek religion
8. Religion of Israel
9. Post-Exilic Judaism
10. Christianity
11. Islam

6. Efforts have been made in modern times to classify men according to natural human differences: Linnaeus, with his four 'races' based on physical, moral, psychical, and ethnological factors; Blumenbach, with his five 'races' based to a large extent on color; and more recent classifications which are based on cephalic measurements, the hair, and other biological criteria. Thus far, however, none of these efforts have been correlated intimately with the unitary character of the historical religions in any way so as to produce kinds or classes.

III. Geography

1. In R. E. Hume's comparative study¹⁰ the field of the history of religion was divided into the regions of origin. The result (omitting 'primitives') is:

- I. Religions originating in South Asia (India)
 1. Hinduism
 2. Jainaism
 3. Buddhism
 4. Sikhism
- II. Religions originating in East Asia (China)
 1. Confucianism
 2. Taoism
 3. Shinto
- III. Religions originating in West Asia (Palestine, Persia, Arabia)
 1. Judaism
 2. Zoroastrianism
 3. Islam
 4. Christianity

2. Geographers have been moved to point to a close relationship obtaining between geography and religions. Oscar Peschel was struck by the fact that the great founders of religions flourished in a limited area which he called the 'Zone of the Founders of Religions.'¹¹ Ellsworth Huntington held that climatic conditions affect human activity, ideals, and development; that climate modifies religion directly, and conditions progress. 'A map of religion does not resemble a map of civilization, no matter what religion is em-

¹⁰ R. E. Hume, *The World's Living Religions*. For his further use of classifications see pages 31-32.

¹¹ O. Peschel, *Völkerkunde*, pp. 324-336.

ployed.' There are differences in religions which are traceable to climate.¹² Vidal de la Blache pointed out that in an impact of cultures the resultant modifications exhibit the influence of particular physical environments: Mohammedanism he held to be a good example. Whereas Huntington viewed religion and culture as being modified directly by the climate, Vidal de la Blache saw religion resting upon culture, and culture upon the physical environment. In substantial agreement with Peschel, he said: 'It is safe to say that there are parts of the earth where religious systems have had special facilities for expansion.'¹³

IV. Language-Race-Geography

Faced with the problem of dividing and presenting the field of the history of religions in his *Allgemeine Religionsgeschichte*, Conrad von Orelli set aside his newly-constructed 'theological step-ladder' classification,¹⁴ and used in its stead one which he said accorded with the factors of 'sprache,' 'ethnographie,' and 'der geographische Gesichtspunkt.' His result was an arrangement of the field of religions into seven groups:¹⁵

- I. Turanian group.
 1. Religion of the Chinese.
 2. Religion of the Mongol-Tartar, Finns, and Japanese.
- II. Hamitic family.
 1. Religion of ancient Egypt.
- III. Semitic family.
 1. Religion of Babylonia and Assyria.
 2. Religion of Phoenicians, Canaanites, and Carthaginians.
 3. Religion of Aramaeans, Ammonites, Moabites, Edomites, Arabs.
 4. Religion of Israel and Semites.
 5. Christianity.
 6. Manichaeism.
 7. Religion of the Mandaeans.
 8. Islam.
- IV. Indo-European family.
 1. Indian religions (Vedic, Brahmin, Buddhist, Jainist and Hindu).
 2. Religion of Parsees.
 3. Religion of Greeks.
 4. Religion of Romans.
 5. Religion of Celts.

¹² Ellsworth Huntington, *Civilization and Climate*, p. 301; cf. p. xi; p. 291-ff. and pp. 389-390.

¹³ Vidal de la Blache, *Principles of Human Geography* (Tr. by Bingham), pp. 336; 341-342.

¹⁴ Second Edition, Vol. I, pp. 13-19. For his 'step-ladder' classification see page 26.

¹⁵ Adapted from table of contents in volume I.

6. Religion of Teutons.
7. Religion of Slavs.
- V. African group.
 1. Religion of Negro Africa.
- VI. American group.
 1. Religion of savage Indians.
 2. Religion of Mexicans.
 3. Religion of Peruvians.
- VII. Oceanic group.
 1. Religion of Australians.
 2. Religion of Tasmanians.
 3. Religion of Melanesians.
 4. Religion of Micronesians.
 5. Religion of Polynesians.

V. Culture

1. F. B. Jevons divided religions into 'customary' and 'positive'—the former group marked by the influence of tradition and custom of peoples; the latter, by the teaching and commandments of the founders. The former includes most of the religions of the past; the latter, Christianity, Mohammedanism, and Buddhism.¹⁶ Morris Jastrow held that religions belong to definite phases of cultural and moral development. He described the historical phases to which religions belong, after the following manner:¹⁷

- I. Religions of savage culture. Somewhat hypothetical.
- II. Religions of primitive culture. Animism. Magic.

Ancestor worship. Examples:

 - Religion of Teutons
 - Religion of Mexicans
 - Religion of Peruvians
 - Religion of North American Indians
 - Religion of Polynesians
 - Religion of Finno-Tartaric peoples
- III. Religion of advanced culture. A close bond exists between religion and morality and there is an accentuation of the legal factor. Examples:

Religions of Babylonia, Egypt, China, ancient India, Greece, Rome, Hebrews.
- IV. Religion co-extensive with life. A single standard for all conduct both public and private.

The product of prophetic movements. Examples:

 - Judaism
 - Buddhism
 - Zoroastrianism
 - Christianity
 - Islam

¹⁶ F. B. Jevons, *An Introduction to the History of Religions*, p. 1.

¹⁷ Morris Jastrow, Jr., *The Study of Religion*, pp. 98-117.

2. In the approach to his criterion of classification Maurice Vernes sharply criticized the philosopher's abuse of the history of religion, pointing out that the history of the different religions required its own method. He placed such abuse of the historical method at the door of the 'comparativists.'¹⁸ Tiele and Albert Reville are singled out for special attack because they stood at the head of the general historical studies of the time, and had by their ardent support of the philosophical doctrine of evolution grossly misused the historical materials. They had classified religions according to internal or subjective characteristics, and made their classification depend upon one's subjective appreciation of the value of each fact in comparison with that which was considered ideal religion.¹⁹

Let historians of religion throw aside without hesitation all the baggage of categories and distinctions of philosophy, such as between religion animistic, polytheistic, and monotheistic; between religions national and individual, and religions universal, between religions of a book and religions of nature!

The only classification which Vernes was disposed to admit was well-founded for the field of the history of religions was that which divided religions into the 'uncivilized' and the 'civilized,' and which gave due regard to the demands of geography and the developments of history.²⁰ Each religion should be placed according to its stage of civilization.²¹ If we place Vernes' nine divisions of his subject-matter under his major divisions, which may be reckoned as aspects of culture, the result is:

- I. Religions of savage and uncivilized: (one group).
- II. Religions of civilized peoples: (eight groups):
 1. Religions of Egypt and 'l'Asie anterieure' (Assyria, Babylonia, Syria, Phoenicia).
 2. Religions of India and of Persia.
 3. Religions of Greece and Italy.
 4. Religions of Germans, Celts, and Slavs.
 5. Judaism and Christianity.
 6. Islam.
 7. Religion of China and the Far East.
 8. Religions of America.

If we may interpret 'uncivilized' and 'civilized' as terms representing stages of culture, then George Foot Moore should be included in this group of classifiers.²² Also E. W. Hopkins ought to

¹⁸ Maurice Vernes, *L'Histoire des Religions*, pp. 67-94.

¹⁹ Ibid. p. 60.

²⁰ Ibid. p. 62-ff.

²¹ Ibid. p. 66.

²² G. F. Moore, *History of Religions*, Vol. I, pp. vii-viii.

be included, who said: 'We shall consider religions solely as expressions of various stages of culture found among various races.'²³ However, in so far as the unitary character of historical religions is concerned, and the relation of each to the field as a whole, neither the arrangement of Moore nor that of Hopkins offered any significant order whatever.

Having now concluded our survey of the classifications of the past, we next turn to the consideration of the relation of classifiers and their criteria to history, to the religious factor, and to method.

²³ E. W. Hopkins, *History of Religions*, p. 10.

CHAPTER V

THE RELATION OF CLASSIFIERS AND CRITERIA TO HISTORY, RELIGIOUS FACTOR, AND METHOD

I. Classifiers and the 'History of Religion' versus 'History of Religions'

A clear distinction has long since been recognized by some scholars, as between a 'history of religions' and a 'history of religion.' Maurice Vernes credited C. P. Tiele with having observed the difference between them, but Vernes criticized Tiele adversely for not using such distinction in his treatment of the 'history of religion': Tiele lapsed into philosophical speculations about the first religious intuitions of man, and allowed such primacy to usurp the place of history:¹

M. Tiele, to be sure, made one reservation, which is to be taken into account. It is not 'history of religions' which he proposes that the materials indicate; it is the 'history of religion.' The former has for its object the recounting of the destiny and modifications of the various religions; the second is given the task of determining how religion—that is to say, the general relationship between man and the super-human powers in which he believes—is developed in the course of the ages, with the different peoples and families of peoples and by those in the womb of humanity. But only when the author approaches to a classification of the principal religions can the distinction which he invokes be held as purely a formal one.

G. F. Moore, in his *History of Religions*, called attention to a distinction between a 'history of religions' and a 'history of religion.' The latter he defined at some length:²

The student who attentively surveys the whole field can hardly fail to discern a unity in the diversity, a general trend of evolution, which warrants the more comprehensive conception of a history of religion. Local and natural religions fuse in national polytheisms; the progress of civilization in varying degrees moralizes religion; mythology and nascent philosophy take up the problem of cosmogony, and are led to unify the creative power or the first principle; the demand for unity in the moral order of the world also tends toward monotheism; vague notions of continuance after death give place to more vivid imaginations; the lot of mortals appears more dismal in contrast to that of the gods; the belief in divine retribution or in the inexorable consequence of deeds is extended beyond this life; man struggles to escape his des-

¹ Maurice Vernes, op. cit. pp. 37-38; 48; 60.

² Vol. I, pp. vii-viii.

tiny, and demands of religion that it shall show him the way and give him the assurance of deliverance. Thereupon a new kind of religion arises in which men ask, not to be satisfied with the good things of this life, but to be exalted above the limitations of humanity or to be saved from the consequences of deeds, and, positively, to share the blessedness of the gods or to attain to union with the godhead. Salvation may be sought—to adopt the Indian analysis—by the way of works, or of knowledge, or of faith; and the methods vary accordingly. Religions of this type address themselves to the individual, and are therefore, logically, ways of salvation for all men, without distinction of nation or race; they often formed organized religious communities and spread by missionary effort; the teachings of the founders are collected in a canon of authoritative scriptures and systematized in a body of doctrine, practical or philosophical.

We hold it significant that both Vernes and Moore, in their description of the 'history of religion' refer to the religious factor as of fundamental importance: Vernes, in 'the general relationship between man and the superhuman powers'; Moore, in the evolution in the conception of the gods, the unity of creative power and the moral order of the world, etc.

Both Vernes and Moore found *evolution* in history in connection with the religious factor; but when it came to supplying their respective histories with a classification on such a basis, they both fell back upon 'culture': the 'civilized' and 'uncivilized.' We ask in this situation: If there is historical evolution in the conception of the superhuman powers in the 'history of religion,' is such historical evolution absent from the 'history of religions'? Is it absent from the history of the religion of any one people, say the Greeks, or Hebrews, or Chinese? How can there be evolution in the whole field of religion, on the basis of the interpretations of the religious factor, and there not also be an evolution in each part of the whole field? And yet Vernes and Moore did not provide for their histories of different peoples a classification that showed the individualities of religions within the great regional bodies of religious experience, or in the field as a whole. Is Indian religion, for example, from 1000 B. C. onward to the present day to be reckoned as one, two, six, or forty religions? Just what, for them, constitutes, within such a body of religious history, a single historical religion? If a single historical religion entire cannot be identified or isolated in history, then how is it possible ever scientifically to classify the individual religions?

When Vernes and Moore, in their classification of the history of religions, abandoned the religious factor as a criterion in favor of one of 'culture,' they evaded the real issue or problem: 'culture' appears to find its own meaning in the religion; how then is it pos-

sible for 'culture' to help us out in our problem?³ 'Culture' itself has never been classified in any way that has proved religiously significant. Religion, however, has characteristics: it is marked by attitudes, concepts, meanings, interpretations, touching the fortunes and destiny of men in their struggle of human living. They are developed in the crucible of continuing human experience. To depend upon 'culture' as a criterion of a classification is to depend upon a concept which cannot in itself represent any people's understanding of God or any other religious 'power.' If the individual religions are to find their places in a religious classification of religions, shall it not be by means of the actual concepts developed in identifiable bodies of human experience?

If Vernes and Moore found their classification of religions into 'uncivilized' and 'civilized' to be adequate for their respective histories of 'religions,' why was their classification not also adequate for the 'history of religion,' inasmuch as the latter is composed of the former? The fact is their criterion is inadequate: what is needed is a criterion that is the same both for the whole of the field ('history of religion') and for its component parts ('history of religions'). Surely, if the evolution of religion is real in the whole field, it must share this development of religion in the separate and historically parallel divisions of the whole field. If this be not so, one may be inclined to surmise that what has passed for evolution in the 'history of religion' has been not so much critical history as a speculative philosophy of history.

The criteria of most of the classifiers in our survey (reviewed in chapters two, three, and four) are, by their very natures, not related to the 'history of religions' but to the 'history of religion.' Philosophers and theologians have been concerned to know what contributions the religious experience of mankind has to offer to aid man in his religious outlook and adjustments today. Some of these classifiers were historians who treated the field as a collection of separate stories. It is very necessary, of course, that historians faithfully present the religious history of the different peoples as separate stories; however, their criteria of classification have, in the main, evaded the religious factor, and embraced other factors such as climate and culture. But if the philosopher of religion, the theologian, and the psychologist of religion depend upon the historian of religion for the story of the 'history of religion' as a whole; if the historian recognizes that there is an evolution that is historical, and that there are historical stages in the great field (as Moore says), and at the same time the historian fails to discover the cri-

³ For historical treatment of 'culture' see chapter VI.

terion which orders all of the separate historical religions into a scientific and historical pattern; then what are the theologians, philosophers, and psychologists to do in such a situation? The answer is: they must get along as best they can, and that is what has happened. The problem of providing a scientific classification of religions is that of the historian: it may be the problem of the philosopher and theologian to exploit the resources of the history of religion, but it is not their problem to devise classifications which in themselves basically interpret historical religion; it is the task of historians to discover the order that exists in the historical phenomena: that order, whatever it may be, provides the basic interpretations, from which come the divisions, classes, and sub-classes of historical religion. The historian's task is unfinished until he has found out, from the historical materials, what a historical religion as a whole actually is, and the sort of pattern all such religions present, when the character of such religions has been allowed to identify them.

II. The Religious Factor and the Two Aspects of Historical Religion

What relation have all the criteria which we have examined, since the days of Hegel and Schleiermacher, to the all-important 'factor' in the 'history of religion'?

In the manner we grouped them all for this digest-survey there were three aggregations of classifications: Those which may be conveniently related (1) to aspects of the 'religious consciousness'; (2) to aspects of the 'man-god' relationship; and (3) to aspects of the religions' environments.

If we but go one step further and consider these three groups of classified criteria in relation to the nature and purpose of a 'history of religion' and of a 'history of religions' we may then classify the classified criteria as follows:

- I. Criteria primarily concerned with the 'history of religion.'
 - (1) Criteria related to aspects of the 'religious consciousness.'
 - (2) Criteria related to aspects of the 'man-god' relationship.
- II. Criteria primarily concerned with the 'history of religions.'
 - (1) Criteria related to aspects of the religions' environments.

III. The Historical Method

As we pointed out in the preliminary introduction,⁴ it is of the very nature of science that it is interested in 'classes.' A scientific treatment of historical religions, therefore, involves such a thing as 'classes of religions.' Human history has been the great laboratory

⁴ p. 3.

experiment in religious adjustments, with religious knowledge deriving from such religious adjustments. To gain this knowledge it is necessary for us to call upon the 'history of religions' in order to find out about the interpretation of the religion of mankind. It is impossible to call upon all of the religions there were, but it is possible to call upon those about which information is available. And those which are available, we believe, represent more than an adequate sampling.

A classification is expected to show what has been the nature of the evolution of religion in history, from the interpretative standpoint. Although such information is possible only through the combining of the contributions of the 'religions' in 'a history of religions,' such a product is, we believe, of supreme importance to the 'history of religion' with which a scientific classification is concerned: not only is there achieved thereby the discovery of the *nature of the interpretation of all religion in one great pattern, but also the actual interpretative status of any one separate 'religion' in its particular historical sphere.*

Conclusion: Can the 'history of religions' be made to yield up to the investigator just what it is in the body of historical interpretations, contributed by the various peoples, that introduces the principle of 'order' in all the religions of the past?

Before we may undertake to set forth upon such a quest there still remains the investigation and criticism of the most influential 'types' of criteria of past classifications, in relation to that which is central to the 'history of religion'—i. e. the *religious factor*. There were only three significant 'types' of criteria in the entire group which challenged our attention: the *nous*, *entitas*, and 'culture' types. To the critical examination of these types of criteria we now turn.

CHAPTER VI

HISTORICAL EVALUATION OF THE INFLUENTIAL 'TYPES' OF CRITERIA, IN RELATION TO CONCEPTS OF THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR

I. Criteria of the Nous Type; History of Nous

What is the relation of Hegel's criterial concept of the 'absolute consciousness' to actual historical concepts of the religious factor? To what great historical concepts of the religious factor did he anchor, and to what extent did he make use of them, if at all, in his classification of the religions? We need to know, in conceptual terms, what it was in the body of historical religion which Hegel used as a 'center of gravity' in his own religious views.

Much of Hegel's actual dependence upon the great concepts of the religious factor in historical religion is to be found in the Greek *nous* of Anaxagoras,¹ and the Hebrew *ruah*,² with the former dominating. Each of these concepts, at the time of its historic rise to great power, served in its own world a function similar to the other.³ Later in history when cross-fertilization of the Hebraic and Greek religious concepts occurred, a certain amount of adjustment, varying with different thinkers, was worked out by which there was a 'division of labor' and a precedence for the basic concepts from the two historical traditions. Hegel uncritically appropriated these two concepts, coming from the two different religious histories, and tied to them at a time when they were no longer performing the same function in historical religion; and despite the fact that their historical usage had once been mutually exclusive, Hegel deliberately put the two together in a mixture that was suitable to his own speculative hypothesis; such action constituted an abuse of the concepts because he thereby altered the content of these great historical concepts for his own particular purposes, although he used the actual historical terms or words as if the old historic content were being carried by these terms.⁴ Aware of the criticism made by Socrates

¹ G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of History* (Tr. by J. Sibree), pp. 53-60. This *nous*, translated as 'Vernunft' and 'reason,' is a concept of a religious factor common both to the human and non-human 'worlds.'

² Ibid. p. 58. The *ruah* appropriated here is the New Testament derivative 'pneuma' ('Geist,' 'Spirit'). Such a *ruah* is far from being the inclusive *ruah* of the sixth century B. C., when it attained its greatest power.

³ Details are found in Chapters VIII and IX.

⁴ Our historical consideration of his use of 'Geist' is not so important for our purpose as his 'Vernunft' or 'Reason' because of the precedence he gave to the latter

that Anaxagoras (fifth century B. C.) did not make full use of the Greek *nous* (religious factor), Hegel pointed out, significantly, that the *nous* in Socrates' time had become an abstraction because 'nature' had not been shown to be comprehended and exhibited in the development of *nous*. Nature, he held, was an organization produced by and from *nous*.⁵ *Nous* is 'sovereign of the world,' and it possesses an 'essential destiny' which (to accord with Hegel's 'inner logic' hypothesis) is expressed sequentially by concepts as follows:

I. As 'nature': 'nature' is a concept of religious power marking the first stage in the development of *nous*;

II. As 'individuality': 'individuality' is a concept of a religious power marking a second stage in the destiny of *nous*;

III. As 'absolute': 'absolute' is a concept of religious power marking the third and final stage in the destiny of *nous*.

But this *nous* is 'sovereign of the world' only in the 'rational' sense; there is also manifest the *ruah* or 'spiritual' aspect in the same evolution, revealing that there is a tendency ever toward a more significant consciousness-of-itself. History is an unfolding of the world of 'spirit' in the three stages mentioned above. Religions of mankind are but various expressions of the unfolding 'rational' and 'spiritual' factor in the universe.

In Hegel's classification of religions we find that Islam is omitted, possibly because it would not fit into his one-way view of the evolution in history. Christianity alone, for him, is the fullest spiritual and rational expression of historical religion.

The history of *nous* as a term, extends from the Homeric age onward. Before the sixth century B. C. it had not achieved a role as concept of the universal religious factor, nor had any other term, for that matter. *Nous* represented only one of the various abilities of a living man, chiefly his normal intellectual powers.⁶ About the sixth century B. C. there developed among the intelligentsia the view that man and the non-human shared a factor in common, a common nature; that the 'worlds' of men and of gods constituted

(*nous*). This 'Geist' or 'Spirit' is defined by him as 'self-contained existence, self-consciousness, consciousness of one's own being.' (Hegel, op. cit. p. 58). Hegel's 'Spirit' slowly rises by evolution in history toward complete self-consciousness. Where does he get this? He quotes the 'Spirit of truth' from the New Testament. But these passages (cf. John 14:17; 15:26; 16:13) in the New Testament which tell of the 'Spirit of truth,' define this 'Spirit' as but one of the blessings attributed to the 'Holy Spirit' or holy *ruah*; the 'Holy Spirit' itself being a special hypostatization of *ruah* ('pneuma'). This 'Spirit of truth' of Hegel turns out to be, historically, an extremely limited expression of a concept which was earlier that of an undifferentiated *ruah*—i. e. the religious factor in the world determining all destinies.

⁵ Hegel, op. cit. p. 53.

⁶ J. Burnet, 'Body (Greek and Roman),' *ERE*, vol. XI, p. 769-a.

only one world; that there was unity in nature. Attempts to define just what that common bond was led to a diversity of interpretations, and *nous* was but one of the words early used for this natural religious factor, affecting the destiny of all things.⁷ It appears to have been characteristic of these earliest terms for this undifferentiated religious factor, that the concept was void of any antithesis in its make-up. The notion of an antithesis in the nature of the religious factor appears to have become pronounced only in a later development.⁸

To Anaxagoras, *nous* was not, as with Aristotle, a 'prime mover' or detached factor which moves the universe or world by working from the outside. On the contrary, it is in all things, entirely homogeneous, not mixed yet permeating all things.⁹ *Nous* 'set in order all things that were to be, and that formerly were but are not, and whatever things now are.'¹⁰ It is of the nature of mind, a sort of fluid, the thinnest of all things, and is the power of knowing and moving things.¹¹ Democritus regarded it as equivalent to *psyche*. Euripides applied it to the human entity also: the *nous* of man is a portion of the heavenly ether; at death the body returns to earth and *nous* is reunited with the ethereal elements.¹²

In the later classical period Plato linked *nous* more intimately with theology. It is the means by which God worked upon a moving visible mass and brought order out of chaos, creating the world and man. God created the *psyche* of man, and in it is the *nous*. In the *Phaedo*, Plato identified two kinds of goodness: one depended upon habit, and is the goodness of the citizen; the other is dependent upon *nous* and it is the goodness of the philosopher.¹³ Plato said: 'We ought to believe that God has given it (i. e. *nous*) to each of us as a *daimon*.'¹⁴ In the *Republic*, *nous* is the eye of *psyche*, akin to the divine, and is immortal.¹⁵

With Plotinus the *nous* underwent further change. Influenced by Plato's *ideas* which he interpreted as intelligible natures of things, he held that there existed a 'trinity' composed of the One, the *nous*, and the world soul; the intelligible natures of things form

⁷ Milesians spoke of 'god-stuff'; Heraclitus of 'logos'; Empedocles of 'love-hate'; Anaxagoras of 'nous,' and so on.

⁸ See below.

⁹ G. J. Stokes, 'Aetiology,' *ERE*, vol. I, p. 156-b.

¹⁰ J. Adam, *Religious Teachers of Greece*, pp. 261-262.

¹¹ J. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, pp. 79-80.

¹² J. Adam, op. cit. p. 309.

¹³ 'Revelation' appears to come from the philosopher.

¹⁴ 90-A. To Plato this *daimon* was a sort of tutelary deity for the directing of one's life.

¹⁵ J. Adam, op. cit. p. 378.

the content of the eternal *nous*. In Plotinus we reach the interpretation of *ideas* as divine thoughts, an interpretation which lived on in Christianity. This *nous* of Plotinus, however, is not what one could call a 'personal' God.¹⁶

By the time of the Neo-Platonists, if not before, the character of the religious factor had come to be recognized in an antithetical manner. A gulf had been fixed, through interpretation, between a 'God' and his 'world,' which Plotinus himself bridged over by his 'trinity' and emanations. Christianity in the hands of the Greek and Latin fathers made Neo-Platonism its orthodox philosophy, and in so doing brought into the Christian tradition more fully than before a *Greek concept of the religious factor* which operated in the world in an antithetical manner. This system of interpretation, derived from Greek religious knowledge, became the framework for the dogmas and the mysticism of later Christianity.¹⁷ Augustine transformed the 'hierarchy' of Neo-Platonic *ideas* and emanations into a 'heavenly hierarchy' later celebrated in medieval Christianity. The entities of this hierarchy helped to establish more firmly than ever the antithesis which continued to trouble Christian thinkers in the centuries that followed, on down to the present century.¹⁸

The Realist-Nominalist controversy was concerned with, but did not solve, this old antithetical difficulty. Are universals realities or mere names? Which is the active factor: form or matter? Aquinas said it was 'form'; Duns Scotus said it was 'matter.' Is the causal factor transcendent or immanent? 'Transcendent,' said Duns Scotus; 'immanent,' said Spinoza. The salvation of men was held to be dependent upon the eucharist, and yet the medieval church was at a loss to define it to the satisfaction of many. The church taught the people that the whole thing was a 'mystery' and not explainable. Its doctrine of transubstantiation rested upon the assumption that bodies in nature had 'substance' and 'accidents': 'substance' is the underlying reality perceived only by thought, and which in the eucharist can be reached only through 'faith'; 'accidents' are the properties and attributes which inhere in the 'substance,' and which are perceptible by the senses. Christ's whole self is contained in every fragment or portion of the host or the chalice.

Hegel, like Spinoza, Descartes, and others before him, was deeply challenged by this old problem: how could 'mind' and 'matter' (or 'spirit' and 'nature'), intercommunicate? After Hegel,

¹⁶ C. J. J. Webb, 'Idea,' *ERE*, vol. VII, p. 83-b.

¹⁷ G. F. Moore, *History of Religions*, vol. II, p. 539.

¹⁸ To Thomas Aquinas, 'God' is *purus actus* ('pure action'), and also rational substance, and the world is the stage upon which the rationality is revealed.

and on down to the twentieth century, interest continued as to which is the efficient factor: form or matter, or was it both?

This very brief sketch of the history of the *nous* and some related concepts of the religious factor shows that the *nous* concept has remained alive and influential in the religious tradition from the sixth century B. C. onward to the present time, in one form or another; and that Hegel's contribution to religion was related to the antithetical problem reaching him through the channels of medieval Christianity and the classical philosophy of the Greeks, in which he was well established. He sought to heal the breach in the dual character of the religious factor by going back to the *nous* of Anaxagoras. He sought in his concept of the 'rational' and 'spiritual' absolute a solution of the problem. He sought a bridge for the two kinds of 'reason' which Kant had left behind him.

It appears, therefore, that it was incidental to the big problem of reconciling religious philosophy with the Christian 'revelation' for knowledge that Hegel's classification of religions made its appearance. We find that Hegel's thought was in the path of medieval religious tradition, but that both Hegel and medieval Christian tradition were framed in a pattern of ideas which was primarily Hellenic in character. *Nous* occupied an important place throughout the centuries; it was finally enthroned in the form of an hierarchy of entities which determine the salvation of men. *Ruah* was forced to take a less important role as a historical concept of the religious factor.¹⁹

We now raise the question: if *nous* has played such an important role in history, if it arose as the concept for the one undifferentiated religious factor in the world, and religions as 'systems' were built upon it, then what of its use as a criterion of classification? Has it the historical ability to bring or identify order in the world of religions?

We know that *nous* as a factor concept did not exist in Greek religion until about the sixth century B. C., which fact excludes from its historical reach the religion of the Homeric and Hesiodic times. After the sixth century we know that *nous*, although not the only term in use, did have as a historical concept the power to represent or identify all historical religions as wholes, indigenous to the Greek world, which did build upon the assumption of the religious unity of man and nature. *Nous* (or its class-term equivalents), as a criterial concept of the religious factor, possessed the historical role of an integrating factor concept: we know of no religious concepts which were not at one time subsidiary to it. *Nous*, therefore, may be used

¹⁹ The history of the *ruah* concept is reviewed in chapter VIII.

to identify such religions as Orphism, Pythagoreanism, Platonism, Neo-Platonism, Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Christianity after the second century. *Nous* may not, however, be used to identify the religion of earlier Aegean peoples of the Bronze Age, or of the Homeric and Hesiodic ages.

Another question arises also. Inasmuch as historical phenomena of a similar character may be found in the religious history of other great peoples, we shall need to use terms by which one may be able to recognize the kind of religion which flourished in the Hellenic world before the belief in the religious unity appeared, and afterward—following the sixth century B. C.—in the Greek world. Because the earlier Greeks (before the sixth century B. C.) had not yet identified the *human* religious factor and the *non-human* religious factor, we shall, for our purpose here, term such religion to be in the *two-factor stage*; after that time, when the religious factor is held to be common to man and the non-human, and there is but one realm of the religious factor, we shall identify, for our purpose here, such religion to be in the *one-factor stage*.²⁰

As we have seen, Hegel did not use as a criterion to classify religions a concept of the religious factor which he found embedded in the body of historical religion. Instead, he resorted to a non-historical concept—the absolute, and its growing self-consciousness. Hegel did not attempt to use the historical *nous* for purposes of classification, although he depended upon it very much in his understanding of religious history. However, if Hegel had chosen to classify religions through the use of the historically fertile *nous* as his criterion, he could have used it accurately to represent only the *one-factor* religions of the Hellenic religious tradition. He could not have used it as an effective historical criterion even for earlier *two-factor* religions of the Greeks; nor could he have used it accurately to identify any kind of historical religion in any non-Greek body of religious knowledge.

Summary. Instead of allowing the history of religion, with its stages of evolution fixed by the interpretations of the religious factor, to determine its own divisions or differentiations through its own concepts, in a genetic classification, Hegel resorted to a speculative concept regarding the inner nature of the religious factor, and dethroned the actual historical concepts of the religions themselves, forcing them to 'fetch and carry' for his unique speculative philosophy of history.

As Hegel's criterion of classification was not a historical but a

²⁰ Additional evidence of the evolution in the interpretation of Greek religion may be found in tracing other Greek concepts. See chapter IX.

speculative one, it was hopeless from the start that others would be able to apply an adequate historical corrective to Hegel's classification, through making use of his own foundations. As we have seen²¹ those who followed in the Hegelian tradition were never able to isolate the difficulty and point the way out: they ended in giving up the task. And our investigation has shown that they were wise in doing so: for all the amending and patching and revising in the world would not have squared a classification of religions with history so long as it did not, as with Hegel, actually rest, criterially speaking, on the historical concepts which interpreted religious factor in the world.

II. Criteria of the Entitas Type; The Limitations of 'Entity'

What is the relation of the widely-used criterion of *entitas* to the actual historical concepts of the religious factor? What historical concepts of the religious factor did the classifiers, using the 'entity' in classifications, tie to? To what extent were they influenced? In our search for answers to these questions we may be able to find that which indicates the historical strength and weakness of this criterion for purposes of classification.

The word *entitas* itself is a creation of the 'late Latins' or medieval scholastics. It referred to a thing's existence, as opposed to its qualities or relations. It meant 'a real being, whether in thought, as an ideal conception, or in fact.' Born of an age when the concept of an antithetical religious factor prevailed, it soon developed a usage as a concrete name, making it possible for it to be used to indicate 'beings' quite apart from any particular attributes and relations. It came to be used to indicate religious agencies of all grades and ranges of influence in the differentiations of the religious factor.

Classifiers, using the 'entity' for criterial purposes, surveyed the spirits, gods, demons, and other religious agencies which historical religions exhibited; took note of the relative number and influence of such; noted differences and similarities existing among the various aggregates of such 'beings,' and devised terms with which to identify the differing aggregates, outstanding agencies, etc. These named aggregates of 'beings' or 'agencies' are then arranged into an 'order' or sequence, usually from the many and relatively unimportant beings, when taken singly, to the few and relatively important entities, when taken singly. The result is a classification of religions of the *entitas* or 'being' type, which usually either divides all religions of history into the simple sections of 'polytheistic'

²¹ See Chapter II.

and 'monotheistic,' or goes further through using these two divisions as bases for further refinement.

The materials of the history of religions suffer much in the translation of the meaning of the entities in the various religions, due (1) to the lack of exactness in the meaning of the class-term for entities, say 'gods'; and (2) to the failure to translate accurately the meaning because of the translator's ignorance of the change of meaning, from one age to another, of entities which appear superficially to be similar but are actually basically different in character as religious factor expressions. Take for example the tendency among 'entity' classifiers to identify the 'tutelary deities' of Buddhism as 'gods,' and therefore Buddhism is 'polytheistic'; but to identify the 'tutelary deities' of Christianity as 'saints' and therefore Christianity is 'monotheistic!'

Another instance is the tendency among 'entity' classifiers to be so impressed by the 'god' which is a highly moralized 'nature spirit,' that such a 'god' is placed as equal and sometimes even higher in the list than a 'god' which is the chief determining one in the cosmic activity of a one-factor religion. In other words the term 'god' is used without discrimination for two quite different sorts of differentiation of religious factor. From the standpoint of the evolution of the concepts of the religious factor, entity classifications ignore the conceptual transitions in 'the growth of God' and give us rather some numerical transitions which are indeed questionable from the historical standpoint.

Not only is a 'god' an ill-defined entity for classification purposes, but the same is true for 'spirit.' Historically speaking, the 'spirit' in primitive religion may, or may not, equate with a 'spirit' in other religions, say in ancient Egyptian religion, and in Christianity. The evolutionary distinction in the meanings of 'spirit' as an entity of religious power is not manifest in entity classifications. There are many expressions used upon the world of entities:²² spiritism, naturism, polytheism, polydaemonism, naturalism, worship of the dead, worship of ancestors, worship of nature, fetishism, animism, idolatry, semi-naturalism, primitivism, naturalistic monism, and numerous others. The utter lack of fixed meanings for this body of expressions among entity classifiers means that the classification by means of the criterion of entity has remained unsatisfactory to the field of the history of religion—whatever may be said in its favor for other purposes.

²² 'Spirit' in English is derived mainly from the 'spiritus' of the Vulgate, to render the Greek *pneuma* and the Hebrew *ruah*. This has been the usage since Wyclif. 'Soul' is Old English: and, in the English Bible, is under the lordship of 'spirit.' In the medieval church the souls of men were subject to the differentiations of *nous*.

Concepts of religious entities in history are valid and genuine enough. As such they are not to be discounted: they represent interpretations of the religious factor. It is a normal development in the history of religion that man, in the pressure of religious adjustment, reifies the religious factor, makes 'beings' of its differentiations, and develops class terms for entities having similar characters. It is normal that man personalizes, hypostatizes, and otherwise humanizes, the non-human world of the religious factor; that he heroizes, apotheosizes, naturalizes, and deifies the human religious factor. Man has no choice as to whether or not he will deal with the religious factor in the world about him and in him. And we look upon human adjustments, in the religions of history, as 'natural' in the circumstances; and not 'artificial' either in the behavior as such or in the interpretations of religious behavior.

Entities in the history of religion, therefore, represent interpretations which show differentiations of the religious factor in the world.

But entity classifiers, such as those of the 'polytheistic' and 'monotheistic' type, often went astray in failing to see that the entity 'god' in every religion is but one entity in a great pattern of entities; that all of the entities of whatever kind, stand or fall together; that each and every one of them represents some differentiation of the religious factor in the world. They failed to see that the significance in any one religion is not what a 'god' or 'spirit' may be in isolation, but what such 'god' or 'spirit' meant in relation to the total group of the differentiations of the religious factor in the world, including not only the non-human powers, but all mankind, living and dead, as well. What an entity means, and how influential it is, in a religion, depends upon the relation its own nature bears to the natures of all of the other differentiations of the religious factor which are held to exist in the world of a particular religion. Entity classifiers have been too much influenced by old-time Christian theology and too little influenced by the nature of the wholeness of a historical religion. Entities placed in a classification were but part of the whole group of entities actually existing and functioning in each religion. Men, living and dead, are religious entities; but they are rather uniformly omitted in the entity classifications. And yet there is no religion without them as such entities.

Of great significance in the fortunes of individual entities in a religion, even greater than their relationship to their kindred group of entities to which we have referred, are the entities' predicaments when they happen to be caught in the throes of the evolution of religion, such as the sort of reinterpretation of religion we saw in the

shift in Greek religion from the stage of the two-factor to the one-factor religion. We ask: what happened to entities, singly or in the aggregate, if they belong to a two-factor religion, and a historical transition to one-factor religion occurs? There is but this answer: the entities, survived only in name, and such names carry new identities so far as their religious power is concerned. If, in the new orientation, an old entity seems to survive and is enlisted in the service of a new interpretation of religious factor as a whole, a closer observation will disclose that it is only the name that survived: the name now identifies an entity of different character and relationship to religious power as a whole. Entities of the living and dead people, to be sure, survive the transition only to be found having their religious characters defined in a new way, and they are all brought to harmonize with the new orientation imposed by a world-view which puts them in roles to fit the newly-found unity. Thus the entities of the living and dead people, even as the 'powers' of nature, survive as names at the cost of having the content of the names changed from what it had been. Whether 'gods' or 'demons,' living persons or the 'dead,' all entities suffered the same fate at the hands of a new religious interpretation of the religious factor as a whole. Any entity in the older religion, whether a 'power' of non-human nature, or eminent human being living or dead, either surrendered to the new order of concepts or died of desuetude.²³

What then is the utility of *entitas* as a criterion for the classification of historical religion? If (1) entities are historically conditioned by whatever whole interpretation of the religious factor, in man and non-human nature, happens to be in use; and (2) if entities are unable to preserve their old religious characters when a historical transition to a new interpretation of the religious factor as a whole occurs; then it is evident from the standpoint of the history of religion at least, that *there is no sort of entity, as such, which is qualified to act historically as a criterion for the religions of history generally*. Entities are not to be found in the body of the history of religions which are able to set the great stages in the history of religions as a whole. There is something else in the body of the history of religions which must set the framework of religions, a genetic framework in which all the gods and men are to be found. And the religions' own concepts, interpreting the religious factor in the world, should be expected to throw before us the materials for the answer, if not the very answer itself.

²³ See chapter III for entity classifications. See chapters VIII to XIII for historical data touching much of the conceptual evolution of certain great 'gods.'

III. Criteria of the 'Culture' Type

1. *The Meaning of Culture.* What has been the meaning, and what is the present meaning of the concept of 'culture'? How has 'culture' served as a criterion of classification? What is the relation between 'culture' and the religious factor?

The term 'culture' was probably first used by Francis Bacon (c. 1605). Inspired by the Renaissance he became acutely conscious of there being a wide difference among bodies of knowledge identifiable as 'Biblical tradition,' and non-Biblical 'ancient' and 'mythological' sources, such as came out of Greece, Rome, Egypt, and Babylonia. Believing that the time was ripe in his day, he set forth the project of a new 'globe of knowledge' which should be built up. Such a new 'culture' could develop through the use of a new method by which a new knowledge could be created.²⁴ Vico (c. 1725) attached culture to 'types of consciousness' exhibited by the human race, and pointed out three periods in history when (1) mythological, (2) heroic, and (3) human 'culture-consciousness' prevailed. To Vico's ideal of a unified organic humanity, Herder attached Lessing's idea of development or progress, and tried to show that history exhibited the culture-concept in two important stages in the 'progress of humanity': (1) the early stage of 'nature' people; and (2) the later stage of 'culture' people. Matthew Arnold (c. 1869) took for granted the individuality of a Greek and a Hebrew culture, and found his interest in attempting to assess values by picking out qualities based upon the differences in the old cultures rather than in their similarities.

Whereas Bacon had been interested in the possibility of a new culture, Vico, Herder, and Arnold, were concerned with what culture had been, Schiller and Nietzsche were interested also in what a culture ought to be: Schiller (d. 1805) lauded the 'culture' of the Greeks because it apprehended nature immediately, and he denounced a 'culture' current in his day because it was a 'sentimental culture.' Nietzsche (d. 1900) denounced the view of Hellenic culture which held that it was one of 'Apollonian calmness,' by declaring that it had not been developed in history without a mighty struggle: culture, he held, was a dynamic product.²⁵

But what is culture? What cultures are there? What relationships exist between them? Edward Meyer held that a basic paral-

²⁴ C. G. Shaw, 'Culture,' *ERE*, vol. IV, p. 358-a. Such a thing as a new 'globe of knowledge' could hardly be reckoned, historically, as having come into existence before the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

²⁵ *Ibid.* p. 359-a. Nietzsche stirred peoples into thinking that their own respective 'national' culture should be supported by a 'culture-consciousness.'

lism obtains for all organically living cultures.²⁶ For Malinowski, each culture is a reality *sui generis*: each unique and not classifiable with others. In defining a culture Malinowski says:²⁷

Culture consists of the body of commodities and instruments as well as of customs and bodily or mental habits which work directly or indirectly for the satisfaction of human needs.

Such a definition, however, is a sort of cross-sectioned definition. What is a culture from the evolutionary or genetic standpoint? Is it possible to define the historical limits of a culture, to tell when it begins and when it ends? In our present age it is widely held that we are in the throes of a cultural revolution in our time. In the words of Calhoun: 'We stagger about . . . between a cultural phase on the ebb and its yet unrisen successor. . . .'²⁸ Frederick Barry says that 'a cultural mutation has taken place' in recent times. As evidence he points out three great doctrines describing the universal characteristics of the natural world which includes man:²⁹ the atomic constitution of matter, the universal flux of energy, and evolution. As these doctrines are commonly understood they describe a world, common to the human and non-human, and present a new picture of the world.

So long as the individualities of cultures in history are no more clearly defined, religions can hardly be expected to go to culture in order to find themselves classified: classified genetically to accord with history.

2. *The Use of 'Culture' as a Criterion.* By returning to our digest of past classifications we are reminded that the following were rather closely related to the concept of 'culture':

1. Customary-positive religions (Jevons).
2. Phases of culture and moral development (Jastrow).
3. Civilized and uncivilized (Vernes; Moore).
4. Culture found among the races (Hopkins).

We look in vain among these classifications for any general agreement as to what constitutes the historical wholeness of a culture. We look in vain for any general agreement as to what constitutes stages represented by examples of 'whole' cultures. Moore, in his *History of Religions* deliberately abandoned the *generic* features of religion in favor of individual characteristics.³⁰ The religious field, as a whole, is merely left divided into the 'uncivilized'

²⁶ Malinowski, 'Culture,' *ESS*, vol. III.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ R. C. Calhoun, *God and the Common Life*, p. 4.

²⁹ J. S. Schapiro, *Pol. and Soc. Hist. of Mod. Europe*. (Rev. ed. 1929) pp. 491 and 538.

³⁰ *Op. cit.* vol. I, p. vii.

and 'civilized'—which mark aspects of culture, sorts of culture, or kinds of culture.

We ask: May not the individual characteristics be emphasized, as desired by Professor Moore, and at the same time be historically presented in such a way that the 'generic' features of historical religion may also be presented? Moore is aware of the development of a great period of epochal changes in some of the bodies of religious history; and he is no doubt aware that these epochal changes marked cultural changes at the same time. However, he does not show the relationship which existed historically between the evolution in the great religions and the evolution of the great cultures: such would seem necessary if the classification of religions is to depend upon culture.

Can it be said that a really scientific history of religions has been written, so long as the story of the separate 'religions' is not telling at the same time an integrated part of the story of the evolution of religion in history as a whole? As long as there is no accepted criterion that can show the generic features for cultures, dependence upon 'culture' as a criterion for the classification of religions offers no significant solution for our problem. 'Culture' in our opinion, in view of these considerations, is an inadequate and unreliable criterion.

3. *The Relation of 'Culture' to the Religious Factor.* Not only is 'culture' unreliable as a criterion to mark the evolution of religion, but it is also unreliable as a historical concept having meaningful relationships with concepts of the religious factor in religions. 'Culture' as such has not acquired in religious experience the position or power that is held by concepts of the religious factor. If, following the definition of Malinowski, culture consists of 'a body of commodities and instruments as well as of customs and bodily or mental habits which work directly or indirectly for the satisfaction of human needs,' then the definition applies equally to the most complex as well as the simplest or most primitive of cultures. If such is culture then where are the stages? If such is culture then what is religion? How do the culture and the religion of a people differ? What is the relationship between them? For answer we find that, though culture is a 'body of commodities, etc.' the meaning of a particular culture depends upon great attitudes, concepts, rationalizations, and meanings, which are the characteristics of peoples 'ways of life.' Now such things as these are parts of historical religion. To be sure, such attitudes, concepts, etc., are cultural devices, from one point of view; but such are the real carriers of interpretations of relations with the religious factor in the world;

this may not be said of culture—certainly not in any generally accepted usage for that term. 'Religions' of history abound in concepts of the religious factor, in which man's interpretation of the religious experiences are to be found. These concepts are of the nature of knowledge, and tell about the operations of the religious factor. The concept 'culture' itself is also a device carrying a meaning in the body of knowledge, but as such it does not carry knowledge of the religious factor. Religion—that is, knowledge of the destiny-determining factor taken as a whole, and man's relationship to it—supplies the meaning and significance to culture. For us, religion cements, unifies, and carries the culture; culture is unable to carry religion and provide the criterion for our scientific classification of the religions of history in an evolutionary pattern.

Having thus far concluded (a) a survey and digest of past classifications; (b) an examination of the classifications' criteria in relation to religion and history; and (c) an examination of the relation which outstanding types of criteria bear to the religious factor in the 'history of religion,'—as in *nous*, *entitas*, and 'culture,'—we now are ready to determine the nature of our *specific* problem, approach, and method, requisite for the continuance and the completion of our undertaking.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS: SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF SURVEY; THE PROBLEM, APPROACH, AND METHOD FOR IMPROVEMENT IN CLASSIFICATION OF RELIGION

I. Summary of the Main Results Obtained

1. Past classifications emphasized the quality and ignored the quantity aspects of historical religions; they failed to identify and to preserve the unitary character of historical religions.

2. The most fertile and significant criterion for the classification of historical religions appears to be the concept of the religious factor. The story of the historical and speculative uses of the Greek *nous*, for example, indicated to some extent the historical fertility of great concepts of the religious factor in the world.

3. The most potent criterion for the classification of the historical religions is the concept of the religious factor taken *as a whole*, as provided by the religions themselves. Past classifiers have failed to make use of such a criterion.

4. This concept of the religious factor as a whole, in a religion, is usually expressed by a group of related concepts taken together, and not by a single concept so inclusive.

5. Although a scientific classification of religions as historical phenomena requires a genetic or evolutionary division of religions to accord with their natures as wholes, no such classification has yet been developed; nor is there a record of one being attempted, on the basis of religious attitudes and concepts within the historical phenomena.

II. The Nature of the Specific Problem, Approach, and Method Required

1. If we are to avoid the philosophical pitfalls which beset our path, we are to allow the concepts of the religious factor *to tell their own story* as much as possible.

2. In order to enable the religions to tell their own stories as much as possible, the 'history of religions' is to be consulted, in which a number of histories of the separate peoples shall provide the data for the meaning of religious experience in different areas and at different times. Whether there be any 'evolution,' i. e. sig-

nificant changes, will depend upon whether the interpretations of the religious factor indicate such.

3. Whatever evolution the interpretations from the religions may set forth—this shall determine the question of any 'stages' in a genetic classification.

4. The determination of the stages in a genetic classification is of first importance to the field of historical religion as a whole (i. e. the 'history of religion'), and is also of first importance to the individual religions themselves (i. e. the 'history of religions'). A genetic classification, if *discoverable*, will harmonize the two aspects of 'history' and make one historical classification of the religions serve the purposes of both; and such a classification will be basic to all other types of classification of religions which would be derived from a scientific use of the historical materials.

5. Stages in historical interpretations will determine any divisions or classes of religions. Divisions, classes, and sub-classes of religions are to be expected in dealing genetically with historical phenomena.

6. The final result should be, because of our approach and method, the materials out of which a differentiatinal classification of historical religions should appear. In outline the result should be a *classification of the religions showing its relation to the history of religions*.

III. Plans of the New Search for Order

1. A new inquiry into the body of historical concepts of the religious factor, and related concepts, becomes necessary. Of necessity the inquiry will be limited to the available materials, chiefly those of the so-called great cultures and religions.

2. Our inquiry will follow through long periods of time in order to make possible the determination whether there were any trends or evolution to be observed in history.

3. Special attention will be given to that period which has attracted considerable attention: from the eighth to the fifth centuries B. C., which Moore calls a 'maximum in the tides of religion.'¹

4. Only the concepts of the religious factor will receive marked attention. In order to keep the project within reasonable bounds we shall exclude some of the concepts which are rather closely associated with the religious factor, but care will be exercised however to see that those which are presented are those which had the greatest

¹ G. F. Moore, *History of Religions*, vol. I, p. ix.

influence in marking the changing interpretations of the religious factor.²

5. At the conclusion of our inquiry the result will be assembled in a brief outline of a classification, elaborated somewhat through the use of a graph, charts, and comments, to bring out some of the chief characteristics of the new genetic classification.

6. A classified bibliography will be added in an appendix, to show the sources which have been consulted in this investigation.

² Historical differentiations into all the notable philosophical systems would require a tracing which is beyond the primary purpose of this survey. While a considerable number of systems are involved, there is no intention of accounting for all of them.

PART TWO

A New Search for Order Among the Historical Interpretations of the Religious Factor

CHAPTER VIII

EVOLUTION IN THE CONCEPTS OF THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR AMONG THE HEBREWS AND ARABS

I. In the Pre-Christian Era

1. *Ruah Among the Early Hebrews.* (a) The Hebrew *ruah* originated in the Semitic world, having been derived from a Semitic root *ruh*, which signified 'to breathe,' or 'to blow.' Its primary significance appears to have been 'air in motion,' as in wind or breath, and the general idea common to nearly all its usages was 'power in manifestation,' or 'energy.'¹

(b) Ninth and Eighth Centuries B. C. Now the *ruah* is the religious factor common to Yahweh and the *bene-elohim*, ('sons of god') but it is not a factor proper to human beings.² Through intercourse between the *bene-elohim* and the daughters of men, *ruah* passed into mankind, producing longevity but not deathlessness. Yahweh transfers his *ruah* from Moses to the seventy elders.³ It abides in Joseph,⁴ and in Balaam who goes into ecstatic prophecy;⁵ it is active in the prophesying of Samuel,⁶ and 'came mightily upon Saul.'⁷ The fury of warriors like Saul and Gideon, and the strength of Samson, are attributed to the *ruah* of Yahweh. Elijah's great endurance is traced to the 'hand of Yahweh.'⁸

(c) Eighth and Seventh Centuries B. C. By this time the *ruah* of Yahweh is a subtle factor which brings fertility to the land,⁹ is available for counsel to men who would do right,¹⁰ and is available only to Israel and not to the foreigners.¹¹ Prophecy tends away from an emphasis upon ecstasy and possession induced by *ruah*, to an emphasis upon moral insight. Micah credits the *ruah* of Yahweh,

¹ R. Birch Hoyle, 'Spirit (Holy), Spirit of God,' *ERE*, vol. XI, p. 784-b. Hoyle points out numerous references in connection with this subject.

² Gn. 6:3-4.

³ Nu. 11:17-ff.

⁴ Gn. 41:38.

⁵ Nu. 24:2-ff.

⁶ I Sam. 10:1-13.

⁷ I Sam. 11:6.

⁸ I Kg. 18:46.

⁹ Is. 32:15.

¹⁰ Is. 30:1.

¹¹ Is. 31:3.

within him, for his attack upon the sins of Israel.¹² Jeremiah credits it with the moral indignation which fills him.¹³

(d) Sixth Century B. C. This is the age when *ruah's* scope is very greatly extended: it moves upon the face of the waters bringing order out of chaos, in the process of creating the world and man.¹⁴ It is also the organ of intelligence which is instructed by no one.¹⁵ It is the cause of movement;¹⁶ it is the life in the nations that follow Yahweh's will;¹⁷ the organ of thinking in man,¹⁸ and the agency bringing greater perfection of mind and character in man.¹⁹

And now *ruah* is not only the possession of the prophet but of the 'Suffering Servant'—the people of Israel—as well.²⁰ It is the bond of the fellowship between Yahweh and the people Israel. So impressive is the great *ruah* that it is even addressed apart from the use of Yahweh's name.²¹ It is that which enables the returned exiles to rebuild their temple.²²

(e) Fifth to Second Centuries B. C. By this time the religious factor, the *ruah* of Yahweh, is often referred to as a factor which was quite active in the past history of Israel; or, a factor to be active in the future glory which is to come under a Messiah. The *ruah* of the present is a power connected with human utterances in song or in speech;²³ it accounts for the superior skill and knowledge of craftsmen;²⁴ and accounts for the potency in the anointing and ordination ceremonies.²⁵ *Ruah* also tends to become more personified: it speaks; is displeased; is rebelled against, etc.²⁶

(f) Second Century B. C. to the Christian Era. In the extra-canonical literature *ruah* is a creator of life after death, has full personality, and is a creating factor working independently of the deity. It is the mother of Jesus, and is an object of worship.²⁷ At-

¹² Micah 3:8.

¹³ Jer. 15:17.

¹⁴ Gn. 1:2.

¹⁵ Is. 40:13. (Tr. as *nous* in the LXX).

¹⁶ Ezk. 1:12; 1:20; 10:17.

¹⁷ Ezk. 37:5-9.

¹⁸ Ezk. 20:32.

¹⁹ Ezk. 11:19; 18:31.

²⁰ Is. 42:1; 44:3-5.

²¹ Ezk. 37:9; Is. 48:16. C. C. Torrey would place the date of the Ezekiel references in the third century B. C., and the Isaiah quotations from Chapter 40 onward, at about 400 B. C.

²² Hag. 2:5; Zec. 4:6.

²³ I Chr. 12:18; II Chr. 24:20.

²⁴ Ex. 28:3; 31:3; 25:30-ff.

²⁵ Ex. 29:7; Is. 10:1; 16:13; 61:1; Nu. 27:23.

²⁶ II Sam. 23:2; Neh. 9:20; Is. 63:14; Ps. 106:33.

²⁷ Hoyle, op. cit. p. 788-b.

tempts are made to carry over into the Greek language the meaning of the Hebrew concepts; Philo is strongly influenced by Greek religious ideas. In the eclecticism which followed, the Hebrew concept of *ruah* is forced into a restricted domain.²⁸

2. *Nephesh Among the Early Hebrews.* *Nephesh* is derived from the ancient Semitic root which meant 'breathe.' In the early history of the Hebrews it came to be regarded as the religious factor native to man. Previous to the Hebrews, before the first millennium B. C., *nephesh* had been very slow in acquiring this form. In ancient Babylonia and Assyria the wide-spread fear of the dead appears to have had something to do with it. The factor of the 'dead' was a menace to the 'living'; and from this fear of the 'dead' probably developed the conception of the factor in man as a form of wind.²⁹ The word which was used by the Semitic Babylonians, and gradually fixed upon by Semitic peoples generally, appeared in the Hebrew form as *nephesh*.

Before about 600 B. C., among the Hebrews, man is a *nephesh* when one of the 'dead' and a *nephesh haya*³⁰ or 'living being' while in the flesh. *Nephesh* is the seat of physical appetites, and the seat of emotion and moral action.³¹

Although man in his nature is different from the nature of the gods, he is subject to the power of the gods. As *nephesh*, man is indestructible and eternal but not immortal: it is necessary for him to experience death; this the gods did not experience. Two exceptions only proved the rule: Enoch escaped Sheol, because 'God took him'; and Elijah was translated into heaven directly by a chariot of fire, thereby escaping Sheol. Like the Homeric *heroes*, these two are not gods, but only mortals who, because of their exemplary lives, are allowed to live as gods, an experience denied to mortal men ordinarily.

Nephesh after the sixth century B. C. underwent a startling change in meaning: it is now the word, the only word, which shares with *ruah* the meaning 'the seat of mentality,'³² For the first time in Hebrew history *ruah* and *nephesh* overlap. Both are used to indicate the religious factor in man: henceforth in experience *nephesh* is the ego, and the *ruah*, less under self-control, is a sort of 'self.'³³ Now *ruah* takes over the jurisdiction of human nature; previously it had been only the religious factor in the non-human world, but now

²⁸ See pages 71-72.

²⁹ G. A. Barton, 'Soul (Semitic and Egyptian),' *ERE*, vol. XI, p. 750-a.

³⁰ Gn. 2:7.

³¹ G. A. Barton, *op. cit.* p. 750-a.

³² Job 20:3; I Chr. 28:12; Is. 29:24; Ezk. 11:5; 20:32.

³³ Hoyle, *op. cit.* p. 785-a.

it becomes also the religious factor natural to man. *Nephesh* now comes under the jurisdiction of *ruah*, and thereafter remains in subservience.

Summarizing the *ruah* and *nephesh* in pre-Christian times we find that before the sixth century B. C. the *ruah* represented the natures of the non-human nature gods and Yahweh, and is withheld from identification with the nature of man: *ruah* is not natural to man. It is found with man only as the activity of gods working in man or on man from the outside of him. *Nephesh*, on the other hand, is used for the religious factor native to man: it is the 'dead' which go to live in the underworld. After the sixth century B. C. a great change occurs in the scope of *ruah*; its range is very greatly enlarged so that it incorporates both the non-human natural world and the human natural world. With this extension of the concept of the religious factor, making it in effect now a concept of a universal undifferentiated religious factor, the *nephesh* becomes servant to the *ruah*. Hereafter one may regard the *nephesh* as *ruah*-conditioned.

Another way to describe the evolution in the basic concepts of the religious factor is to define the old world of the religious factor in terms of entities: (1) the older *ruah* 'world' was one of more or less personalized and moralized entities representing the 'powers' of non-human things: the baalim or 'lords of the soil,' demons, Yahweh, the neighbors' gods, etc.; all these had a nature which was not to be confused with the natures of men. *Ruah* may act upon or in man, affecting his fortunes in this world, but *ruah* is not of man. (2) The older *nephesh* 'world' is composed of mortals: 'shades,' 'dead,' or 'departed,' and 'living men,' and is a world of men or beings who have experienced or must experience death, which is so uncharacteristic of gods.

After the Exile, however, the *ruah* 'world' and the *nephesh* 'world' became one world,—one uniform order of *ruah* or religious power. The religion of the Hebrew people now gradually shifts from an age of two-factor religion to an age of one-factor religion.

In later religious literature there is much white-washing of older outmoded beliefs and ideas, belonging to the two-factor age; later Hebrews looked back upon such older practices and ideas as disgraceful. One-factor religion has prevailed with the Hebrew peoples continuously ever since it was acquired—a religion with an interpretation which encompassed the whole of nature including man in one realm of *ruah*.

After the Exilic Period there gradually developed a stabilization of religious concepts into a 'system' which re-evaluated past

religious resources and traditions: in this 'system' (i. e. Judaism), *ruah* ('spirit') in its most powerful differentiation as the 'Spirit of Yahweh,' is credited with the gift of the Torah. In fact 'revelation' is that knowledge which tells of the 'way of the *ruah*.' In Alexandria, Philo held that the human *nous*, in case of ecstasy, is replaced by the divine *ruah*; that it is the *logos* and not the *ruah* which is the instrument in creation.³⁴ The *logos* of Philo coincided with the Platonic *nous*.³⁵ Such interpretations by the crossing of terms from two great cultures, by an eminent Jewish scholar, are basic evidence that underlying concepts of the Hebraic religious factor were giving way in Judaism, to a degree at least, before the pressure of basic Hellenic concepts of the religious factor. Similar changes were in progress in the first and second Christian centuries among Christians, when the Hebraic interpretations of the life and work of Jesus set forth by Christian Jews were being altered to conform to the demands of Greek attitudes and concepts, to suit the Gentile Christians.

II. In the Christian Era

1. *Ruah* in Christianity. With the apostle Paul, *ruah*³⁶ is the gift of God to the believer. The life of man is due to divine operation, and not due to the activity of *ruah*. To him as with Philo the *nous* is only an important element in the natural man, his native capacity apart from the divine gift of *ruah*.³⁷ Sometime before the beginning of the Christian era, Judaism had gathered in, probably from the sources in Zoroastrianism, a body of angels and demons: these religious entities, however, did not alter the one-factor religion of Judaism or Christianity, changing it back to the earlier stage of religion. For these new spiritual 'powers' in the hierarchy are all of them *ruah* (or *pneuma*) in nature and take their authority from the position they occupy in a unified religious government of the universe. They are under the authority of God. The entire order or scheme of spiritual beings from God and Satan on down to lowly spirits, is retained in the ideology of Paul, and in the background of the early Christians.

Concepts of God, Kingdom of Heaven, Torah, Messiah, prophecy, Gospel, and others,—all central and vital to the Christian faith—integrated with the underlying *ruah* (*pneuma*) or 'spirit' of God. Apostles, like the prophets of old, were held to speak 'in the

³⁴ H. H. Kennedy, *Philo's Contribution to Religion*, p. 89.

³⁵ W. R. Inge, 'Alexandrian Theology,' *ERE*, vol. I, p. 311.

³⁶ In the New Testament letters of Paul, *pneuma* (Greek) largely carries for him the meaning of the historical Hebraic *ruah* coming to him from his Jewish traditions.

³⁷ Kennedy, op. cit. pp. 91-94.

spirit.' To the Christians there came also from Jewish sources in the Hellenistic period the doctrine that after the advent of the Messiah 'the holy spirit' (*ruah*) would be poured out upon all mankind. All books in the New Testament except *Second* and *Third John* refer to *ruah*.

Among the most remarkable uses of the *ruah* is in the activity of its special differentiation as 'Holy Spirit' when it is held to account for the historical Jesus: it is the father of Jesus;³⁸ it is manifest at his baptism;³⁹ it is used to drive out demons;⁴⁰ and it descends upon the little community at Pentecost.⁴¹

Religious 'systems' were deeply affected by the cross-fertilization of concepts of the religious factor, such as developed between the Hebrew *ruah* and the Greek *logos*.⁴² Early Judaism, following neither Philo nor Paul, looked upon early Christianity as a heresy of Judaism. Christians claimed that their Gospel was a gift of the 'spirit' even as the Jews claimed their Torah to be a gift of the 'spirit' of God. But by the second and third centuries A. D., it was the Neo-Platonists who were labeling Christianity a heresy, not of Judaism, but of Greek religion! Neo-Platonism was not basically *ruah*, nor in part *ruah*, because it was not Hebrew-born nor strongly influenced by Hebrew concepts. However, Christianity went over to Neo-Platonism nevertheless. Christians took along with them the sacred canon of Hebrew scripture with its Torah, some of the traditions of Judaism, and the Christian 'revelation' or Gospel, and went to live, so to speak, in a Hellenistic world of religious concepts. This eventual surrender to Neo-Platonism brought about a realignment of basic concepts of the religious factor in Christianity, with the *ruah* surrendering to the power of the more comprehensive Greek concepts. One historic result of this Hellenization of Christianity, an off-shoot of Judaism, was the formulation of the Christian creeds. In this task the main problem was the definition of the nature of the historic Jesus in relation to the religious factor in God and in man. Out of these differences of definition arose distinctions which distinguish the church divisions.

What became of the *ruah* when the creeds were formed? We find it surviving as a third member of the trinity, as God the Holy Ghost; it finds its place in an ideological frame of reference that is

³⁸ Luke 1:26-38.

³⁹ Mark 1:10; Mt. 13:16; Luke 3:22.

⁴⁰ E. g. Mt. 12:28.

⁴¹ Present-day Christians continue to celebrate the historic 'descent' of the 'Holy Ghost' (*ruah* hypostatization) at Pentecost.

⁴² Greeks had used more than one word for the one undifferentiated universal religious factor. The plurality of words used by Philo, Paul, and Plotinus, is another matter: these words represent differentiations within the one factor.

Neo-Platonic in character. Jesus of history is no longer interpreted Hebraically as the 'heaven-sent' Messiah, or the prophet in whom the *ruah* of God worked; he is now become the *logos*, a *Christos* or cosmic power, very God of very God, God the Son, an entity which is the King of human spirits, Lord of heaven and earth. In his teaching Jesus had talked of the realm of nature and man as the Kingdom of God; now that view has long since been shunted aside for another view, the Church of Christ, in which Jesus has found a place as the head of the Church of Christ, a system of religious power involving two worlds—this life and the next: little or nothing is ever heard now of the Kingdom of God.

The *ruah* (*pneuma* of Paul) was revived as a concept in the days of the Protestant Reformation, and since that time. Evangelicalism emphasized greatly the availability of the 'spirit' of God as manifested in the Holy Spirit, made possible through the work of Christ, and working directly from God in the lives of men. However, the Protestants failed to return to the 'Kingdom of God': the 'Church of Christ' and Hellenic ideology continued to afford the frame of reference within which the *ruah* of God operated. Among Christians to this day the *ruah* remains a potent but quite restricted concept of religious power, operating through the media of faith and the sacraments.

2. *Ruh* (*Ruah*) and *Nafs* (*Nephesh*) Among the Arabs of Islam.

In Arabia, before the rise of Islam, *ruh*, the Arabic rendition of the old Semitic word, meant only 'the breath.' Its use in the sense of religious power in a one-factor religion was unknown to Arabs until their primitive conception of the religious factor was set aside.⁴³ *Nafs*, the Arabic for the 'shade' or 'departed,' was early used much as the early Hebrews had used *nephesh*. The new *ruh*, appearing in Arabia in the seventh century A. D., was no doubt directly inspired by the one-factor *ruh* (*ruah*) religions of Judaism and Christianity which arose in Palestine, and flourished on the borders, and touched oases, of the desert of Arabia.

According to concepts of the religious factor in Islam, Rabb, the 'lord' (a 'spirit') takes the *nafs* to himself when the *nafs* dies.⁴⁴ The work of Allah is accomplished in large part through the work of entities, all of which are *ruh* in nature: Jibril, who brings the revelation to the prophet, is termed *ar-ruh al'amin* ('faithful spirit'), or *ar-ruh al-quds* ('holy' spirit').⁴⁵ And there is the *ar-ruh* ('angel')

⁴³ Th. Noeldeke, 'Arabs (Ancient),' *ERE*, vol. I, p. 671.

⁴⁴ *Koran*, sura xxxix, 43.

⁴⁵ Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 'Demon and Spirit (Muslim),' *ERE*, vol. IV, p. 616-a.

which brings motions to the heavenly bodies, and living beings. There is Azraul, the angel of death; Israfil, who sounds the last trumpet at the judgment; Mikail, who provides for the sustenance of the body and mind; Malik, who guards hell; Iblis, who commands the jinn; and still others. All are *ruh* in nature.⁴⁶

According to Islam, man, while still in the womb, receives both his *nafs* and his *ruh*. The *ruh* is understood to be a second creation due to the direct action of Allah.⁴⁷ Islam came under the influence of classical Greek culture even as Christianity and Judaism before it. By the time of the rise of Islam, Christianity had already gone over to Hellenism, but Judaism had not yet done so. Arabic concepts of the *nafs* and *ruh* were equated with and translated freely into the Greek *psyche* and *pneuma*, respectively. Moslem doctrines were strongly influenced by the Greek doctrine of *nous* (as *aql* or 'reason'), and the doctrine of the 'inner senses.'⁴⁸ But for all of the Greek influences the center of gravity in the Moslem conceptual world did not shift, basically, from its *ruh* concept. Greek influence strongly affected the religious thinking of the Mutazilites, the Sufis, and numerous Moslem scholars; but in the world of Moslem orthodoxy there was no appearance of yielding its basic terms for the universal spiritual factor.⁴⁹

The historical divisions in Islam are marked by the differences in *ruh* interpretation: was the *ruh* of Allah, which once expressed its activity in the divine office of the prophet, to be understood as continuing its work in the inspired imams and a mahdi, and through traditions traced to the 'family of the prophet,' or, was the *ruh* of Allah, once active in the prophet, to be traced through the activities of the 'companions of the prophet'?

3. *Ruah in Later Judaism.* In medieval times Judaism came to regard the holy *ruah* as only an attribute of God. In more recent times, in circles of Judaism, the old doctrines of the holy *ruah* of their scriptures (the Old Testament of the Christian) has been 'little discussed.'⁵⁰ Jews resort to the use of the old Greek notion of divine immanence to explain the religious factor.⁵¹ Like Christianity, Judaism was finally won over to the use of the basic concepts of the religious factor furnished by the Greek religious tradition. Not however until the Middle Ages, after concepts of the Greek religion derived from Aristotle and Neo-Platonists had come afresh by

⁴⁶ Gaudefroy-Demombynes, op. cit. p. 618-a.

⁴⁷ T. J. de Boer, 'Soul (Muslim),' *ERE*, vol. XI, p. 744.

⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 746.

⁴⁹ Carl Stephenson, *Medieval History*, p. 210.

⁵⁰ Cf. article 'Holy Spirit,' *Jewish Encyclopedia*.

⁵¹ Hoyle, op. cit. *ERE*, vol. XI, pp. 791-a and 791-b.

the way of Arabic sources, did the Jewish transition to a Hellenic frame of reference appear to have completely taken place. This shift among the great Jewish theologians and philosophers appears to have occurred about the thirteenth century A. D.

III. Summary and Differentiations

The Semitic-born *ruah* concept remained restricted to a two-factor religion previous to the time of the Babylonian Exile. Hebrews were the only Semitic people whose religious interpretations accomplished successfully the great transition from a two-factor to a one-factor stage. The first system built upon the new unity was Judaism; the second of note was Christianity, and the third, Islam. But the tremendous influence of Greek religious concepts drew these old religious systems out of their parental orbits: Christianity about the third century and Judaism about the thirteenth century, A. D.⁵² Islam, alone, appears to have been able to cling in a vital way to her world of *ruh*. Neo-Platonism did become a very strong influence in Sufism in the third century of the Moslem era;⁵³ the Neo-Platonic conception of the 'soul' did not bring with it, however, a *nous* or *logos* conception of religious power having sufficient force to cause it to be embraced by the Moslems.

That which enabled the Moslems to hold fast, we believe, was the very early establishment of her codes of Islamic law which have been maintained uninterrupted in their force throughout the centuries. In support of this view, D. S. Margoliouth says:⁵⁴

In the first century of Islam Medina produced a school of jurists who, though they left nothing in writing, by their labors prepared the way for the codes whose publication followed shortly after the foundation of Baghdad. In the middle of the second century it was the home of the jurist Malik, where he received as pupil Shafi'i. . . . With these personages two of the three great Islamic codes are connected. It is, therefore, Arabian (and indeed Medinese) law that theoretically is observed throughout Islam. . . .

This persistence of the power of Arabian or Medinese law also helps explain the continued exalted position held by the Arabic language throughout Islam today.

Religion of the Semites

I. Two-factor religion.

- (1) Religion of the Hebrews
(Before the sixth century B. C.)
- (2) Religion of the Arabs
(Before the seventh century A. D.)

⁵² G. F. Moore, *History of Religions*, vol. II, pp. 84-ff.

⁵³ Ibid, p. 437.

⁵⁴ 'Muhammedanism (in Arabia),' *ERE*, vol. VIII, p. 884-a.

II. One-factor religion.

- (1) Religion of the Jews
(*Ruah* until about the thirteenth century A. D., and *nous* thereafter)
- (2) Religion of the Christians
(*Ruah* until about the third century A. D., and *nous* thereafter)
- (3) Religion of the Moslems
(*Ruah* throughout the centuries)

CHAPTER IX

EVOLUTION IN THE CONCEPTS OF THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR AMONG THE GREEKS, ROMANS, AND MEDIEVALISTS

I. In the Greek and Medieval Religion

1. *Foreword.* When we traced the history of *nous* in connection with the criterion of Hegel,¹ we discovered that the concept of the religious factor was not attached to the word *nous* until about the sixth century B. C. Previous to that time *nous* represented only mental attributes of a living person; after that time it was used to represent an undifferentiated religious factor, common to all things. We noticed that *nous* was only one of the words used for the concept in the later period. In post-classical times the interpretations in religion restricted the scope of *nous*; and through the Neo-Platonists the more restricted usage was passed on to medieval Christianity and thence on down to Hegel. Thus the Greek religion before and after the sixth century B. C. appears to differ basically in its interpretation of man and his world. But there were also other concepts which supplied evidence of that evolution of religion from one stage to another. To this additional evidence we shall now turn.

2. *Before the Sixth Century B. C.* In Homer, *daimon* is a common name used for the immortal gods (*theoi*), entities representing 'power' in the non-human objects and forces of the world. *Daimones* are responsible for the decrees of fate.² In his description of a Golden Age, which he imagined existed in a remote past, Hesiod actually identifies the *daimones* with the *psyches* of those people who lived then.³ In the words of Burnet—

The men of the Golden Age became *daimones* after death, while those of the Silver Age are called 'subterranean blessed,' . . . We are apparently to think of an earlier time, when men might become gods upon earth, and of a later time when they might become chthonian divinities. . . . All that, however, was very long ago, and no such lot is possible for souls now. The souls of the Bronze Age men went 'nameless to the dark house of chill Hades.'⁴

¹ Chapter VI.

² O. Schrader, 'Aryan Religion,' *ERE*, vol. II, p. 54-a.

³ A. C. Pearson, 'Demons and Spirits (Greeks),' *ERE*, vol. IV, p. 591-b.

⁴ John Burnet, 'Soul (Greek),' *ERE*, vol. XI, p. 739-a.

The cult of *heroes* in this age is sharply distinguished from the worship of the *theoi*. 'The cult of *heroes* was localized at the graves, which implies that their souls dwell there.'⁵

In Homeric literature the *psyche* is a 'shade', the native determining factor and surviving potency of the human individual, i. e. 'the departed.'⁶ The seer, Teiresias, one of the 'departed,' in Hades when he is visited by Odysseus, is without powers of communication with mortals in the flesh until he is given such for the occasion by Persephone.⁷ The *psyche* can speak if it drinks blood.⁸ Favorites (*psyches*) of the gods (*theoi*), who are carried away to the Elysian Fields, are made 'immortal' through permission granted to them to have bodies. A *theos* ('god') of the early Greek religion had a body, and was reckoned as a *zoon*.⁹

Among the Greeks of the post-Homeric period the worship of the 'dead' was widely and regularly practiced; in fact the cult continued down to the end of the archaic and well into the classical age.¹⁰ The diverse religious practices to appease the *daimones* which prevailed at the same time, were quite independent of the practices of the cult of the 'dead.'

3. *After the Sixth Century B. C.* Among the Orphic sects the *psyche* is now reckoned as a 'power' or destinal factor identical in nature with that of a *theos*; but because of wrong-doing in a previous existence it is 'immured within the body in expiation of its guilt.'¹¹ In the early cult of Dionysos the *psyche* is held to be a 'fallen' *theos*. Orphic plates show that the Orphic saint actually claims to be a *theos*.¹² The *psyche* is held to be a 'supernatural guest' which the living human individual entertains. This view is widely accepted in Athens as early as the days of the tyrant Peisistratus, in the second half of the sixth century B. C.¹³ Pindar (c. 522-443 B. C.) held that the *psyche* alone is from the gods (*theoi*).¹⁴

Although the Orphics held the *theoi* and the *psyches* to be identical in their natures, it apparently required the aid of the scientist-philosophers to bring the common factor into more intimate relationship with the non-human natural world itself. Thales (c. 600

⁵ John Burnet, op. cit. p. 739-a and 739-b.

⁶ Ibid. p. 738-a.

⁷ This power, temporarily conferred, is *nous* carrying one of the ancient meanings of that term.

⁸ Odyssey, XI.

⁹ I. e. 'animal.' Burnet, op. cit. p. 739-a.

¹⁰ W. Capelle, 'Body (Greek and Roman),' *ERE*, vol. II, p. 769-a.

¹¹ Ibid. p. 769-b.

¹² Burnet, op. cit. p. 740-a.

¹³ Burnet, op. cit. p. 740-a.

¹⁴ Ibid.

B. C.) is reported to have said that all things are full of gods. Pythagoreans, influenced by Orphism, held that the air is full of souls (*psyches*), and that these are the same as *daimones* and *heroes*.

Aristoxenus ranked the 'departed' next after the 'gods' as worthy of honor and veneration. Heraclitus went even further in saying that 'character is each man's *daimon*; his inner self is his true divinity, and his fate is moulded by his own individuality.'¹⁵ He declared that neither God nor man made the cosmos!¹⁶

Attempts were made to identify more clearly just what this unifying factor was like, which linked all things. The Ionians termed it *theos* but likened it to water, or vapor, or mist. Diogenes of Apollonia defined it in man as 'internal air,' a small portion of 'god.' Heraclitus held that it was introduced into the body by respiration, and that if it were to be called 'immortal,' it meant that it returned at death to the 'undying air' outside. Anaxagoras believed it was a sort of fluid, thin and unmixed with anything else, and the cause of motion.¹⁷

Of greatest interest was the intent or the character of the factor. Anaxagoras, terming it *nous*, said that it was of the nature of mind, the source of knowledge in us. Diogenes of Apollonia also identified it with mind.¹⁸ Heraclitus termed it *logos*, and said it was a sort of 'fire' both in man and in the world outside of him, and that knowledge is the response of the *logos* in man to the *logos* outside.¹⁹ Democritus made no distinction between the *psyche* and the *nous*. According to Empedocles the factor exhibited a dual character of 'love and strife.'²⁰

Plato held that the *nous* is that in the *psyche* which proceeds from God. Similarly, Aristotle believed the *nous* to be the divine element in the *psyche*, and such *nous* emanates from the divine *nous*, and that it enters man from without.²¹

Six centuries after Plato, and in line with the Platonic traditions, Plotinus defined the *nous*, i. e. the eternal *nous*, as composed of the intelligible natures of all things. These natures, interpreted according to Platonic *ideas*, are divine thoughts.²² Platonists' concepts, however, developed a gulf between God and the world, a gulf which in an earlier day Philo had bridged over with the *logos* bor-

¹⁵ A. C. Pearson, op. cit. p. 593-a.

¹⁶ L. R. Farnell, 'Greek Religion,' *ERE*, vol. VI, p. 409-b.

¹⁷ Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, pp. 79-80.

¹⁸ A. K. Rogers, *Student's History of Philosophy*, p. 19.

¹⁹ Jas. Adam, *The Religious Teachers of Greece*, p. 309.

²⁰ *Ibid.* p. 378.

²¹ G. J. Stokes, 'Intellect,' *ERE*, vol. VII, p. 370-b.

²² C. C. J. Webb, 'Idea,' *ERE*, vol. VII, p. 83-b.

rowed from the Stoics.²³ Crossing the bridge by means of emanations, a method previously used by the Gnostics, he moved from First Cause to *nous*, to world *psyche*, to matter composing the world of phenomena.²⁴ These Neo-Platonic *ideas* and emanations were taken over by Augustine for Christianity. He changed them into a hierarchy of entities having power to control destinies of things within the limitations set by God, and under the authority and power of God. Earlier church fathers had also learned 'in the school of Plato.' About this core of Neo-Platonist teachings and modifications by Augustine the orthodox Roman Christian doctrines were later established.²⁵

The Greek word *pneuma* did not figure prominently in literature until the time of Aeschylus, Herodotus, and later. Although these two writers of the fifth century B. C. flourished at a time when the intellectuals of Greece had already assumed the belief in a religious bond of unity between man and nature, the term *pneuma*, it appears, had not yet acquired its religious factor meaning: it meant only 'a movement of air,' or 'a gentle blast of air,' a 'breath' of the nostrils or the mouth. Later, however, in the writings of Aristotle, Polybius, Plutarch, and others, *pneuma* came to signify that which animates the body: the 'spirit.' In the New Testament *pneuma* and *psyche* 'are used indiscriminately' in this latter sense; and *pneuma* is also used in the sense of human soul or agency distinct from the body, and also used to set forth the power or agency of God.²⁶ *Pneuma* is not only the 'power' of God,²⁷ but it is also the 'power' of men and of angels.²⁸

According to the medieval scholastics the *psyche* is an individual substance produced from nothing by the creative act of God, introduced into the bodily organism. It is not derived from the parents, as is the body. It is 'intrinsically independent' of the body, although it is 'extrinsically dependent' in relation to the body.²⁹

4. *Summary and Differentiations.* Before the days of the Orphics and the Schools of scientists and philosophers, a two-factor religion prevailed: men's fortune and destiny were conditioned by a

²³ Philo, following Plato, held that the *psyche* possessed a *nous* that is the image of the divine *nous*. When the *nous* of God is breathed into man by God it is then become *pneuma*. The *nous* in man is an undivided part of the divine *logos*. (Cf. H. A. A. Kennedy, *Philo's Contribution to Religion*, p. 87).

²⁴ G. F. Moore, *History of Religions*, vol. II, p. 533.

²⁵ J. Burnet, 'Souls (Greek),' *ERE*, vol. XI, p. 742-a.

²⁶ J. H. Thayer, *Greek-English Lexicon of the N. T.*, pp. 520-522. Lexicographers link the New Testament *pneuma* with the translation into Greek of the Hebrew *ruah*; *pneuma* or *ruah* is rendered *spiritus* in Latin.

²⁷ John 4:24.

²⁸ Hebrews 12:9.

²⁹ A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of Immortality*, p. 69.

world of *daimones* and a world of *psyches*. The former is the world of the gods or immortals, i. e. the 'deathless.' The other, the world of those who must die. Such a two-factor world prevailed in Homeric and Hesiodic times. Hesiod's reference to man's becoming a *daimon* after death, attracted attention only because it was exceptional. But, as we have seen, such was not the accepted view of what was true for mortal men living in his own time.

From the sixth century onward there was developed a new body of interpretations and traditions in Greek religion which, in one form or another, has survived to the present day. The schools of philosophy in Greece were all based upon the assumption of the religious unity of man with nature; these represented differentiations of one-factor Greek religion.

Characteristic of Greek religion was the mystery cult. Aristophanes, it is said,³⁰ proclaimed it as a generally accepted tradition in his day—the fifth and fourth centuries B. C.—that Orpheus was the apostolic founder of all mysteries. Orphism was probably the earliest Greek religious development based upon the assumption of the spiritual unity in the natures of gods and men. Following the rise of Orphism, one-factor religion became differentiated into a number of systems of interpretations, each setting forth meanings for experience and pointing out ways of adjustment. In the late classical period there appeared to have been a fusion of elements of Orphism with Secularism of the Schools into a sort of Neo-Orphism, which carried on to some extent into Neo-Platonism and then into Christianity. The religion of Christianity became the greatest of all the mystery cults. When finally it became imperial it was quite 'Greek' in its religious philosophy and quite 'Roman' in its organization or pattern. By this time, in its one-factor religious concepts, Christianity had largely changed from a Hebraic to a Hellenic character.³¹

Religion of the Greeks and Medievalists

I. Two-factor religion (*daimon-psyche*) Before the Sixth Century B. C.

1. Religion of the Aegean peoples.
2. Religion of the archaic Greeks.

(The religion of the aristocrat and peasant alike included the cult of the 'dead' and the worship of 'powers' in non-human nature.)

II. One-factor religion (*nous, logos, etc.*) After the Sixth Century B. C.

1. Religion of the Orphics.
2. Religion of Schoolmen (Secularism).

³⁰ L. R. Farnell, 'Greek Religion,' *ERE*, vol. VI, p. 408-b.

³¹ See below: late Roman religion.

3. Religion of Isis, et al.
4. Religion of *philosophes-mystes*.
Neo-Orphics; Neo-Pythagoreans
Neo-Platonists; Christians (early Fathers)
Jews (after the Thirteenth Century)
5. Religion of the Imperial Romans.
(The state religion)
6. Religion of Christianity.
Nestorians; Jacobites; Copts; Abyssinians
Greek Catholics
Roman Catholics
Protestant Catholics

II. In the Roman Religion

1. *Before the Third Century B. C.* In the earliest Roman records there are *numina* ('powers') such as those which assured crops, success in wars, etc. Among them there is one outstanding *numen* named Jupiter. There are also *di parentes*, the 'shades' of ancestors—the 'dead.' A cult flourished called the *dies parentales*.³²

In the period from about 700 to 218 B. C. there prevailed two groups of gods: the *di indigetes* ('native, old gods'), and the *di novensides* ('newcomers'). Chief among the new 'powers' of this period were the following:

(a) The new cult of Diana, about the seventh century, located at Aricia, the center for 'the Dying god' which Frazer has uncovered in his *Golden Bough*.

(b) A cult which linked Juno, Jupiter, and Minerva. Juno and Minerva were Greek and were introduced by the Etruscans.

(c) The Sybilline Oracles, a system of ritual for the *di novensides*.

(d) Demeter, Dionysos, and Persephone, are introduced about 493 B. C.

(e) Apollo is introduced into Rome about 431 B. C., and is closely associated with Sibyl and the oracles.

(f) Later on, Artemis, Aphrodite, and Aesculapius, enter. These alien deities, mentioned above, were introduced for the most part by means of Roman names, but the Greek rites were retained and used by the Romans. During the above period the old Roman private and public cults continued. Each family maintained, as did the state, its *sacra* ('sacred object' or 'sacred spot') which helped to stabilize the laws and customs. The practice of sacrifice to the household spirits and the 'dead' was also maintained throughout the long period.

³² W. Warde Fowler, 'Roman Religion,' *ERE*, vol. X, pp. 820-ff.

2. *After the Third Century B. C.* This is the period marked at its beginning by a rapid decline in the influence of the old-time gods. Hannibal's invasion of Italy brought terrifying losses of life in the Roman armies, climaxed at Cannae, in 216 B. C., where the disaster occurred which wiped out the flower of Roman youth. Envoys of the Roman government went to Delphi to find out from the oracle of Apollo whether there be an end to the military disasters which had been befalling the Romans of the republic. According to Fowler, the Romans 'knew not what deity was persecuting them, or where to turn for help, and were in danger of complete demoralization.'³³ While Hannibal was still at large in Italy, the sacred stone of the Great Mother of Ida was brought from Phrygia to bring comfort to the people of Rome. In great numbers the people turned to cults from abroad to satisfy their religious needs. 'Though the old city-cults lingered on in outward form, they lost their real meaning under the overshadowing power of deified kings and the attempts of philosophers to provide a rational basis for the daily conduct of the individual.'³⁴ Ennius (d. 169 B. C.) introduced the Romans to naturalistic ideas of the gods, which knowledge became the common property of educated men, and can be traced in the writers of plays, and in Cicero, and in Varro.³⁵ During the last two centuries of the republic, Epicureanism and Stoicism became widely influential. Cicero and Varro, though eclectic in their views, were strongly Stoic.

Evidence of marked change in the religion of the Romans appeared during the last days of the republic and the early days of the empire. (1) The *manes*, which for so long had been 'shades' or 'dead' and had been worshipped as 'powers' in their own right, now became *di manes* (minor deities). (2) *Deus* is now only Zeus: Zeus is the one sovereign of the world; Jupiter, formerly exalted as a nature-god, lives on as 'weather,' 'sky-power,' etc. (3) *Divus*, an adjective meaning 'belonging to the deity,' comes into prominent usage. It comes to be widely used also as a noun: *divus*, meaning 'divinity,' or 'god'; and *diva*, meaning 'divinity,' or 'goddess.' The older usage of *deus* and *dea* ('god' and 'goddess'), belonging to the old Roman religion, disappeared. These words *divus* and *diva* came into use to identify deified persons, such as emperors and empresses. Pagan emperors of Rome did not claim to rank with Zeus, of course; an emperor, usually after his death, was formally elevated in the conventional spiritual hierarchy of beings under Zeus, to the posi-

³³ Fowler, op. cit. p. 835-a.

³⁴ Ibid. p. 835-b.

³⁵ Ibid. p. 836-a.

tion of a *divus*, not a *deus* in the meaning of Zeus, a *deus* over all. The great Julius and Augustus were elevated to a position in Roman state religion to that of *divi* and not *dei*.³⁶

Augustus, like many another eminent Roman of the late republic and early empire, believed in one *deus*, and a hierarchy of *divi*. His resolute attempt to restore the old-time religion accomplished something for Rome. The old-time two-factor Roman religion was dead, never to be revived; the climate of religious ideas of his day had become so strongly Hellenized by Greek notions of the religious unity of the world, that Augustus' revival of worship at old shrines and renewal of the use of old ceremonies may have caught up vitality more through appropriation of Greek meanings read back into old Roman forms, than in meanings coming down from Rome's ancient past. Greece, by the time of Augustus, had been one-factor in religion for five centuries. Augustus' revival was possibly an improved utilization of new non-Roman religious resources: one example of this was his imperialization of the many religious cults of the empire, with a state cult co-ordinating the whole. His action suggests to us the co-ordinating and patterning of spiritual entities that developed in imperial China, such as under the Han and T'ang dynasties. There is but one spiritual government assumed; it incorporates the universe, with the empire inside the greater government; many divinities have their parts to play, and all are under Zeus (or Heaven), the celestial ruler; and on earth in the empire the emperor, as a son of Zeus, is a divinity co-ordinating the whole.

Since Roman state religion had become such a one-factor religion by the time of the early empire, early Christians faced a religion of power which contained some unwelcome features. The Christians faced the unwelcome prospect of seeing their *divus* (Christ) fitted by Roman imperial authorities into the pattern of religious entities of the state cult; and their Christ, under such an arrangement was but one of many *divi*: all under one reigning God (Zeus), to be sure, but subject to placement in the spiritual order by one who is himself a living divinity (the emperor). Eventually the Christians elevated Christ—the *divus*, the 'dying god' and 'king'—to the status of a *deus*! Christ came to the position of God-the-Son, outranking all the *divi* under the *deus* of the universe! Soon after Christ was reckoned a *deus* there followed a re-orientation of the calendar, and a transformation took place in the conventional pattern of spiritual hierarchs held by Christians to be flourishing under the God of the world. In the transformation, pagan worthies and divinities were displaced by a hierarchy of *new divi* ('saints' and

³⁶ See unabridged Latin lexicons.

'angels') flourishing under the Christ ('God-the-Son') of the early church. In place of the divine emperor at the head of a divine government on earth, under the God of the world with his attendant pagan spiritual hierarchy, the Christians instituted a Christ at the head of a divine government of *both* heaven and earth, with an attendant Christian spiritual hierarchy which linked this world or this life and the next.

As late as the end of the second century A. D., Marcus Aurelius, the eminent emperor and Stoic philosopher, is saying: 'Zeus gives every man a portion of Himself, the *daimon*, which is every man's understanding and reason.' 'Let the deity in thee be the guardian. . . .'³⁷ But by the early part of the fourth century the religion of the emperors had changed: now the emperor is only a layman: he even looks to the priests ('divines') for his own spiritual salvation: they alone have control over the reservoir of spiritual power, and the sacraments, by which salvation from Christ was to be mediated. Old-time imperial *divi* are now metamorphosed into 'powers' of the church; and the new *divi* to be venerated, more or less, include deceased Church 'fathers' and 'apostles' and 'saints' linked with the government of the 'church of Christ.' Living priests may open and close the gates of Heaven and Hell for all men, from the lowliest even unto the greatest—the emperor himself, included.

3. *Summary and Differentiations.* Roman two-factor religion went rapidly into decline after about 200 B. C. Some of the practices of the cult of the dead and nature cults survived until a considerably later time. The older Roman religion was bolstered up by two-factor Greek cults during the early centuries of the republic; one-factor Greek religion, represented by the Orphic cults and secular religious systems, came in later. The religion of the Romans in the days of the pagan empire was an advanced faith—i. e., one-factor. Augustus himself believed in an all-governing deity, but preferred the name Apollo for Zeus. There was nothing inconsistent with one-factor religion in having 'emperor-worship' based upon the concept of the *divus* or 'son of Zeus.' The inimitable life and death of Jesus of Nazareth, finally interpreted as a historical *deus*, interpreted as the central figure of a great mystery religion bringing immortality to its adherents, and exalted rationally for the intelligentsia by the Greek ideology in Neo-Platonism—such factors combined to exalt the Christ to a position that no pagan emperor could ever have hoped to attain, either in this life or by his influence in the life to come.

³⁷ 'Meditations,' *Harvard Classics*, vol. II, pp. 208-209; 231.

Religion of the Romans

- I. Two-factor religion.
 - 1. Religion of the Etruscans.
 - 2. Religion of the early Romans (regal and republican).
 - 3. Religion of imported Greek cults (derived from departmentalized gods).
- II. One-factor religion.
 - 1. Religion of the Orphics.
 - 2. Religion of the Greek Schools (Secularism).
 - 3. Religion of Isis.
 - 4. Religion of Imperial Romans (the state religion).
 - 5. Religion of Christian Romans (the state religion).

CHAPTER X

EVOLUTION IN THE CONCEPTS OF THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR AMONG THE IRANIANS

I. In the Gathic Period

1. *Foreword on Source Materials.* Alexander the Great has been accused of burning the ancient copies of the Iranian sacred scriptures. Whatever the cause, the sources for the history of concepts of the religious factor are not abundant. Another obstacle is the difficulty of dating the Avestan sources. A third problem is that of arriving at a correct translation of the concepts which are available in the records. We find it necessary to disregard translations in cases where, by comparisons, it is found that they are warped by known translator's notions of evolution of religion in history, which stand in the way of the facts. The chief one we found it necessary to disregard is the translation of concepts which, in violation of the evidence, insist upon the exaltation of the religion of the prophet Zoroaster, and debasing the religion of a later period which possessed more comprehensive conceptions of religious power.

2. *Before the Sixth Century B. C.* Two class-terms for 'gods' come down to us from the ancient Iranians and Vedic peoples: *ahuras* and *daevas*. They are connected with *dyaus* ('sky'), and are plural in form, and mean 'heavenly ones.' The terms have a slightly different spelling in the Sanscrit than in the Avestan shown here. But both in India and Iran they represented 'powers' of non-human natural phenomena. 'Comparative philology has shown that the two peoples from the period of unity employed the same two general terms for a god, thus indicating that the character of the objects of their worship was the same.'¹

In the oldest or Gathic literature the outstanding entity is termed Ahura Mazda. Gathic writers always wrote and declined the words separately, evidently conscious of the meaning of each part: *ahura* meaning 'lord,' and *mazda* meaning 'wise' or 'wisdom.'² Ahura Mazda is a great spirit of nature: he puts on the solid heavens as a garment.³ So great are his moral attributes that they are personified and addressed as if they are distinct from their source and ground in Ahura Mazda himself. There are: Vohu Mana

¹ E. Edwards, 'God (Iranian),' *ERE*, vol. VI, p. 290-b.

² Ibid. See footnote *ERE*, vol. VI, p. 292-a.

³ Ibid. p. 292-a.

(‘good mind’ or ‘good spirit’), Asha (‘rightness’), Khshathra (‘kingdom to be desired’), Armaiti (‘piety’ or ‘devotion’), and so on. There are *daevas* and *drujes* reckoned as male and female religious forces evilly disposed toward man,⁴ which are demons sprung from evil thought, deceit, and presumption.⁵ There is also another and a special ‘power’ which is coeval with Ahura Mazda, one which works to thwart the purposes of Ahura Mazda.⁶

Ahura Mazda and his attributes, and also his opponents, are in ‘substance’ *mainyu* (‘spirit’):⁷ His Vohu Mana is ‘good spirit’; his opponent Angra Mainyu, or Aka Mana, ‘evil spirit’ or ‘evil mind.’ Gathic literature has more to say about the *mainyu* of Ahura Mazda than that of Angra Mainyu. Angra Mainyu (‘evil spirit’) does not owe existence to *spenta mainyu* (‘good’ or ‘holy spirit’), but is ‘co-eval and co-existent, if not co-eternal with the god-head.’⁸

Fravashi in the Gathic period are the ‘shades’ or ‘dead,’ or ‘ancestral spirits,’—taken as a group. In the early cult of the *fravashi*, the ‘dead’ require gifts of food from the living. A survival of this ancient view is noted in a freak of custom surviving as late as the European Middle Ages.⁹ In the later religion of the Iranians, however, the *fravashi* have attained an honored place on the religious calendar; they have the definite role as ‘protectors’ of men during the first month of the year. Instead of requiring help or sustenance from men, they are now engaged in the role of extending help to men.¹⁰ Their role is now similar to that of tutelary deities noted in other religions.

The word *urvan*, according to Casartelli, expressed most closely what we mean by our word ‘soul’ in the widest sense. He holds that the form and meaning of the word appear to have come down practically unaltered from the *Gathas* to the Pahlavi *rubano* and the modern Persian *ravan*: it is the element of man which remains immortal after death, and bears the responsibility of reward or punishment for actions in this life.¹¹ Casartelli also states that the relationship of the *urvan* to the *fravashi*, in spite of all that has been written on the subject, still remains very obscure, and probably was never very clearly defined.¹²

⁴ A. V. W. Jackson, ‘Demons and Spirits (Persian),’ *ERE*, vol. IV, p. 619-a.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 619-b.

⁶ Edwards, *op. cit.* p. 292-a.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 292-a.

⁸ L. C. Casartelli, ‘Philosophy (Iranian),’ *ERE*, vol. IX, pp. 855-856. He quotes Dhalla.

⁹ Ed Lehmann, ‘Ancestor Worship (Iranian),’ *ERE*, vol. I, p. 455-a.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 455-b.

¹¹ Casartelli, ‘Soul (Iranian),’ *ERE*, vol. XI, p. 744-a.

¹² *Ibid.* p. 744-b.

If the above statements were true, then other evidence presented on the *fravashi* above, would have to be discarded. However, Casartelli helps somewhat by admitting that the relationship is obscure; we know that the evidence from Lehmann indirectly refutes what Casartelli says. We have called attention to the fact that *fravashi* changed from 'shades' requiring the aid of men to ministering 'angels' of God to help men during certain days in the year. We now find it necessary to infer that a transition such as this, in the meaning of *fravashi*, could not have developed without there having developed a parallel evolution in the meaning of the *urvan* also. This indicates that the *urvan*, a single 'shade' in earlier times, was not immortal like the gods; and that by the time the *fravashi* had become helpers of men the *urvan* was no longer a 'shade' but a 'soul' which shared the same spiritual nature and fortunes which the greatest religious entities and their hierarchical assistants possess within a cosmic government.

At what time did the Iranians reach their stage of cosmic or religious unity? Was it as early as Herodotus in the fifth century B. C.? Herodotus answers in the negative. He explicitly declares that the religion of the Persians in his day, did not, as did that of the Greeks, conceive the gods to be of the same nature as men.¹³

II. In the Later Avestan Period and After

We have indicated above that the early *urvan* was a 'shade,' and that the early *fravashi* were the 'departed' or entire group of 'shades.' We have also pointed out that, in the non-human natural world there were numerous *mainyu* ('spirits') both good and bad. Also, that in the later period the very character of the *fravashi* and the *urvan* probably changed at the same time. But the time of such change is not very definite.

In the later Avestan period we find that the *fravashi* became pre-existent and immortal entities, 'celestial archetypes and antetypes of all good beings.' Every object is endowed with a *fravashi*.¹⁴

Another term in use at this time was *daena*, variously defined: 'divine force,' (Geiger); a 'self,' (Moulton); a 'conscience' or sort of Indian *karma*¹⁵ which determines the destiny of the *urvan*¹⁶ in accordance with the latter's deeds in this life. Both good and evil men have a *daena*.

Still another word was *ahu* which meant 'life' or 'vital force';

¹³ G. F. Moore, op. cit. vol. I, p. 374.

¹⁴ Dhalla quoted, *ERE*, vol. IX, p. 866.

¹⁵ Ibid. p. 866-b.

¹⁶ Dhalla identifies the *urvan* as the 'ego proper,' the 'real I-ness.'

it apparently comes into being with the body and goes with it. Moulton defined *ahu* as 'vitality.'¹⁷ Casartelli says of it:¹⁸

A word which in the Pahlavi characters can be read either as *ahu* or as *akho* is . . . embarrassing. In the former reading it corresponds with the same word in Avestan and perhaps means 'nature.' *Akho*, however, is a mysterious power which recalls the *daimon* of Socrates, because it has to warn both body and soul to act virtuously and avoid evil.

In later times *ahu* (*akho*) played a less important role, confined to maintain animal heat in the body, and to function in digestive processes.

Whether or not Herodotus was correct in saying that the Persians did not, like the Greeks, conceive the 'gods' to be of the same nature as men, such is certainly not true in Strabo's time—the first centuries B. C. and A. D. Strabo reported that the whole realm of nature, in the Persian religion, is definitely under the control of Ahura Mazda.¹⁹

Further evidence of the shift from one stage of religious interpretation to another is borne out in the concept of the *yazatas*, usually translated as 'gods.' According to Edwards, 'the outstanding feature in the contrast between the Gathic and the later Avestan divine circle is the re-enthronement of the whole of the pre-Zoroastrian nature-gods as *yazatas* (i. e. 'gods'), or beings fit to be worshipped side by side with Ahura Mazda and his archangels. The number of *yazatas* is unlimited. At this time practically the whole of the good creation was stamped as Mazda-made and worshipped.'²⁰ Foremost of all the *yazatas* is the 'god' Mithra, who is given no place in the earlier Zoroastrian prophetism.²¹

Edwards traced the evolution of the concept of Ahura Mazda through the *Gathas*, the *Later Avesta*, and the *Achaemenian Inscriptions* of Darius, Xerxes, and others,—his interest being 'monotheism.' He believed that the *Inscriptions* represented a 'purer monotheism' than the *Later Avesta*. Our concern here is to note that he points out an evolution in Persian religion:²²

The position assigned to him is distinct in each of three cases. In the *Gathas*, Mazda Ahura alone is recognized as God. . . . In the *Younger Avesta*, although a great host of divinities are prayed to and ac-

¹⁷ In our view, Moulton's evaluation of concepts is not free of his notions on evolution in religion which he read into his translations; an example is seen in his 'monotheism' read into the discussions of *fravashi*.

¹⁸ Casartelli, 'Philosophy (Iranian),' *ERE*, vol. IX, p. 868-b.

¹⁹ Moore, op. cit. vol. I, p. 374.

²⁰ Edwards, 'God (Iranian),' *ERE*, vol. VI, p. 293-a.

²¹ Ibid. p. 293-a.

²² Ibid. p. 293-b.

knowledge as worthy of worship, still, formally at least, they are accorded that dignity as the creation of Ahura Mazda. Even Mithra, 'the lord of wide pastures,' was created by the great Ahura, and Anahita also 'proceeded from the Maker Mazda.'

In the *Inscriptions*, on the other hand, there are associated with Auramazda, in the prayers of the kings, 'clan-gods' (perhaps the words should be rendered 'all the gods'), and 'the other gods that are.' . . .

In the connections between Ahura Mazda and the above-mentioned 'other gods' we see something in the evolution more impressive than 'monotheism' purer than at another time. Ahura Mazda of the *Gathas* had as his spiritual intimates only moral attributes; there is no evidence to support the view that he is a cosmically supreme 'lord' at this time. His prominence in the *Gathas* does not exclude the fact that other religious 'powers' in the Iranian's religion were flourishing at the same time, of which prophetism was but a phase. By the time of the *Later Avesta*, however, the jurisdiction of Ahura Mazda is greatly extended; and by the time of the *Inscriptions*, his creation of heaven, earth, man, peace, and prosperity, gave him jurisdiction over both the human and non-human realms.

It is possible to observe to better advantage the evolution in Iranian religion if a particular religious 'power' or 'god' in question is observed in relation with the total pattern of spiritual entities found operative at different periods. The concept of a religious government, common to all religious powers, is not present in the Gathic period; but such an assumption seems clearly present, if not in the *Later Avesta*, at least in the *Inscriptions*. The plurality of 'gods'—more properly divinities—in the *Later Avesta* and *Inscriptions*, belongs to a more advanced stage in religious interpretation than that of the prophet Zoroaster as recorded in the *Gathas*.

III. Summary and Differentiations

By trusting to the scope and function of the various concepts of the religious factor in Iranian religion we are led to the view that the religion of the prophet Zoroaster, though high in its moral content, is a prophetic phase of an advanced two-factor Iranian religion. Later, all human and non-human spiritual forces are united in one government of 'spirit.' When the transition in religious interpretation occurred we are not certain. Herodotus may have been in error, or he may have not come into contact with the more advanced thinking of the Persians in the fifth century, when he reported that the Persians did not conceive the gods to be of the same nature as men. We would place the transition at about the time of the reign of Darius the Great (c. 500 B. C.), or soon after, which

date is shortly before the time Herodotus was writing. Mazdaism was flourishing in the Achaemenian Period which ended about 330 B. C. The conquests of Alexander shattered institutional Mazdaism during the following century. A 'Dark Ages' followed from about 250 B. C. to 226 A. D., which was followed by a revival of Mazdaism through the next four centuries. Then came the Moslem invasions with the accompanying expansion of that faith which so largely displaced the old faith in Persia. Possibly ten thousand adherents of the one-factor Mazdaism survive in Iran to this day; a larger number—over a hundred thousand—the descendants of the 'exiles' from Persia, now flourish in western India. Apparently no marked changes in basic concepts of the one-factor faith developed after the seventh century A. D., except for the influence of India's powerful prevalent *brahman* 'frame of reference,' which was regnant in western India when the exile began, and within which the exiled Parsees have found their religion conditioned ever since.

Religion of the Iranians

- I. Two-factor religion (Before the fifth century B. C.)
 1. Religion of the ancient Iranians
(Before Zoroaster)
 2. Religion of the Medes and Bactrians
(Gathic Age)
 - (a) Religion of Zoroastrian reform: Prophetism.²³
- II. One-factor religion (After the fifth century B. C.)
 1. Religion of the Mazdaeans
 - (a) Mithraism
 - (b) Manichaeism
 - (c) Mazdakism
 2. Religion of the Parsees

²³ In the light of history 'Zoroastrianism' appears to be a very inadequate title for the religion of the Parsees today. The religion of the ancient prophet of Iran is more comparable with the eighth century prophetism of the pre-Exilic Yahwists in Israel.

CHAPTER XI

EVOLUTION IN THE CONCEPTS OF THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR AMONG THE INDIANS

I. In the Vedic Period

In the *Rigveda* an *asura* is a 'being of mysterious power.' It is not yet, as later, a member of one of the two opposing hosts of religious 'powers,' (*asuras* and *devas*). Where a conflict is found between religious forces, it is found only between a single demon and a single god. By the time of the *Brahmanas*, however, there are the two opposing hosts: *asuras* and *devas*, i. e. 'demons' and 'gods,' and both groups are recognized as the offspring of the 'lord of creatures,' Prajapati.¹ These gods of the Aryans, though anthropomorphic, are clearly representative of the phenomena of non-human nature.²

The *pretas* and the *pitaras* are religious entities who were once human beings on earth. The *pitaras* are the 'fathers' or 'ancestors,' after they have finally become definitely established in their spiritual home. But the *pretas*, are the 'departed,' who, after death, are 'shades' or 'dead' and maintain for a transitional period a separate existence before they go on to join the established home of the 'fathers.' *Pretas* eventually become *pitaras*.³

Another important word in the *Rigveda* is *brahman*, which, according to Keith, naturally and normally meant 'prayer,' 'spell,' 'holy speech,' 'holy writ,' and probably 'holy power.' In the later *Rigveda*, *brahman* in union with the god Agni drives away disease, and is set over against the three Vedas themselves, as a power of equal force.⁴ Accepting it as true in history that individual powers are older in conception than manifestations of a universal power, Keith applies the principle to India at this early period: he holds it natural to suppose that India developed the conception of a power common to the various gods, as the unity of the gods is admitted by the time of certain Rigvedic hymns. This power 'we may assume,

¹ A. A. Macdonell, 'Vedic Religion,' *ERE*, vol. XII, p. 610-a.

² *Ibid.* p. 602-b.

³ E. W. Hopkins, *Religions of India*, p. 10. W. Crooke, 'Ancestor Worship (Indian),' *ERE*, vol. I, p. 454-a. Hopkins says: 'It is not denied that the Hindus made gods of departed men,' but adds: 'They did this long after the Vedic period.'

⁴ A. B. Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads*, Harvard Oriental Series, vol. XXXI, pp. 445-446.

was naturally denoted by the term *Brahman*,⁵ as a result of the extraordinary importance attached by priests to prayers and spells which secured them their means of livelihood. . . .⁶ According to Hillebrandt, *brahman* in the *Rigveda* denotes a mysterious power which can be called forth by means of various ceremonies.⁷

According to Macdonell, the 'soul' of man in Vedic times was variously identified by the terms *atman*, 'breath,' *asu*, 'spirit,' *manas*, 'mind,' and *prana*, 'respiration.'⁸ Among these terms, found in the four Vedas, only the *atman* is prominent. Its early meaning is 'wind'; later, 'breath,' and still later, 'self,' i. e. 'that which stands or moves,' 'the nature of a thing,'—such as the 'self' of a man, of the earth, or of a disease.⁹

The later *Brahmanas* show that there is begun the attempt to define the *atman* as 'mind' or as 'consciousness.' At the same time there is a connecting of the *atman* of the world with the *atman* of the human individual. Not until the very latest Brahmanic period is there the expression of a full identity of a cosmic *atman* with a human *atman*.¹⁰

Next in importance is the *prana*, or 'respiration,' which term does not come into prominence until well into the age of the *Brahmanas*.¹¹

II. In the Aryo-Dravidian Period

1. *brahman*. In the *Brahmanas*, the *brahman* is now identified with Brhaspati ('lord of prayer'), an entity of great power even in the *Rigveda*, an entity which is called the high priest of the gods. Another entity with which *brahman* is now identified is Prajapati ('lord of creatures'): at first Prajapati is superior to, and is the creator of, the *brahman* as 'holy writ,'—an earlier meaning; later, there is the identification of *brahman* with Prajapati; and later the step is reached in which *brahman* is placed in ascendancy over Prajapati.¹² Very late in the Brahmanic period the *brahman* attains an identification with *atman* conceived as a 'world soul,'¹³ and thus comes to indicate the factor of religious unity in the world.¹⁴

⁵ Keith capitalizes the word. In our subsequent discussions, which concern the neuter form, we shall continue to spell the term uniformly as *brahman*.

⁶ Keith, op. cit. p. 446.

⁷ 'Brahman,' *ERE*, vol. II, p. 797.

⁸ 'Vedic Religion,' *ERE*, vol. XII, p. 616-a.

⁹ Keith, op. cit. p. 451.

¹⁰ Ibid. pp. 451-452.

¹¹ See below for *prana* history.

¹² Keith, op. cit. p. 449.

¹³ Ibid. p. 450, (Ref. A. V. x. 8.44).

¹⁴ Ibid. p. 450, (Ref. *Taittiriya Brahmana*, iii. 12, 9; also *Satapatha Brahmana*, iii, 11, 1).

'It is in the *Satapatha Brahmana* that we find the neuter *brahman* exalted to the position of the supreme principle which is the moving force behind the gods.'¹⁵ The *brahman* is identified with the wind, with the *pranas* as 'vital airs,' with the sun, and with Purohita the high priest of the thirty-three gods. In later books of the same work, *brahman* is exalted to the position of the supreme first principle which, itself without beginning, creates the universe:¹⁶ '*brahman* in truth was this universe at the beginning; it created these gods.'¹⁷

Searching out the differentiations of the universal *brahman* gave rise to the philosophical developments in early India. Vedantic monism and Sankhya dualism, for example, were both developed from the assumption of a common destiny-determining factor linking man and his world. The central problem was the interpretation of the nature of man, and what makes for satisfactory adjustment with the religious factor in the universe.

2. *atman*. As Keith has pointed out,¹⁸ the *atman* is early defined as 'world soul,' and in the late Brahmanic period is identified with *brahman*. With such identification the *atman* acquires a new character as a religious factor by virtue of the *brahman* relationship. For the Brahman absolutists in India it became the 'unconditioned' *atman*.

For the Sankhya, *atman* is an infinite number of unchanging 'atmans' known as *purusha*; these 'atmans' are conditioned by the existence of an eternal active matter known as *prakriti*. Jains held that the *jiv-atman* ('life-self') remains in its nature forever unchangeable and individual. Early and Hinayana Buddhists, following the Buddha, held that the individual (*atman*) is impermanent, but is composed of enduring mobile atoms of existence (*dharmas*).¹⁹ Indian Mahayanists (Buddhists) introduced Brahman elements such as *maya*, 'thatness,' the reality of mind, and *avatars*; this Buddhist group is eventually absorbed by Neo-Brahmanism.²⁰ Neo-Brahmanism is moved to deny the reality of 'matter,' holding it to be illusory. To the Lokayatikas or Charvakas, the *atman* is a compound born of the elements when the body is born, and ceases to exist at the death of the body. Madhavacharya, the celebrated

¹⁵ Hillebrandt, 'Brahman,' *ERE*, vol. II, p. 797.

¹⁶ Ibid. p. 799-a.

¹⁷ *Satapatha Brahmana*, xi, 2, 3.

¹⁸ Keith, op. cit. pp. 148-149.

¹⁹ J. C. Archer, *Faiths Men Live By*, pp. 263-264.

²⁰ Ibid. pp. 274-276.

Vedantist teacher of the fourteenth century, asserted that the system of Charvaka was followed in his day by the majority of men.²¹

What the *atman* meant to Gautama, the Buddha, is a subject of much controversy among western scholars. It is possible that he did not rebel against the notion of the *atman* as a 'self,' so much as against the prevailing notions of the nature of the 'self' which he regarded as erroneous. Did he interpret what we regard as the 'ego' or 'I' as a component thing, an aggregate which is impermanent? His attack was possibly upon the prevailing conception of an eternally unchanging 'self,' which 'self' he regarded as persisting eternally but as actually a changing rather than an unchanging 'self.' Buddhists of today insist that Buddha's 'anatta' doctrine did not mean 'soullessness.'²²

Jiv-atman is a variation of the *atman*. In the Upanishadic literature the *jiva*, used alone, is that which leaves the body in a dream; has no consciousness when descending from the moon, until it attains a new birth; after death the *jiva* travels two roads: either the road to the world of the gods or to the world of the 'fathers.'²³ In the *Bhagavad-Gita* the *jiva* is 'immortal,' 'imperishable.' In Jain and Sikh literature the compound word is widely used: the Jain *jiv-atman* is an entity which seeks to separate itself from the active enmeshing *prakriti* ('matter') which causes suffering; the Sikh *jiv-atman* is an entity derived from a great deity, which may, through the assistance of the gurus, gain release and find its way back into the life of the deity again.

3. *prana*. In the *Satapatha Brahmana*, the *prana*, ('life') of man or beast is differentiated, because of its forms of activity, into 'off-spring' *pranas*—of sight, mind, hearing, etc., all of them 'vital airs' depending upon the chief *prana*; the meaning of *prana* is extended further to include the 'cosmic life' or 'wind,' and this *prana* is placed in direct relationship with the *prana* ('life') of man himself. Finally, in a late view, *prana* is identified with Prajapati,²⁴ who fashions animals from his *pranas* ('vital airs');²⁵ *pranas* are established in the 'soul.'²⁶ And *pranas* are also identified with *rshis* ('ancestral worthies').²⁷

A new function is performed by the *prana*, as recorded in the *Brhadaranyaka Upanishad*: at death when the 'soul' passes, the

²¹ R. Garbe, 'Lokayata,' *ERE*, vol. VIII, pp. 138.

²² Coomaraswamy holds that Gautama and the Vedanta agree that that which transmigrates is the 'non-atman.' Cf. his *Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism*, pp. 109-110.

²³ *SBE*, vol. I, p. 83-ff., pp. 271-279, and notes.

²⁴ Keith, op. cit. pp. 453-454

²⁵ *SBE*, vol. XLI, VII, 5, 2, 6.

²⁶ *SBE*, vol. XLIV, XIV, 3, 2, 3.

²⁷ *SBE*, vol. XLIV, XII, 8, 1, 22.

prana, a sort of soldier of the cosmos, follows after the 'soul.'²⁸ Though it is a created *prana* it determines when the 'soul' shall depart;²⁹ and without a *prana* the human individual cannot live.³⁰

In the *Vedanta Sutra* the *pranas* are limited in size, and are guided by divinities; the chief *prana* is neither 'air' nor 'function,' but is a guardian of the senses, and is independent even as the 'soul' is independent.³¹

4. *Brahma, Shiva, Vishnu.* The great entity Brahma originated in the speculations of the Brahmanic period, and Shiva and Vishnu developed in popular cults.³² Brahma, probably because of his origin, never had a great following in the later centuries. Shiva and Vishnu appear in the *Rigveda* under the names of Rudra and Vishnu, and hold a less dominant position than those held by some of the other 'gods.' Rudra is the god which slays men and cattle, and brings disease; Vishnu is one of the sun-gods. Following the Upanishadic period, Rudra (now called Shiva 'the auspicious') is the God of the universe, one upon whom the worshipper may meditate, may see everywhere in the universe, and from whom satisfactory religious adjustments may be obtained.³³ Vishnu is also transformed: by his incarnations (*avatars*) he comes down among men to share their experiences, and is represented in human history by such persons as Rama and Krishna. He too is a God of the universe: Narayana, a supreme God, creator and ruler of all. He upholds order both in the natural and moral realms, and becomes incarnate in order to defend this order when it is jeopardized, from time to time, by his enemies.³⁴ These developments are found in the stories and concepts in the *Puranas*, and in the great epics—*Ramayana* and *Mahabharata*—which for the most part are historically of later date than are the *Upanishads*.

5. *Transmigration and Karma.* About the eighth or seventh centuries B. C., a belief in transmigration and karma, on the basis of a religious unity of the world, was taking lodgment among a small group of people in northern India. From there the doctrine gradually spread to the whole of India.³⁵ Only a trace of the doctrine appears in the *Rigveda*, but in the *Satapatha Brahmana* the

²⁸ SBE, vol. XXXVIII, IV, 4, 2.

²⁹ SBE, vol. XXXVIII, VI, 3, 4.

³⁰ SBE, vol. XXXVIII, VI, 1, 13.

³¹ SBE, vol. XXXVIII, II, 4, 1-22.

³² H. Jacobi, 'Brahmanism,' *ERE*, vol. II, p. 810-b.

³³ R. G. Bhandarkar, *Vaishnavism, etc.*, pp. 155-156.

³⁴ H. Jacobi, 'Incarnation (Indian),' *ERE*, vol. VII, p. 193-a.

³⁵ J. N. Farquhar, 'Soul (Hindu),' *ERE*, vol. XI, p. 743-a.

teaching is well-developed.³⁶ All of the systems of so-called orthodox philosophy in Brahmanism accepted the doctrines of rebirth and pre-existence.³⁷ All of the religious systems which developed in India after that time, such as Jainism, Buddhism, and Sikhism, accepted the doctrine. To be sure, each of the religious systems explained in detail how the doctrine was to be accepted by its adherents: each of the systems provided a characteristic 'way out.'

Religious groups in India differ on the matter of what is 'orthodox' revelation in literature. A characteristic mark of Brahmanism is its acknowledgment that it is 'Vedic' knowledge which provides divine revelation.³⁸ Others accept as revelation the religious knowledge supplied by persons, such as Gautama and Mahavira, who appear historically long after the *rshis* who are credited with having supplied for the orthodox their knowledge or revelation as found in the ancient Veda.³⁹ Since the days when Brahmans became the 'official spokesmen' for the meaning and authority of the revelation of the Veda, they have themselves constituted a class of minor religious entities: today, as in the long past, the Brahmans, both men and women, are accepted and venerated as spiritual figures or minor divinities.⁴⁰ They are members of a superior order of human beings to persons of the lower castes. Spiritual gradations have long since been defined for other castes as well. Spiritual levels among the living are fixed in the sacred literature, and the holy law books and legal codes have long since set them forth for the guidance of an ordered society.

III. Summary and Differentiations

When the historical curtain rises on the early religion of ancient India that religion is far from being very simple or 'primitive'; however, it is very clearly still in that stage of interpretation known as two-factor religion: the *asuras* and *devas*, though anthropomorphic, are clearly representative of the 'powers' in non-human nature. And the *pretas* are clearly the 'dead' or 'shades' which require the worship and the gifts of men. Following the rise of the concept of an undifferentiated religious factor in the *brahman*, about the eighth or seventh centuries B. C., a new orientation for religion took place. The main body of religious tradition and knowledge was system-

³⁶ S. N. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, p. 25.

³⁷ S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 27.

³⁸ H. Jacobi, 'Brahmanism,' *ERE*, vol. II, p. 799-ff.

³⁹ The 'rejection of the Veda' by heretical groups in India is not acceptable at face value. What the heretical groups did was to accept the Veda on such terms as they, rather than the Brahmans, saw fit. Hence such 'rejection' is not tantamount to holding that Vedic literature is for them utterly without influence.

⁴⁰ Bhattacharya, *Hindu Castes and Sects*, p. 28.

atized in Brahmanism. Later, divergent interpretations appeared in the heresies which gave a new lease of life to religious thinking and practice. Still later, a revitalized Brahmanism brought back into the system many of the heretics, and the Brahmanization continued thereafter to spread to non-Aryan groups of peoples throughout India. A wide diversity of faith and practice was thus furnished by the medley of racial and linguistic groups, all of which were accommodated under the sheltering tent of the great *brahman* concept: the universal religious factor gradually displaced the simpler assumptions of religious power lying behind the gods of non-Brahman and non-Aryan peoples. Such newcomers had heretofore looked out upon an un-unified world with the religious factor still divided between gods and men. The God of the *brahman*, known chiefly under the names of Vishnu and Shiva (and their respective secondary titles), ruled the world of religious 'powers' whether they derived from a human or a non-human origin. Most of the peoples of India came to adhere to cults which today fall under the main divisions of 'Hinduism'—Vaishnavism and Shivism. Among the later historic differentiations were the interpretations of the religious factor in Kabirpanthism, Sikhism, the Brahma-Samaj, and the Arya-Samaj.

Religion of the Indians

- I. Two-factor religion (Before the eighth century B. C.)
 1. Religion of the Aryans
 2. Religion of the non-Aryan groups
- II. One-factor religion (Since the eighth century B. C.)
 1. Religion of the Brahmanists
 - (a) Aryan Brahmanists
 - (b) Aryo-Dravidian Brahmanists or Neo-Brahmanists ('Hindus')
 1. Vaishnavists
 2. Shivists
 3. Kabirpanthis
 4. Sikhs
 - (and others)
 2. Religion of the Jainists
 3. Religion of the Buddhists
 - (a) Hinayana Buddhists
 - (b) Mahayana Buddhists
 1. Lamaists
 2. Sectarrians
 4. Religion of the Charvakas

CHAPTER XII

EVOLUTION IN THE CONCEPTS OF THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR AMONG THE CHINESE AND JAPANESE

I. From Shang Dynasty to Confucius

1. *Oracle Bones*. If the so-called 'oracle bone' records recently uncovered at Anyang are to be trusted, we may begin tracing concepts of the religious factor in China from about 1400 B. C. This earliest evidence points to a dual body of religious entities. Translations have yielded only two significant concepts for the religious factor: one of them appears to represent the 'dead' or 'departed,' and the other, spiritual forces 'streaming down' from above, upon men below: these latter forces are spoken of as 'descending, sending down blessings.'¹ Presumably these forces that 'stream down' are entities representing natural or non-human phenomena.

2. *Ch'i* and *chi*. What *ch'i* meant in pre-Confucian times is not entirely clear; *ch'i*, meaning 'breath' or 'air' is, according to Legge, the word earliest used by the Chinese for 'spirit.'² Some light is added from the old Chinese word *chi* ('sorcerer,' 'witch') when the character is broken down into its three parts: (1) 'spirit'; (2) 'flesh'; and (3) 'the right hand'—all of which provide the meaning 'to hold a piece of flesh in the right hand and offer it to the spirit.'³ This term *chi* ('sorcerer') is 'rarely found outside the old books.'⁴ In pre-Confucian times a class of men known as *wu* held notions and followed practices probably quite similar to those of the modern shaman. In the days following the rise of the learning of the classical period, the *chi* and the *wu* went into decline. Later, the Taoists may have systematized such notions and methods of these older religious specialists as they could reconcile with their philosophy of religion.⁵ Evidence for the pre-Confucian *ch'i* is, therefore, quite scant but fairly clear; it is in a much later period that *ch'i* rises to a peerless position among religious concepts.⁶

3. *Shen* and *Kuei*. Here, as in the case of the *ch'i*, mentioned above, it is difficult to avoid reading into the words the meanings

¹ H. G. Creel, *The Birth of China*, pp. 177-178.

² *SBE*, vol. XVI, p. 419.

³ R. F. Johnston, 'Worship (Chinese),' *ERE*, vol. XII, p. 759-a.

⁴ R. F. Johnston, 'Magic (Chinese),' *ERE*, vol. VIII, p. 259-a.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 259.

⁶ See below.

given them in later times. In this early day the *kuei* is a 'shade' or 'departed spirit' or 'dead' human individual. There is an old Chinese proverb, not to be taken in a derogatory sense: 'Alive a man, dead a *kuei*.' Etymologically the word *kuei* does not warrant the translation 'demon'—i. e. a spirit of non-human nature—but the 'dead.'⁷

Shen, literally a 'host' or 'herd,' is a group of spiritual powers worthy of honor: according to historical tradition, Shun worshipped the *shen*, the natural forces represented by the mountains, rivers, and heavenly bodies, etc.⁸ Legge translates *shen*, in the *First Appendix* to the *Yi Ching*, as spirits whose seat is in heaven.⁹ There is another Chinese saying that 'the *shen* of today are the men of ancient times.'¹⁰ On the face of it this may seem to refute other evidence. But we have only to observe that among the canonized worthies there are names of persons, listed in the spiritual hierarchy of the state cult of China in modern times, who flourished in Chinese history long after the beginning of the Christian era. Therefore, the 'men of ancient times' are not necessarily men as early as the pre-Confucian era with which we are dealing here.

4. *Shang Ti*, *T'ien*, *Ti*. Much controversy has arisen among translators regarding the precise meaning of these three terms which are found in the early period. There is no evidence to support the view that the three terms—*Shang Ti*, *T'ien*, and *Ti*—were ever used as equivalents before the fourth century B. C., when they appear in the writings of the Taoist philosopher, Chuang-Tzu. Before that time, in early Chou, the meanings were probably as follows: *Shang Ti* (*Shang*, 'above' and *Ti*, 'sovereign') signifies 'supreme ruler,' 'high god,' or 'divine being.' *T'ien* is 'heaven,' 'sky,' or 'being' whose abode is heaven or the sky.¹¹ One crossing of the two foregoing terms is the use of *T'ien* as the residence of *Shang Ti*; another, *T'ien* is a literary substitute for *Shang Ti*: but both usages are probably late developments. The first substitution of *T'ien* for *Shang Ti* occurs in the Confucian-edited stories of the traditional tyrant Chieh, hero Tu, and the much lauded Wen and Wu Wang of the Chou family, as found in the *Shi Ching* and the *Shu Ching*.¹² *Ti*

⁷ P. J. MacLagan, 'Demons and Spirits (Chinese),' *ERE*, vol. IV, pp. 577-a and 577-b.

⁸ W. E. Soothill, *The Three Religions of China*, p. 137. Tradition places Shun before 2000 B. C.

⁹ *SBE*, vol. XVI, p. 34.

¹⁰ MacLagan, op. cit. p. 577-b.

¹¹ J. C. Archer, *Faiths Men Live By*, p. 57; Also K. S. Latourette, *The Chinese: Their History and Culture*, vol. I, pp. 70-78; and W. A. Cornaby, 'God (Chinese),' *ERE*, vol. VI, pp. 272-a and 275-b.

¹² Problems of Chinese origins have recently been attacked by Ku Ch'ieh-kang, a pupil of Hu Shih, which throws doubt on the traditional views of the antiquity of

is used alone, early, to mean a 'divine being.' Apparently these three terms—Shang Ti, T'ien, and Ti—had independent usage in early China, but with the merging of peoples and tribal cultures the terms became common property of the Chinese. However Ti may have been simply another way of expressing Shang Ti, for the character is the same in both.¹³

5. *The Meaning of 'Ancestor Worship'; 'Son of Heaven.'* Ancestors have not been the sole objects of worship for any people known to the history of religion. Those who worship 'ancestors' to the extent emphasized by Chinese and the Bantu of the present day, worship also other spiritual powers.¹⁴ Hence 'ancestor worship' does not embody, signify, or adequately represent the total religious factor 'powers' of the Chinese or any other people.¹⁵

As late as Confucius there is as yet no clear evidence of the appearance of the general worship of ancestors in the sense that ancestors are venerated later on, that is to say, as tutelary deities.¹⁶ The first concrete example offered in Chinese recorded history, of characteristic ancestor worship, is that credited to the Duke of Chou who lived in the twelfth century B. C. This appears to be a most unreliable reference in view of the later adulation and idealization of the Duke of Chou by the Confucianists.¹⁷ With corroborating evidence lacking, and other evidence being strongly against it, this reference may be regarded as a probable interpolation.

The expression 'Son of Heaven' is not a conceptual product that extends back to the time of pre-Confucian Chinese religion. It is not found in the *Shu Ching*.¹⁸ It finds its first support in Confucian literature, dating a century after Confucius, in an account of the attitude which the Duke of Chou was supposed to have held toward his father, namely, as a 'Son of Heaven':¹⁹

In the reverential awe shown to one's father there is nothing greater than the making him the correlate of Heaven. The Duke of Chou was the man who first did this.

the *Shu Ching*, especially its chronology as accepted from Confucian days. Conceptions of the *Shi Ching* are also undergoing change at the hands of younger scholars. (See Arthur W. Hummell's 'What Chinese Are Doing in Their Own History,'—*Soc. Science Abstract*, 3, 204).

¹³ Archer, op. cit. p. 57.

¹⁴ Paul Radin, 'Ancestor Worship,' *ESS*, vol. II, p. 2.

¹⁵ Bantu and Chinese religions are by no means in the same class, because of their considerable attention to ancestors. Bantu religion is two-factor religion and Chinese religion of today is one-factor religion. The Bantu lack a concept of a common religious factor.

¹⁶ T. J. Bullock, 'Ethics and Morality (Chinese),' *ERE*, vol. V, p. 468.

¹⁷ W. G. Walshe, 'China,' *ERE*, vol. III, p. 551-a. Walshe cites this earliest reference from the *Shu Ching*.

¹⁸ W. A. Cornaby, 'God (Chinese),' *ERE*, vol. VI, p. 273-b.

¹⁹ *SBE*, vol. III, pp. 476-478. For date of classic see comments of translator, Legge.

II. Late Chou and Afterward

1. *Ch'i* and *t'ai ch'i*. In the ancient *Yi Ching*, lessons had been developed about the ordering of the political and personal affairs of the early house of Chou. In later times these lessons which had centered about the figures in the ancient *Yi Ching*, were extended from this small area of human affairs to the 'larger theatre of universal nature.' The records of such extensions are found in the *Appendices* of the *Yi Ching*, a literature of a much later date than the old classic. In these *Appendices* the Chinese philosophic commentators built upon the theory that the three lines of the early trigrams featured in the ancient *Yi Ching*, represent three great 'powers' in the world: Heaven, Earth, and Man.²⁰

In the *Appendices*, therefore, we discover, in an ever-ascending scale, the application of the hexagrams to the constitution and course of nature, the later chapters furnishing some of the materials out of which Chu-hsi (A. D. 1130-1200) developed his scheme of cosmogony and cosmology, which now represents modern Chinese philosophic thought on the subject.

A commentator in the *Third Appendix* says: 'The *Yi* was made a principle of accordance with heaven and earth, and shows us therefore, without rent or confusion, the cause (of things) in heaven and earth.' 'The "Great Extreme" (i. e. *t'ai ch'i*) produced the 'two elementary forms' (i. e. *i*).'²¹ Legge is inclined to credit the idea of *t'ai ch'i* to Taoist sources because it is not found in the Confucian literature previous to the time of the *Third Appendix*.²² For our purpose here it is sufficient to note that the concept, whether Confucian or not, is Chinese in either case. A basis of unity in nature had at last been reached; and such unity is the assumptive ground of all Chinese philosophy. Taoism and Confucianism as systems of ideas could not so much as have been in existence in China before the time when the *Third Appendix* was being written; they probably have their beginnings in the fifth or fourth centuries B. C.²³

If Lao Tzu lived in the sixth century B. C., and his work is authentic as written, he may be credited with having reconciled all things in the *Tao*.²⁴ If Lieh Tzu lived in the fifth century B. C. and his work is authentic as written, he may be credited with having

²⁰ W. G. Walshe, 'Cosmogony and Cosmology (Chinese),' *ERE*, vol. IV, p. 138-b.

²¹ Of *t'ai ch'i*, Legge says: 'Nowhere else does the name occur in old Confucian literature. I have no doubt myself that it found its way into this Appendix in the fifth (or fourth) century B. C. from a Taoist source.'—*SBE*, vol. XVI, p. 12; also a footnote on p. 39.

²² See footnote p. 376, *SBE*, vol. XVI.

²³ MacLagan says that there was no 'explicit Taoism previous to Lao Tzu.' (*ERE*, vol. XII, p. 199-b). This aids us little: for when did Lao Tzu live, if he did?

²⁴ See below for Lao Tzu's *Tao*.

started from an ultimate basis which differentiates into *ch'i*, *hsing*, and *chih*: *ch'i* is for him a 'vivifying principle' or 'aura' of the behaving universe: a 'cosmic force'; *hsing* and *chih* are 'form' and 'matter.'²⁵ These three elements progress from a state of chaos to a state of order, in the final stages of which the pure and light portions form 'heaven,' the heavy and gross portions from 'earth,' and 'man' appears as the vehicle of their harmonious *ch'i*.²⁶

Wang Pi (226-249 A. D.) said of *t'ai ch'i* that it is the denomination of that which has no denomination; a later commentator, expanding Wang's comment, said that *t'ai ch'i* means the original subtle matter that formed the one chaotic mass before heaven and earth divided. He identified the *t'ai ch'i* with the *Tao* of Lao Tzu.²⁷

Chou Lien-ch'i (c. 1017-1073 A. D.) wrote a short treatise on the *t'ai ch'i* which, for him, is the first cause or principle from which *yin* and *yang*²⁸ were evolved, which produced the universe.²⁹ Chu Hsi (1130-1200 A. D.) of the Neo-Confucian school, held that both *li* and *ch'i* existed from the beginning, but that *li*, a principle of law and order, is prior to *ch'i*. The alternate action and inaction of *li*, operating in the sphere or world of *ch'i*, produces the two great forces, the *yin* and *yang*, by which all things are brought about.³⁰ Wang Yang-ming, of the Ming period, rejected the dualistic view and asserted that the *yin* and *yang* together constitute only one vital force. The great *t'ai ch'i* is an active factor, bringing forth *yang* when it is moving, and *yin* when it is quiet; the continual 'begetting' of the 'great monad' is the continual begetting of the *yin* and *yang*.³¹

2. The 'two forces': *yin* and *yang*. These terms, *yin* and *yang*, are found together as early as the Stone Drums (c. eighth century B. C.).³² Before the fifth century B. C., however, they had not yet come to represent the dual aspects of cosmic behavior: they mean 'the light and dark sides of a sunlit bank,' or the bright and dark properties of the sun and moon.³³ About the fifth century B. C. when the Chinese began to think clearly in terms of a cosmos they still did not make use of these famous terms to represent the 'dual forces' in the natural order: other terms, such as *liang i* ('the pair'),

²⁵ Giles, *A Chinese-English Dictionary*, 1912.

²⁶ Maclagan, op. cit. p. 200-a.

²⁷ See note pp. 375-376, *SBE*, vol. XVI.

²⁸ See below.

²⁹ A. Forke, 'Philosophy (Chinese),' *ERE*, vol. IX, p. 856-b.

³⁰ Walshe, op. cit. *ERE*, vol. IV, p. 140-b.

³¹ F. G. Henke, *The Philosophy of Wang Yang-ming*, p. 236; pp. 241-242.

³² S. Couling, *Encyclopaedia Sinica*.

³³ J. Legge, *SBE*, vol. XVI, p. 43.

were used.³⁴ But in this classical period the terms *yin* and *yang* were being used to describe a more restricted range or aspect of natural power: the first usage for the purpose of expressing phases of the dual nature forces is found in a literary work credited to a grandson of Confucius, and to Lieh Tzu, of the fifth or fourth centuries B. C.³⁵ In the *Li Ch'i*, Heaven exercises control of the 'strong and light forces,' and Earth the 'darker and weaker forces.'³⁶ Sages find the origin of all things in heaven and earth; and the 'two forces' are made the commencement of all. The spirits 'breathing in nature' are 'associates.'³⁷ Not until the Sung philosophers do the terms *yin* and *yang* appear to have attained full meaning of 'dual forces' binding man and nature.

Today the ways by which the Chinese harmonize their lives with the 'changing moods of nature,' are based upon the explanations of a unified nature exhibiting dual natural characteristics known as *yin* and *yang*. The religious calendar provides an ordered body of religious entities, customs, and practices, which are oriented to the universal working of the dual forces.³⁸ According to D. C. Graham, the conception of *yin* and *yang* permeates and saturates the mental, moral, and social life of the Chinese, affecting every phase of their existence.³⁹

3. *Kuei-shen; kuei; shen*. The term *kuei-shen* made its first appearance in the *First* and *Third Appendices* of the *Yi Ching*, a concept representing a group of spiritual beings including both *kuei* and *shen*. This compound word is used twice in the *First Appendix*; here the *kuei* still denotes the 'shade,' and the *shen* is used for spirits whose seat is in heaven: both are ancient meanings for these terms.⁴⁰ The compound term also appears twice in the *Third Appendix*, but here the meanings differ from what they were in the *First Appendix*. The first and second uses of this compound term in the *Third Appendix* offered difficulties to translators: in the case of the first use of the term, Legge translates the parts as 'the anima' and 'the animus'; Canon McClatchie, as 'demons' and 'gods'; Medhurst, as 'contrasting principles of human life.' We follow Maclagan who accepts this term as a word representing all the inhabitants of the spiritual world.⁴¹

³⁴ J. J. M. DeGroot, *Religion in China*, p. 9; also Giles, op. cit.

³⁵ Forke, op. cit. p. 492.

³⁶ *SBE*, vol. XXVII, 7, 3, pp. 380-381.

³⁷ *Ibid.* p. 383.

³⁸ L. Hodous, *Folkways in China*, e. g. pp. 152-153.

³⁹ *Religion in Szechwan Province, China*, p. 32.

⁴⁰ For difficulties in translating, see Introduction in *SBE*, vol. XVI, pp. 32; 34-35; 53.

⁴¹ Maclagan, op. cit. *ERE*, vol. IV, p. 576-b.

From the foregoing we see that the old *kuei* and old *shen* have come to be treated in a new manner; they are in process of being reoriented to a *ch'i* world.⁴² Instead of their being spiritual powers totally unlike each other—i. e. one composed of human religious entities, and the other non-human religious entities—they are now understood to be one body of 'powers' with a destiny-determining character in common. Under the new orientation the 'dead' change to tutelary spirits or divinities under the jurisdiction of Heaven.⁴³ From now on the dead are ancestors, sharing in the very nature of Heaven itself, and acting as aids and mediators of Heaven. They take an interest in their own descendants. Their purpose is to serve Heaven, and they share in operating the spiritual government of the universe. Gifts heretofore offered to them were to feed them because they were subject to hunger and thirst: they were 'powers' in their own right. Now, gifts are offered out of respect and veneration for them by the living, who seek to square their lives with the standards of the illustrious ancestors, rather than to hope to assuage the ancestors' hunger. Posterity now gives to ancestors in token of the worthy lives the descendants are trying to live, under the surveillance of Heaven and ancestors, who, it is hoped, will be pleased with the display of such wholesome attitudes and behavior on the part of the living.⁴⁴

From the standpoint of the undifferentiated religious factor, the *kuei* and *shen* are now reckoned as products of the *yin* and *yang* or 'dual forces,' which in turn are but aspects or derivatives of *t'ai ch'i*. In the flesh man's nature is a combination of the *yin* and the *yang*, a combination encompassing the *kuei* and *shen*. At the experience of death the *shen* and *kuei* parts separate: *shen* ascends to the bright and warm *yang* realm of the religious factor; *kuei* descends to the heavier and darker particles of earth, the *yin* realm of the religious factor. The numerous *kuei*, in, on, or near the earth's surface, are in large part commonly held to be *yin* forces in their native haunts, and have their petty jurisdictions allotted to them by Heaven.

4. *Great Entities; the Nature of Man.* When once China had evolved to a one-factor religious interpretation, the old entities were dropped from use. Some of the *names* of old entities survived, however, but at the cost of finding a new role, to identify a power with a different character, to fit in with the conception of the government

⁴² The concept of *ch'i*, after the fourth century B. C., has the power to bring all spiritual entities into a single body or 'government,' and makes all entities the differentiations of a common religious factor in the universe.

⁴³ T. J. Bullock, op. cit. *ERE*, vol. V, p. 467-b.

⁴⁴ Walshe, op. cit. *ERE*, vol. III, pp. 729-a and 729-b.

of the world and the nature of man. The ordering and ruling One in the universe, under the name of Shang Ti, comes to be worshipped in a special manner by the emperor of China only, who is himself held to be the Son of the ruling One. The ordering One is also known by the name T'ien ('Heaven'). Under other names the great cosmic ruler is worshipped by the people themselves.⁴⁵ At the beginning of each lunar New Year, the religious calendar of custom calls for the recognition of the worship of Heaven and Earth.⁴⁶ Throughout the year honors and festivals are accorded an assortment of entities, but all such 'gods' are allotted their domain, whether they be ancestors or the petty spirits in the natural environment: all are under the sway of the 'Pearly Emperor.'

The *Tao* of Lao Tzu is a great entity. It may be identified as the behaving religious factor in the universe:

The successive movement of the inactive and active operations constitute what is called the *course* (of things).⁴⁷

Or, the *Tao* may be identified as an IT or THAT which *in-forms* all things:

The things which from of old have got the One (the *Tao*) are:

Heaven which by it is bright and pure;
Earth rendered thereby firm and sure;
Spirits with powers by it supplied;
Valleys kept full throughout their void;
All creatures which through it do live;
Princes and kings who from it get
The model which to all they give.

All these are the results of the One (*Tao*).⁴⁸

In every man there is a *hsing* ('heaven-implanted nature').⁴⁹ *Hsiao* ('filial piety') is the constant method of Heaven, the righteousness of Earth, and the practical duty of man.⁵⁰ In the Chinese writing, the meaning of *hsiao* is expressed in a character showing a young man in the relationship of subjection to an old man.⁵¹

III. Investigators' Comments on Chinese Religion

1. DeGroot holds the view that China has but one religion: in the age of the Han dynasty (c. 221 B. C. to c. 200 A. D.) this one religion divided into Taoism and Confucianism. Buddhism was

⁴⁵ Hodous, op. cit. pp. 26 and 34. A common name used is Yu Huang ('yellow emperor').

⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 13.

⁴⁷ *SBE*, vol. XVI, Ch. 5, par. 24, of *App. III of Yi Ching*.

⁴⁸ *SBE*, vol. XXXIX, p. 82. (Part II, 39, 1, *Tao Te Ching*).

⁴⁹ Soothill, op. cit. p. 197.

⁵⁰ *SBE*, vol. III, pp. 472-473. (Ch. 7, *Hsiao Ching*).

⁵¹ Archer, op. cit. p. 83.

grafted upon the parent stem which he calls universism.⁵² Our answer and correction to his view is that China has had two religions: one before the fourth century B. C. and one since that time. The second religion divided into the 'systems' of Taoism and Confucianism, but the institutional division which occurred in early Han period was preceded by an earlier and more significant intellectual division, when the great ideas in each were being evolved: and this occurred probably two centuries before the rise of Han.

2. A common denominator for Taoism and Confucianism, suggested by Bruce, is found in the Chinese body of ancient sacred writings. 'The chief differences between opposing camps resolve themselves largely into questions concerning the interpretation of sacred writings accepted on both sides as the final court of appeal.'⁵³

3. According to Soothill, the expression of the interpretation of the two natural forces in Chinese religious thought does not appear to have been fully stated until the middle or end of the Chou period.⁵⁴ We would place the date for this in the century following Confucius, in the late fifth or early fourth centuries B. C., which is in the last third of the long Chou dynasty.

4. Walshe regards the spiritual government of powers in China as analogous to the system of saints and mediators which are found to exist in Christianity along with the underlying belief in the unity of the Christian Godhead.⁵⁵ We find this is not true for the pre-Confucian, two-factor religion of China, but that it is true for the post-Confucian, one-factor religion. One spiritual order exists for the Chinese worshippers only since the classical times, following Confucius. Whatever spirits the Chinese today may regard as presiding over the phenomena of non-human nature, these together with the spirits of deceased relatives, are all in an ordered whole, so far as the rank and file of Chinese are concerned.

5. According to Hodous the Chinese householder offers worship at New Years after the following manner: 'After the offering to Heaven and Earth, the head of the household offers incense before both the household gods and the tablet of ancestors.'⁵⁶ (In ancient times the worship of gods and ancestors was not conducted at the same time and place).

⁵² *Religion in China*, p. 3.

⁵³ *Chu Hsi and His Masters*, p. 5.

⁵⁴ *The Three Religions of China*, p. 175.

⁵⁵ 'China,' *ERE*, vol. III, p. 550-b.

⁵⁶ *Op. cit.* p. 13.

IV. Transplantation of Chinese Concepts in Japan

1. *In* and *yo*. The literate period of Japanese history began with the introduction and use of Chinese characters and classics about the fourth century A. D.⁵⁷ The advanced or more complex ideology from the Chinese religious world gradually rooted and displaced the more primitive conceptions of the natives.

Since the Japanese already had their own traditions and natural and human forces in the islands before the Chinese influences arrived, it came about that the Japanese eventually defined their own religious 'powers' within a pattern of religious interpretation supplied by the more advanced notions of the Chinese. Evidence of this transference and this development is clearly indicated in the Japanese religious classics which date from about the early eighth century A. D. According to the record, the *in* and *yo* ('yin' and 'yang'), representing the passive or female principle, and the active or male principle, were accepted as basic interpretations for the behavior of nature. And such acceptance of concepts forming the 'mainspring of nature in Chinese philosophy,' clearly prepared the basis for traditions of Izanagi and Izanami, the mythical creators of Japan.⁵⁸

'Of old,' states the *Nihongi*, 'Heaven and Earth were not yet separated, and the *In* and *Yo* not yet divided. . . . The purer and clearer part diffused and formed Heaven, while the heavier and grosser element settled down and became Earth. . . . Heaven was formed first, and Earth was established subsequently. Thereafter divine beings were produced between them. . . .'⁵⁹ And in the *Kojiki* one finds a list of 'the names of the deities that became in the Plan of High Heaven, when Heaven and Earth began. . . .'⁶⁰ The last couple born in the Plan of High Heaven is ordered by the other gods to 'make, consolidate, and give birth to this drifting land.' This pair, Izanagi and Izanami, descend from Heaven to the Island. They celebrate their union, and from it the offspring of islands, gods, etc., are produced.⁶¹ The religious literature of the *Kojiki* and the *Nihongi* served the historical purpose of harmonizing the native or national religious 'powers' of Japan with the concepts of one-factor religion introduced from China.⁶² Along with this Chinese

⁵⁷ K. Asakawa, *History of the Nations*, vol. VII, pp. 13-14.

⁵⁸ Michel Rivon, 'Cosmogony and Cosmology (Japanese),' *ERE*, vol. IV, p. 163-b.

⁵⁹ Rivon, op. cit. p. 163-a.

⁶⁰ Ibid. p. 162-b.

⁶¹ Ibid. p. 164.

⁶² Harada says that it is out of the *Yi Ching* that the *yin* and *yang* 'order' was transferred to Japan. We find the 'order' in the *Appendices*, and not in the ancient *Yi* itself. (See T. Harada, *The Faiths of Japan*, p. 53).

religious 'frame of reference' came also the attending ancestor worship, ideals of filial piety and loyalty, which Japanese learned to perform after the manner of the Chinese.⁶³ The view was early established in Japan that what Heaven decreed is called the nature of things.⁶⁴

2. *Kami*. This is the prominent Japanese word for 'spirit.' It is quite inclusive, in that it includes not only 'powers' in non-human nature but also the spirits of the deceased in the Shinto funerals, as well.⁶⁵

3. *Religious Developments*. Interpretations belonging to one-factor religion in China which came to Japan, brought along also Taoism and Confucianism. Buddhism did not arrive until after Confucianism was fairly well rooted. It came in first from Korea and China rather than from India. The Chinese concept of religious unity took root in Japan in a more fundamental way than the original Buddhist (Indian) concept, as is borne out by the fact that the Japanese religious classics actually make use of the Chinese and not the Indian view. Especially in the T'ang period, the Japanese went to great lengths to imitate the Chinese, modeling their culture forms and civilization after that of the Chinese; this was from the seventh to the tenth centuries A. D. One major development was the appearance of the Japanese Shinto. Inasmuch as Shinto claims as its own the above-mentioned classics—*Kojiki* and *Nihongi*—and makes use of the Chinese ideology and even terminology, Shinto may be regarded as a Confucian or Chinese state-cult away from home; Shinto state-cult is in reality a Japanese adaptation of the Chinese state religion. A basic ideology is common to the old Chinese state-cult and the present Japanese state-cult. Attempts have been made in the history of Shinto, to screen out the foreign elements. Since, however, Shinto is genetically linked to Chinese religion, the efforts to get rid of fundamental Chinese elements have been in vain.

For several centuries preceding the nineteenth century opening of Japan to the Occident, Japan's samurai class held a monopoly of the education and government of the Japanese people. Their concepts and ideals were, according to Harada, 'entirely based upon Confucianism.'⁶⁶ Whether or not this is an overstatement of the facts, it is established that Japanese in the past have taken Confucianism so seriously that they have tried to conserve and keep unsullied the true doctrines of Confucianism. When the Sung philoso-

⁶³ Michel Rivon, 'Ancestor Worship (Japanese),' *ERE*, vol. I, p. 457-a.

⁶⁴ T. Harada, *The Faiths of Japan*, p. 54.

⁶⁵ T. Harada, 'God (Japanese),' *ERE*, vol. VI, pp. 294-295.

⁶⁶ *The Faiths of Japan*, p. 158.

phers developed 'revisionist' doctrines for Confucianism, in the twelfth century A. D., a group of Japanese scholars, in a movement known as the 'Old Learning,' took upon themselves the task of defending the faith by seeking to purge it of admixtures which had corrupted it. They rejected the Neo-Confucian concept of *li*, as a law or principle of order operating in a world of *ch'i*, and identified the *ch'i* and the *li*, attributing the vital factor in the world to the very nature of the cosmic factor itself.⁶⁷ Buddhist cults developed and flourished in Japan throughout the centuries following the inception of the faith, but the basic concepts of Chinese religion held dominance over those of Indian derivation.

According to a recent rescript of the Japanese Emperor on the subject of education, the Imperial Family of Japan not only considers itself coeval with Heaven and Earth, as spiritual powers, but it takes for granted that such a view is the accepted and regnant faith of all the Japanese people.⁶⁸ And in a recent prayer composed by the Empress Nagako,⁶⁹ the 'living' who experience sorrow from losses of loved ones in war are to find their spiritual consolation and peace in the Emperor. He is the spiritual power who is divinely led and directed and empowered by Heaven for his appointed tasks at the head of a great people.

V. Summary and Differentiations

One-factor religion made its appearance in China not before the fifth century B. C., and spread to Japan about a thousand years later. Japanese religion up to that time was a simple form of two-factor religion. Confucianism and Taoism became well-known in Japan, and a counterpart of the Chinese state-cult arose in Japan in state Shintoism. Buddhism came in from China and Korea, already probably orientated to the Chinese world-view. In later centuries a number of vigorous Buddhist and Shinto cults and sectarian movements arose, but the state-cult co-ordinated the whole of them. To this day Japanese religious ideology is dominated by the world-view and the basic moral concepts of Chinese religion.

The Religion of Chinese and Japanese

I. Two-factor religion

- (a) Religion of the ancient Chinese (Before c. 450 B. C.)
- (b) Religion of the ancient Japanese (Before c. 500 A. D.)

⁶⁷ T. Harada, 'Philosophy (Japanese),' *ERE*, vol. IX, p. 872-a.

⁶⁸ *Bulletin No. 10*, from Elliott, 19 LaSalle St., Chicago.

⁶⁹ *Associated Press*, dispatch released December 1, 1937.

II. One-factor religion

- (a) Confucianists
- (b) Taoists
- (c) Shintoists
- (d) Buddhists

(1) Chinese Buddhists (after c. 200 A. D.)⁷⁰

(2) Japanese Buddhists (after c. 600 A. D.)

⁷⁰ The extent to which the Chinese *ch'i-yin-yang-tao* notions prevail in the thought and activity of individual Chinese and Japanese Buddhists, over the Indian notions in the *brahman-atman-karma* outlook, is not known with any considerable degree of accuracy. The Buddhist may retain his *karma-samsara* and swing over to the Chinese world-view. We gather that, outside of a very small number of monks and intellectuals, the Chinese and Japanese Buddhists are loyal to the Chinese concepts of natural unity of the human and the non-human.

CHAPTER XIII

EVOLUTION IN THE CONCEPTS OF THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR AMONG MODERN 'PRIMITIVE' SOCIETIES

I. Foreword on Source Materials

So-called primitive peoples have no literature of their own with which to supply a knowledge of their religious concepts through long periods of time. The religions of primitive societies, generally speaking, are independent historical developments; and our knowledge of them depends upon the investigations of modern and contemporary primitive societies by non-primitive observers. Our observation of the evolution in the religions of such peoples, if there be any evolution of consequence, must depend upon the comparative study of a number of primitive societies living under diverse conditions. Instead of looking only to our own wide sampling of religious concepts we shall depend in the main upon the generalizations of well-known investigators.

The evolution of primitive religion must of necessity be traced in, and confined to, the primitives' more comprehensive and basic interpretations given to the religious factor. In our previous investigations we found that the most comprehensive interpretation of the religious factor to be that which dealt with the whole of the natural world including man; ranking next, we found a body of interpretations of the religious factor to be regional in scope; and the third ranking body of interpretations we found to be societal in scope.

If we apply this sort of development to the entire field of 'primitive' religions, in the same manner as has been found to be true in the field of 'advanced' religions, we may expect among the many 'primitive' religions the greatest concurrence among them to be found in the first ranking or broadest interpretations, namely that of man's relation to nature as a whole; less concurrence may be expected in the regional phase, because societies must survive as they can, through adjustments to varied living conditions imposed by nature: some to hunting and fishing, some to herding on the grasslands, others to simple agricultural or to complex agricultural conditions; and still less concurrence may be expected in the societal phase, because there are differences in the interpretations of religious factor even within the tribes in the world who hunt, tribes

which herd, and the aggregates which engage in agricultural activities, whether under simple, or under complex, conditions.

II. Examples of Concepts Among 'Primitives'

1. *Arunta*. These hunter people of the interior of Australia, among the least differentiated of any human stock in the world, have the following concepts of the religious factor: (1) *karuna* ('shade' or 'dead'), which experiences reincarnation; (2) the *arumburinga* ('double' or 'split-spirit'): both the *karuna* and *arumburinga* are native to, or linked normally with, the human being's own nature. (3) The *iruntarinia* are non-human nature 'powers' or 'spirits' which dwell in whatever places the Arunta themselves may please to live in. These foregoing concepts are re-enforced by the tribal mores which 'bind them hand and foot.' However, for the tribe, the element of change is ever present in this relatively fixed body of practices because of slight modifications which are introduced from time to time through the influence and activity of exceptional living members of the group.¹

2. *Eskimos*. An aged Greenlander (Eskimo) is reported to have pronounced his religious faith as follows:²

We observe our old customs in order to hold the world up, for the powers must not be offended. We observe our customs, in order to hold each other up; we are afraid . . . men so helpless in face of illness. The people here do penance, because the dead are strong in their vital sap, and boundless in their might.

Here we have the same kinds of forces and influences that we found among the Arunta: (1) the 'powers,' (2) the 'dead,' and (3) the 'customs,' or mores which provide a 'system.'

III. Generalizations of Tylor and Boas

E. B. Tylor, who advocated *animism* as the origin of religion, supported his theory with materials from the primitive religions by claiming that such religion divides into

two great dogmas, forming parts of one consistent doctrine; first, concerning souls of individual creatures, capable of continued existence after the death or destruction of the body; second, concerning other spirits, upward to the rank of powerful deities.³

While we cannot accept Tylor's animism, because it is too narrow a definition in which to sum up a primitive religion, we can ac-

¹ B. Spencer, F. J. Gillen, *The Arunta: A Study of Stone Age Peoples*, pp. 11-12.

² Quoted from Rasmussen in *ERE*, vol. IX, pp. 846-b-ff., H. B. Alexander, 'Philosophy (Primitive).'

³ L. H. Gray, 'Demons and Spirits (Introductory),' *ERE*, vol. IV, p. 566-a.

cept as historical fact that there are, in general use in primitive religions, two groups of religious entities, corresponding to Tylor's 'two great dogmas' which he found in primitive religions.⁴

Among the primitives Franz Boas found two types of reaction to the outer world:

There are two widely distributed concepts of power, the one anthropomorphic and clearly conceptualized, the other vague and defined with difficulty. Languages like the American Algonquin, which classify the objective world in what is human-like (i. e. animate) and what is not human-like (i. e. inanimate), give the clearest evidence of the importance of the anthropomorphic viewpoint.⁵

Fundamentally distinct from anthropomorphization is the conceptualization of power as an attribute of objects. The concept is necessarily vaguer than the concrete anthropomorphization. A stone, a piece of wood or a tree is conceived as having the quality of bringing good luck or misfortune; a particular place or a particular time is endowed with 'sacred' qualities; a word or a symbolic action may have the quality of power; or finally all nature may have the quality of exerting power. The awe inspired by any of these phenomena is a response to their immanent power that may have a depressing or an inspiring effect.

Such powers may also be discovered in man. . . .

Both types of reaction to the outer world occur continually side by side and independently. They flow together in so far as the quality of power is ascribed to the anthropomorphized concepts.⁶

Tylor's two dogmas bring to the front for us the two groups of entities; Boas identifies or isolates for us two different sorts of power which 'occur continually side by side and independently.'

Thus the purpose of the above quotations is to show that a two-fold aspect of the religious factor is present in the historical materials of the primitive religions, whether the factor is regarded in terms of 'entities' or in terms of 'types of reaction.'

IV. *What is 'Primitive Religion'?*

Is it possible to subsume the religion of one or many primitive peoples under a term which catches up and retains all aspects of the religious factor? *Fetishism*, proposed as a general category by De Brosse in 1760, has long since become obsolete because of its limited range. Tylor in 1871 proposed *animism*, with fetishism as a subordinate department or aspect of animism. This *animism* proved inadequate when it was clearly shown that there are concepts of religious power which are derived from non-human sources, and are

⁴ If an *-ism* is required to encompass the basic philosophy of all religions of whatever kind, a philosophy from which all philosophical systems differentiate, is not such found in *factorism*, or its equivalent?

⁵ Franz Boas, 'Anthropology,' *ESS*, p. 94.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 95.

not covered in the term. What then may be said for *ancestor worship*? This, too, proved unable to serve as a rubric for the whole religion of any people, because it ignored a large part of the religion even of those people who place the greatest emphasis upon the placation or veneration of their ancestors. But how may the expression be accurately used to describe religion? There has been much confusion in the use of the expression as to just what it means: does it refer to that stage of religion when ancestors, as the 'dead,' are worshipped in their own right as 'powers'? Or does it refer to the later stage found in some religions in which ancestors are part and parcel of the tutelary deities, or saints, or 'bureaucracy' under God, and who have minor jurisdictions and authority in the one spiritual government of the universe? Shall the earlier stage be identified as two-factor ancestor worship, and the later stage, one-factor ancestor worship? Or shall the term be dropped altogether? Surely it is not an expression which can clearly identify the religion of any people, if the religion is considered as a whole; nor may it be used accurately for any particular aspect of a people's religion unless it is accompanied with an indication whether or not the people in question have built their faith upon a religious unity of the world.

What may be said for the term *manaism*? Codrington's discovery of *mana* among the Melanesians, led to the discovery of similar concepts of a non-human religious factor among other peoples, such as the *orenda*, *manitou*, and *wakanda* concepts among the American Indians. A universalizing of the term *mana* has been suggested,⁷ but such a thing is historically unwarranted because the *human* religious factor is found excluded from the scope of the *mana* class of concepts. *Manaism* is not adequate to serve as a rubric for any stage in the religion of the primitives, because of its conceptual limitations in terms of religious 'power'; it cannot even serve to identify any single primitive religion if taken entire. Radin points out that the *manitou* of the Ojibwa does not refer to a cosmic property, believed by them to exist everywhere in nature; it refers to definite spirits, not necessarily definite in shape. A universal *mana* concept, according to Radin, suffers from over-systematization due to the observers being imbued with 'Caucasian metaphysics.'⁸

V. The Concept of Religious Unity Is Absent

Although the concepts of the religious factor are found among all primitives known to us, even among the stone-age Arunta, such

⁷ A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, p. 201.

⁸ R. H. Lowie, 'Ojibwa,' *ERE*, vol. IX. p. 456-a. Lowie quotes Radin, but disagrees with him. Lowie begs the question when he holds that *manitou* is a 'concept of cosmic force, unanalyzed.' (p. 456-b). Also, see Boas, op. cit. p. 97.

concepts are found to cluster about two poles: the human religious factor and the non-human religious factor. And *there are no concepts of the religious factor in the primitive religions in which the two groups are combined.* The entities or 'powers' are not understood as differentiations of a religious factor common to all things. If 'monotheism' infers a stage in religion in which man, in his nature, is 'one with God,' then there is no such thing in religious history as 'primitive monotheism.' Primitive monotheism is mythical. American Indians who believe in the 'Great Spirit,' actually comparable with the Christian's God, have been influenced by a one-factor religion near by. Their own religion of the past has no concepts to support such a view of God. So-called 'high gods' of the primitives require, for those who use the term, a new definition if they would be historically accurate.

However, just because there are no unqualifiedly primitive concepts of the religious factor which represent an assumption of religious unity, one is not warranted in holding that the primitives had not gone a long way in generalization. The concepts which primitives did develop, represented great achievements in religious interpretation. Although the concept of unity is totally lacking in primitive religions, there *are* interpretations encompassing sizeable aggregates of religious factor expression, nevertheless. The primitives put together the elements of order in nature which they did observe; and although they did not interpret the whole as one realm of energy or system of activity or government, they did interpret what for them was their 'world,' and as they understood it. Primitives are found with a working arrangement with their 'world,' whether their understanding of its workings be little or great. For the problem in religion for mortals is always one of an affair of man with whatever for him is his 'world.' But it is to be emphasized that there is no evidence that in primitive religion the unity of nature is actually in their thought, and merely un-articulated; on the contrary, the evidence indicates that the primitives could not bring themselves to the point of confusing the two 'worlds' of the religious factor, i. e. of spirits of non-human nature forces, and spirits of men, living and deceased.

Primitive societies, in their adjustments to the natural environment, are found to be differentiated into hunter, herder, and farmer, societies: they are conditioned by natural environments offering a wide variety in forces upon which human destiny may be determined. These aggregates of hunter, herder, and farmer societies, are further differentiated into individual societies: each organic, operating, society is 'individual' in its religious interpretations, regardless of

similarity or difference in natural habitat involved in the adjustment—whether hunter, herder, or farmer.

V. Summary and Differentiations

Religions of the primitive societies are found, on the basis of their interpretations of the religious factor, to differentiate as follows: (1) in their primary differentiation: a 'man-nature' interpretation; (2) in their secondary differentiation: a 'man-region' interpretation; (3) in their tertiary differentiation: a 'man-society' interpretation.

All of the religions of all primitive societies are two-factor religion.

Religion of Primitive Peoples

- I. Two-factor religion.
 - (a) Religion of hunter peoples.
 - 1. Religion of the Arunta
 - 2. Religion of Pygmies and Bushmen
(and others)
 - (b) Religion of herder peoples.
 - 1. Religion of the Samoyed
 - 2. Religion of the Eskimos
 - 3. Religion of the Tungus
(and others)
 - (c) Religion of farmer peoples (simple culture)
 - 1. Religion of the Ashanti
 - 2. Religion of the Bantu
 - 3. Religion of the Algonquin
(and others)
 - (d) Religion of farmer peoples (complex culture)
 - None that are modern or contemporary
- II. One-factor religion.
 - None.

CHAPTER XIV

EVOLUTION IN THE CONCEPTS OF THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR AMONG THE EARLY 'CIVILIZED' SOCIETIES

I. Foreword

Early civilized peoples had a literature of their own with which to supply a knowledge of their religious concepts through considerable periods of time. But the amount of such literature and the concepts which have survived with this literature are not, generally speaking, abundant. Three peoples, not previously surveyed—the Egyptians, the Babylonians, and the Canaanites—will be used by us to represent these early civilized folk in the ancient Old World; and the Mexicans, Mayas, and Incas, will be used to represent the early civilized folk in the ancient New World.

II. Among the Egyptians (Before the Christian Era)

The *ba* is a sort of 'soul' that dwells in the body during life and departs at death. Because it returns to the body from time to time, it is necessary to give the best of care to the preservation of the body in the tomb, and to provide quantities of food by which the 'departed' may be sustained.¹ There is also the *ka* of man, that vital force which animates the body, and is a counterpart of the body; it comes into the world with the body, and will accompany it into the next existence.² The 'dead' in Egypt were never worshipped as 'gods.' 'No cult of ancestors as gods under their own names and in their own shapes ever grew up in Egypt.'³ Egyptians venerated long lists of ancient royal names which the Egyptian king delighted to honor; but this veneration was motivated by loyalty to the reigning monarch and not by a devotion which characterizes a real worship of ancestors.⁴ 'Seti I did not regard his ancestors as gods because they were his ancestors, but because, as kings of Egypt, they had been gods: every king during his life was the 'good god' as the successor and representative on earth of the sky-god Horus, the oldest ruler of Egypt.' Osiris and Horus were venerated, not because they were ancestors, or because they were founders of a monarchy, but because

¹ G. A. Barton, 'Soul (Egyptian),' *ERE*, vol. XI, p. 752.

² J. H. Breasted, *A History of the Ancient Egyptians*, pp. 65 and 70.

³ H. R. Hall, 'Ancestor Worship (Egypt),' *ERE*, vol. I, p. 441-a.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 440-b.

they were great gods. The identification of a dead man with one such deity allowed no room for true ancestor worship.⁵

There were countless non-human nature spirits in Egypt. A few of them stood out from among the crowd, such as the god Osiris of the Nile or Nile Valley; the god Re of the sun,—both well disposed toward men. And there were gods Set and Apophi which were not well-disposed toward men.⁶ According to Barton, 'the Egyptians never developed philosophical ability; they did not form theories as to the inner composition or structure of the soul. . . . In Egypt the interest centered in the future fortunes of the soul.'⁷ The conception of the deity among the ancient Egyptians 'never got beyond the primitive stage.'⁸ Breasted says of the religion in the Old Kingdom that the priests never reduced the tangled mass of concepts to a coherent system: it remained as accident and circumstances brought it together—a chaos of contradictions.⁹ The eventual triumph of Osiris was due to his taking over as his own the tomb of the historical Egyptian king Zer, of the First Dynasty.¹⁰ The highest point in the conception of deity was attained when Ikhnaton deified the vital heat of Egypt which he found accompanying all life: Aten is everywhere with his rays.¹¹

In the time of the Saite Dynasty, in the seventh century B. C., Egyptian religion is still the old-time divided affair: a religion of gods and spirits, and a religion of the 'dead.' Great efforts were made at this time 'to gather up everything that had come down from antiquity and to restore texts which had been for centuries disused.'¹² During the subsequent occupations of Egypt by the Persians, Alexander, and under Ptolemaic rule, the old religion remained firmly entrenched. Breasted says that the Greeks never learned to read Egypt's writing sufficiently well to understand its surviving records or learn the truth of its ancient history. But the 'philosophizing theology' of the Egyptian priests did contain 'germs' which may have found their way into the Ionian systems.¹³

Greek deities were introduced into Egypt at a time early in Greek history, but such deities had little if any influence. When the religion related to Serapis was introduced from Sinope, the old

⁵ Hall, op. cit. p. 441-a.

⁶ G. Foucart, 'Dualism (Egypt),' *ERE*, vol. V, pp. 106-107. This pronounced moral dualism came late in the history of the old religion of Egypt.

⁷ Barton, op. cit. p. 752-b.

⁸ Wiedemann, 'God (Egyptian),' *ERE*, vol. VI, p. 279-a.

⁹ Breasted, op. cit. p. 62.

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 148.

¹¹ Ibid. p. 267.

¹² G. F. Moore, *History of Religions*, vol. I, p. 198.

¹³ Breasted, op. cit. pp. 400-402.

Egyptian religion absorbed it.¹⁴ However, this Serapis cult, after its transformation in Egypt, was subsequently thoroughly Hellenized—the liturgy even being embellished by the Greek poets. As an Isis-Serapis cult it spread widely during the Ptolemaic period and the first Christian century. Moore calls this ‘cult of Isis’ the most civilized of all the foreign religions which were ‘missioning in the Roman world.’¹⁵ Its strongest attraction was its assurance to men of their immortality. Acquiring the features of the Greek mystery the Isis mystery religion, under various names, spread about the Mediterranean. Orphic cults had flourished in Greece already for several centuries, and had built up a faith in the conception of the human soul being restored to its former state as a divinity. Both the Hellenized Isis and the Orphic cults acknowledged that all the gods were one.¹⁶ The Isis cult had no such view when it absorbed the Serapis cult from Sinope; its advanced notions must have been acquired from Hellenic sources: Greece had known one-factor religion since the sixth century B. C.

Colonies of Jews also settled early in Egypt, following their rise as a nation, but such Jewish immigration had no appreciable influence on the old Egyptian religion. By the time the masses in Egypt were under pressure to abandon their old two-factor religion, Christianity had developed, bringing within it a mystery faith with a greater appeal than that of Isis. It was not until 392 A. D., by an edict of Emperor Theodosius I, a Christian, that the old temples of Egypt were finally closed, bringing to a legal end the ancient religion of the country.

III. *Among the Babylonians (Before the Christian Era)*

Man survived the experience of death as a *napistu* (‘breath,’ ‘shade’); kinsmen of the ‘departed’ provided food and raiment in the graves. In later times a communal meal was also provided for the benefit of all the ‘dead.’¹⁷ Another term for man after death was *edimmu*, the entity which is hungry and restless.¹⁸ As late as the seventh century B. C., Assurbanipal made provision for the ‘shades’ of his royal predecessors.¹⁹ Thompson classifies all the Babylonian entities into three groups: *edimmu* (see above); un-human spirits, and semi-human spirits. These mysterious semi-hu-

¹⁴ Moore, op. cit. p. 200.

¹⁵ Ibid. p. 588.

¹⁶ Ibid. p. 591.

¹⁷ S. Langdon, ‘Death and Disposal of the Dead (Babylonian),’ *ERE*, vol. IV, p. 445-b.

¹⁸ R. C. Thompson, ‘Demons and Spirits (Assyria and Babylonia),’ *ERE*, vol. IV, p. 568-ff.

¹⁹ Langdon, op. cit. p. 446-a.

man spirits are similar to the *lilith* of the Hebrews, which had intercourse with Adam and gave birth to *lilin*, i. e. demons of many sorts.²⁰

Babylonian concepts of the religious factor attained the greatest height in the *Cosmogonic Epic*, particularly in the preface to that poem. A copy recovered from Assurbanipal's library dates from about the seventh century B. C.²¹ Its outstanding concepts are *apsu* and *tiamat*: *apsu* ('the deep'), a concept probably derived from ancient Eridu, is the orderly framework, i. e. 'water' framework, of nature; *tiamat* ('disorderly waters'), a concept probably derived from Nippur, is the active, turbulent, troublemaking waters. In the preface of the Epic, an account of the universe is given in which the two 'waters' or 'powers' are complimentary forces, and are responsible for the evolution of things:²²

When above unnamed was the heaven,
(And) earth below by a name was uncalled,
Apsu (the deep) in the beginning being their begetter,
And the flood of Tiamat the mother of them all,
Their waters were embosomed together (in one place),
But no reed had been harvested, no marsh-plant seen;
At that time the gods had not appeared, any one (of them)
By no name were they called, no destiny [was fixed]
Then were the gods created in the midst. . . .

In this interpretation, 'water' remains the destiny-determining factor: *apsu* and *tiamat*, both water-bodies, are the 'ground of the world.'

In the hymn which follows the famous preface, the great god Marduk²³ is praised for his heroism and conquest: he has met and overthrown the trouble-making Tiamat and other powers of disorder, and brought them into subjection. If we are to interpret the concept of water, in the preface, as a Babylonian concept of the undifferentiated religious factor in the universe, then it appears that Babylonian religion did not subsequently rise to the possibilities of this great interpretation: Babylonian religious interpretation failed to accomplish the great transition from a two-factor to a one-factor religion, as provided in the above concept of universal power. The

²⁰ Thompson, op. cit. p. 570-a. Regarding the *lilith* and *lilin* in Hebrew literature, see H. Loewe, 'Demons and Spirits (Jewish),' *ERE*, vol. IV, p. 614-a.

²¹ Moore would push back the date for the Epic to about 2000 B. C. (op. cit. p. 210). What is the date for the preface? The preface contains more advanced ideas than the Epic itself.

²² A. H. Sayce, 'Cosmogony and Cosmology (Babylonian),' *ERE*, vol. IV, p. 129-a.

²³ In an older version of the story it is not Marduk, the great god of Babylon, but Enlil, the Sumerian god of the mountain, which is the conqueror. Marduk's power had subsequently been built up by combining the attributes of the most renowned deities.

level of religious thought in the hymn of praise to Marduk remains on a much lower level than that made possible by the thought in the preface to the Epic. There is no evidence in the historical materials of Babylonian religion that any general transformation in the spiritual character of the gods and men was ever attempted, much less brought about. As Moore has pointed out, Babylonia remained to the end on a relatively low plane of religious development, without philosophy and without any subtleties; the scientific astronomy of the Babylonians belongs, when at its greater height, to the Greek and Arsacidan times.²⁴

It is a moot question the extent to which advanced concepts of the religious factor in Babylonia affected the religious concepts of Hebrew, Greek, and Iranian religion. Hebrews attained their concept of religious unity during or very soon after the Exile of the sixth century B. C. Their chief citizens sojourned in Babylonia for a considerable time, and some of them remained there after the exilic period was over, and maintained a center of considerable intellectual activity. Greek scientist-philosophers of the Milesian school found in water and its various forms a unifying factor in nature, determining the destiny of nature and man. This school flourished in the sixth century, likewise. And it was possibly in the same century, while Zoroastrian Persians were taking over political control of Babylonia, that the Babylonian religion exerted an influence over Persian thought. During the Persian control, from about 538 to 330 B. C., it would have been altogether probable that Iranian religion should gain its universal note from Babylonian influence. Apart from this particular historical consideration, however, we have elsewhere estimated the transition in Iranian religion at early fifth century B. C.,²⁵ which is well within the Persian period of control of Babylonia. While we do not have the evidence to prove it beyond doubt, it would seem that Babylonia's greatest religious concept brought a new plane of thinking to neighboring religions at the very time when Babylonian religion itself was slowly dying because it failed to make use of its resources. At any rate Babylonian religion died in its native religious environment, while Greek, Hebrew, and Iranian religious interpretations were able to bridge the transition from two-factor to one-factor religion, and close in on the dying faith. Marduk died, and all of the other old Babylonian gods died: they found no place for them, not even as names, in a world of a universal religious factor.

Damascius of the sixth century A. D., was at least partly aware

²⁴ Moore, *op. cit.* vol. I, pp. 241-242.

²⁵ Chapter X.

of the potentiality of the great concepts in Babylonian religion when he said:²⁶

The Babylonians, like the rest of the barbarians, pass over in silence the one great principle of the universe and constitute two, Tavthe (Tiamat) and Apsu (Apsu), making Apsu the husband of Tavthe, and denominating her 'the mother of the gods.' And from these proceeds an only-begotten son Moymus. . . .

IV. Among the Canaanites and Phoenicians

A re-arrangement of Paton's classification of all the Canaanite spiritual powers makes possible for us the following groupings:²⁷

- (a) 'gods': 1. titles of divinity;
 - 2. 'nature gods' which are individual deities;
 - 3. departmental deities: they preside over aspects of human life, and have names carrying such meanings as 'sex love,' 'maker,' 'strength,' 'scattering,' 'fortune,' 'joy,' et al.
 - 4. imported Babylonian gods.
- (b) 'the dead': heroes; departed.

Religion in ancient Syria, before about 2500 B. C., belonged to a stone-age level of culture; after that time Semitic culture came in and developed. This early Semitic religion was characterized by such features as divination, oracles, soothsayers, 'high places' with their sacred stones and posts dedicated to gods of non-human natural forces. Prominent were gods of the sun, moon, and other heavenly bodies. Rites for the 'dead' were practiced in caves. The goddess of love had a commanding place among the nature deities. Such were the characteristics until about 1100 B. C.

In the period from about 1100 until 400 B. C., there developed in the religious practices an intensification of the moral and personal relationship of man to the gods. Now the gods are described with many terms which show their power and authority over men. While the gods are termed man's 'helpers,' the gods themselves regard man as an *abd* ('slave'). 'High places' are continued in use as places for the worship of certain non-human nature gods, and prophets and diviners continue to function. More distinctive for this period, however, are the new features which relate the sacrifice to a more exacting body of gods: there are now: an elaborate priesthood, temple prostitutes, human sacrifices, phallic emblems, votive offerings, and ecstatic prophets.²⁸ As late as 307 B. C., in a battle with Agathocles, the Carthaginians, colonists from Syria, offered up as a sacrifice on the altar of one of their gods, the prisoners taken

²⁶ Quoted from A. H. Sayce, op. cit., p. 129-a.

²⁷ 'Canaanites,' *ERE*, vol. III, pp. 177-188.

²⁸ Paton, 'Phoenicians,' *ERE*, vol. IX, p. 897-a.

in battle.²⁹ Alongside these practices there continued to flourish the cult of the dead also. After about 400 B. C., the Greek and Hebrew influences began coming into Syria, bringing in visions of a religiously unified world. Later, we find a new group of people, believing in a religiously unified world, appearing in Antioch and being called 'Christians.'

V. Among the Ancients of the New World

Among the Incas, 'it was a custom . . . among all classes of people, to place with the dead, offerings of food and other things required by them when living. This custom has never been eradicated, and even now it is practiced secretly in many parts of Peru.'³⁰ The Incas inherited from a pre-Incan people the main religious tradition of a powerful god under the name Viracocha, meaning 'dweller in space.' There was also a creator god, and gods of the sun, moon, and lightning. Worship was so complicated that it required a great body of priests. Characteristic of the religion were the festivals which brought success to agriculture; the oracles, and not infrequent human sacrifices.³¹

The Mayans had gods of rain and a god of fire. Hearts of animals were cut out and thrown into the fire as offerings to secure adequate rains for the crops in the new year. There were also gods of war, of trade, of the cardinal points, etc. There were festivals for the purpose of bringing the rain and crops. Priests were known as the *ah-kin* ('lords of day-signs').³²

With the Mexicans, Quetzalcoatl was 'the waning moon,' 'the creator,' 'the wind-god,' and 'moon-god.' Tezcatlepoça was the name of the 'waxing moon.' There was also a maize-god and a god of thunder. Worship was offered to the sun, moon, morning star, hearth fire, maize, rain, and a host of minor spirits of nature. Included in the offerings of living animals to the gods were offerings of human beings. The dead were worshipped also: those who died ordinary deaths went to live in the house of the lords of the dead, in an underworld. Those who died violent deaths were privileged to abide on the surface of the earth, at the house of the rain-god on a mountain to the east. And those who were killed through being slain on the sacrificial stone, and those who died in childbirth, went to the house of the sun-god.³³

Although the religion of the Hopi today is a mixture of reli-

²⁹ Paton, op. cit. p. 896-b.

³⁰ C. R. Markham, 'Andeans,' *ERE*, vol. I, p. 471-b.

³¹ Ibid. pp. 470-474.

³² E. Seler, 'Mayans,' *ERE*, vol. VIII, pp. 505-506.

³³ E. Seler, 'Mexicans (Ancient),' *ERE*, vol. VIII, p. 614.

gious traditions, features of the old Mexican religion live on. Important to the Hopi of today are the maize-god and the rain-god. The 'breath-body' in the living animal sacrifice is what the god most desires. When human sacrifices were common to the old Mexican religion such were practiced only rarely among the Hopi.³⁴

VI. The Concept of Religious Unity; Summary and Differentiations

What is to be said, in summary, of the concept of a universal religious factor among the foregoing 'early civilized' peoples of the Old and New Worlds? We found from the concepts and practices in ancient Egypt that the Egyptians did not reach it; that the Babylonians probably reached it as an interpretation, but not as a resource, for they failed to use it to transform their religion; that the Canaanites and the ancients of the New World were not as near to it as were the Egyptians. All of them are found to have practiced rather complex, but at the same time two-factor, religions. Egyptians and Babylonians lived in areas having relatively stable natural forces, but they had to exercise relatively complex social controls in order to insure peace and adequate food supply for a large population. Their religious concepts underwent little significant change throughout their long histories. One of the most characteristic changes which did occur in both areas was the reshuffling of entities into ever changing patterns to fit in with the turns in the wheels of political fortune. Syrians and early Americans developed religions in areas which afforded less security in the matter of a regular food supply than in Egypt and Babylonia. Human sacrifice was common to both areas of precarious agriculture, with many people, and a two-factor religious tradition behind them.

Religion of Early Civilized Peoples

I. Two-factor religion.³⁵

(d) Religion of farmer peoples (complex culture).

1. Religion of ancient Egyptians.
2. Religion of ancient Babylonians and Assyrians.
3. Religion of Canaanites and Phoenicians.
4. Religion of Incas, Mayans, Mexicans and Hopi.

II. One-factor religion

None.

³⁴ L. H. Gray, 'Hopi,' *ERE*, vol. VI, pp. 785-788.

³⁵ For summary of other two-factor religions, and which shows relation of the ancient civilized to them—see summary and differentiations at end of chapter XIII.

CHAPTER XV

CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SURVEY OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPTS OF THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR: A NEW CLASSIFICATION; ITS MEANING

I. Conclusions From the Survey of Concepts

1. The less comprehensive concepts of the religious factor were developed and used prior to the more comprehensive concepts.

2. Concepts of the religious factor in some religions cluster about two 'poles': the human and non-human. In all other religions the concepts cluster about one 'pole': the natural world as a whole, including man as part of it.

3. When religion developed through a transition from one sort of polar type to another, it developed in every case from the two 'pole' stage to the one 'pole' stage.

4. The religion of only five great societies has clearly evolved from one great stage to the other. These five were the Hebrews, Greeks, Iranians, Indians, and Chinese.

5. This evolution in religion from one stage to another is a change from one interpretation of man and 'nature' to another interpretation of man and 'nature.' The earlier stage possesses no concept of an undifferentiated religious factor in the world, linking the human and non-human; the later stage has such concepts and interpretations. These attitudes or interpretations of man, concerning himself and what for him is his 'world,' are the broadest and most comprehensive interpretations in the entire field of the history of religion. Man either holds to a religious unity in his thinking and practices or he does not hold to it.

6. This greatest of generalizations in the concepts of the religious factor is the primary determinant in a genetic classification: the primary differentiation of religion in the world is into two-factor (or two-pole) religions, and the one-factor (or one-pole) religions.

7. The five one-factor religions of history all came into existence, historically, in the period from about 800 to 400 B. C.

8. The basis of all religion, as knowledge, is the interpretation of man's relation to his world; concepts, therefore, which show the religious factor in this relation, are the basic regulatory concepts for all others in religions.

9. Historical concepts and interpretations, taken as a whole, require that we recognize two-factor religion to be further differentiated, into numerous 'man-region' or 'regional' religions:¹ such are religions of hunter peoples, herder peoples, simple agriculture peoples, and complex agriculture peoples,² whose entities have characters and whose religious customs include practices which clearly reflect the kind of adjustment or life imposed in the respective regions.

10. Historical concepts and interpretations, taken as a whole, require that we recognize one-factor religion to be further differentiated into five 'man-region' or 'regional' religions: religions of *ruah* peoples, *nous* peoples, *mainyu* peoples, *brahman* peoples, and *ch'i* peoples.

11. If one-factor religion is further to be differentiated, then the concepts require that the religion of the *ruah* peoples, for example, be differentiated into the religions of 'societies': namely, religion of Jews, religions of Christians, and religion of Moslems. Similar treatment is to be accorded the *nous*, *mainyu*, *brahman*, and *ch'i* religions.

12. A cross-section of a historical religion, whether one-factor or two-factor, exposes the concepts arranged in a series of concentric 'rings,' as it were: each 'ring' offers an interpretation of man in relation to the religious factor, the outer 'ring'—or most inclusive concepts—offering an interpretation of 'man-nature,' the next, 'man-region,' and the next, 'man-society' interpretation. This process continues until the center is reached, which is the religion of the individual adherent, the religious individual, or the individual's own religion. A historical religion, therefore, has its historical aspects which, when defined, may be identified at its various reaches: natural, regional, societal, etc., even to the individual.

13. If we look at historical religions all together on a large canvas, we view them genetically to be thus: Historical religions as a whole divide primarily into two great divisions, or two natural religions. This primary differentiation is continued by a secondary differentiation into regional religions: there are five members in the regional class of one primary division, and there are many more members—the exact number unknown—in the regional class of the other primary division. This sub-class called regional religions, de-

¹ A 'regional' religion is that of a particular people in a particular area, in which a characteristic interpretative body of concepts function or prevail.

² This manner of grouping affords not only convenient but strikingly distinguishable categories of religious interpretation among the primitive cultures. A listing of all such groups, individually, even for those whose concepts are known, or partially known, would be impracticable for our purpose.

rived from one of the primary groups, differentiates further into a tertiary class of societal religions which are commonly known as 'systems' and are implemented with institutions. A tertiary differentiation obtains also for the sub-class of the other primary division.

14. Finally, the concepts as a whole enable us to outline a formal classification for the religions of history along genetic lines. Each religion finds its place in the pattern according to its interpretation of the religious factor as a whole. The primary, secondary, and tertiary differentiations provide the method for handling the materials of history, in a formal classification. Since our criterion of classification is that of the *concept of the religious factor taken as a whole*, such a criterion of the religious factor is able to encompass the reach of any religion and to command what constitutes the wholeness of a religion, and so to classify as wholes the religions of the past.

II. A Condensation of a Genetic Classification of Historical Religions

(on the basis of religious factor)

- I. Two-factor religion ('man-nature')
 - (A) ('man-region')
 - (1) ('man-society')
- II. One-factor religion ('man-nature')
 - (A) ('man-region')
 - (1) ('man-society')

(kinds of religion)

<i>All Religions</i>	<i>Divisions of Religions</i>	<i>Classes of Religions</i>	<i>Sub-classes of Religions</i>
			societal religion
			societal religion
		regional religion	societal religion
		regional religion	societal religion
	natural religion	regional religion	societal religion
		regional religion	societal religion
		regional religion	societal religion
Historical religion			societal religion
			societal religion
		regional religion	societal religion
		regional religion	societal religion
	natural religion	regional religion	societal religion
		regional religion	societal religion
		regional religion	societal religion
		regional religion	societal religion
		regional religion	societal religion

A classification of religions, according to the historical interpretations of the religious factor, exhibits the field of the history of

religion in a pattern yielding divisions, classes, and sub-classes. Such is a genetic classification.

III. *A Genetic Classification of Religions*

I. Two-factor religion

- (A) Religion of hunter peoples
 1. Religion of the Arunta
 2. Religion of Pygmies
 3. Religion of Bushmen
(and others)
- (B) Religion of herder peoples
 1. Religion of the Hebrews (pre-kingdom period)
 2. Religion of Arabs (before seventh century A. D.)
 3. Religion of Iranians (before Zoroaster)
 4. Religion of the Samoyed
 5. Religion of the Tungus
 6. Religion of the Eskimo
(and others)
- (C) Religion of farmer peoples (simple conditions)
 1. Religion of the Ashanti
 2. Religion of the Bantu
 3. Religion of the Algonquin
(and others)
- (D) Religion of farmer peoples (complex conditions)
 1. Religion of Sumerians, Babylonians, Assyrians
 2. Religion of Aegeans of the Bronze Age
 3. Religion of ancient Egyptians
 4. Religion of Canaanites, Phoenicians
 5. Religion of Italic peoples (early Roman republic)
 - *6. Religion of ancient Hebrews (pre-exilic; kingdom)
 - *7. Religion of the archaic Greeks
 - *8. Religion of Medes and Bactrians
 - *9. Religion of ancient Indians (Aryans)
 - *10. Religion of ancient Chinese (pre-Confucian)
 11. Religion of the Incas
 12. Religion of Mayans, Mexicans, and Hopi
(and others)

II. One-factor religion

- (A) Religion of *ruah* peoples
 1. Religion of the Jews (*ruah* until about the thirteenth century A. D.; *nous* thereafter)
 2. Religion of the Christians (*ruah* until about the third century A. D.; *nous* thereafter)
 3. Religion of the Moslems (*ruah* throughout Moslem history)

* The ancient Hebrews, Greeks, Iranians, Indians and Chinese appear to have been the only peoples in history who re-interpreted their religious experience sufficiently to embrace a one-factor religion and leave their two-factor religion behind them.

- (B) Religion of *nous* peoples
 - 1. Religion of the Orphics
 - 2. Religion of Schoolmen (secularism)
 - 3. Religion of Isis, et al
 - 4. Religion of imperial Romans (the state religion)
 - 5. Religion of the *philosophes-mystes*
Neo-Orphics; Neo-Pythagoreans;
Neo-Platonists; Christians (early 'fathers')
 - 6. Religion of Christians (third century onward)
Nestorians
Jacobites; Copts
Catholics: Orthodox, Roman, Protestant
 - 7. Religion of Jews (after about the thirteenth century A. D.)
- (C) Religion of *mainyu* peoples
 - 1. Religion of the Mazdaeans
Mithraism
Manichaeism
Mazdakism
 - 2. Religion of the Parsees
- (D) Religion of *brahman* peoples
 - 1. Religion of the Brahmanists³
Aryan Brahmanists (early)
Aryo-Dravidian Brahmanists (Neo-Brahmanists or Hindus)
Vaishnavists; Shivists;
Kabirpanthis; Sikhs; et al
 - 2. Religion of the Jains
 - 3. Religion of the Buddhists
Hinayana Buddhists
Mahayana Buddhists
Lamaists; Sectarrians
 - 4. Religion of the Charvakas
- (E) Religion of *ch'i* peoples
 - 1. Religion of Confucianists
 - 2. Religion of Taoists
 - 3. Religion of Shintoists
 - 4. Religion of Chinese Buddhists (after c. 200 A. D.)
 - 5. Religion of Japanese Buddhists (after c. 600 A. D.)

IV. Comment Upon Historical Religion as Reflected in a Genetic Classification

1. *Evolution of religion.* (a) At the time when people emerge into the light of recorded history they are uniformly practising a religion in the two-factor stage.

(b) In addition to the five peoples who developed religion beyond the two-factor stage, there was one—the Babylonians—who exhibited evidence of approaching the one-factor stage as early as

³ Not the religion of Brahman class only but all those whose religion was interpreted for them by the Brahmins.

the seventh century B. C., if not earlier. However the Babylonians themselves proved unable to take advantage of this advance to the point that they could carry through the necessary re-orientation in their religious interpretations as a whole. If the Babylonians are counted along with the other five, and are dated in their arrival at unity in the seventh century B. C., then we may note that all of the great advances in religious evolution made their appearance in the period from about 800 to 400 B. C.⁴

(c) Omitting the Babylonians, the historical sequence for the appearance of the one-factor religions was probably as follows: Indian, Greek, Hebrew, Iranian, and Chinese.⁵

(d) At the present time, one-factor religion is found spread over most of the inhabited land areas of the world, having displaced two-factor religions which were once universally practiced, to the extent that about 91 % of all the peoples in the world are one-factor in religion, and about 9 % are two-factor in religion.⁶

(e) All of the developments of religion from the two-factor to the one-factor stage occurred in Asia—the Greek originating on the littoral of Asia Minor. However, because of transplantation, one-factor religion has spread during the centuries to all of the inhabited continents of the world, and now prevails in all of the densely populated areas and choicest lands.⁷

(f) *Ruah* religion has been sharply curbed by *nous* religion. Evidence for this may be seen in the transition of Jews and Christians from *ruah* religion to *nous* religion. *Mainyu* religion of the Parsees in India has long since come under the spell of the *brahman* climate in Indian religion.⁸ Moslems appear to have retained a sturdy *ruah* religion to the present day. In the Middle East *brahman* religion is in the ascendancy, and in the Far East, *ch'i* religion is supreme today.⁹

(g) Evolution in religion is marked prominently by great ages of philosophy. The ages of greatest philosophic activity occur at the time when religious unity is first assumed and being exploited of its possible meanings. Other marks of evolution having great prom-

⁴ Not one additional advance in religious evolution of this character has appeared in history since about 400 B. C. The body of twentieth century science is not only unitary but historically unique. If its body is filled with religions aborning in the present century, its brood would possess a genetic relationship unlike that shared by the famous five.

⁵ See graph on page 149.

⁶ See chart on page 150.

⁷ See chart on page 150.

⁸ Migration to India did not change the class of 'natural' religion to which the Parsee faith belonged, but only its 'regional' religious frame of reference. Their 'societal' religion was preserved.

⁹ See chart on page 151.

inence are those due to friction of great religious traditions having different origins, which friction is quite noticeable in the struggle of concepts for survival. Thinkers and reformers struggle with the adjustment necessitated from the cross-fertilization of concepts, in order to determine the precedence or range of each: as for example, the Neo-Confucianists, Neo-Platonists, and Neo-Brahmanists or Hindus. And when available religious interpretations failed to satisfy religious needs, new interpretations arose which subsequently became implementalized and then were subjects of attack as heresies by the conservatives. Later, counter-reformation movements developed which redressed the old traditions: such as in the rise of the creeds of Christianity; the rise of a more inclusive sectarian Brahmanism in the early Christian era; and the rise of a new Confucianism following the successes of alien faiths in China.

2. *The Meaning of 'Two-factor' and 'One-factor.'*

(a) One-factor religion, when it appeared, signalized the rise of schools of science and philosophy. The philosophical interpretations held by different schools and cults did not weaken the one-factor religion, but on the contrary, marked its development and adaptation to the needs of a whole society. It did not matter whether the factor was interpreted monistically or dualistically, both such interpretations were based upon the assumption that both man and his world about him had a destiny-determining factor in common. Religious systems, originating in one great area, were, from the genetic point of view, only differentiations in religious interpretation; all such were based upon an assumption of the religious unity of man and his world.

(b) In the two-factor religions there were no systems of philosophy presupposing the unity of nature. But philosophy of a sort that is not dependent upon the supposition of unity was present in all two-factor religion. Many classes of concepts and generalizations were developed, but not one appeared which assumed that men and gods shared the same nature.

(c) The use of such terms as two-factor and one-factor to identify a religion, has no connection whatever with philosophical dualism or monism.

(d) A two-factor religion is not one in which the two refers to two religious 'powers' *in man*, or to two 'powers' outside of man *in non-human nature*. Nor is the one-factor religion one in which the one refers to one religious 'power' in man or to one 'power' in non-human nature. What we mean by two-factor religion is one in which the religious factor native to man and the religious factor native to the non-human are *different sorts of factors*, which may not

be identified because they are different, and are never confused in the minds of the people. There appears to be no confusion whatever on this point in the thinking of early civilized and primitive peoples. In fact there is much made of any tendency whatever to bring the two kinds of religious factor near to an identity. And what we mean by one-factor religion is one in which the religious factor native to the human and the non-human are the *same sort of factor*. And what appears quite important to note is that the character of the one-factor 'powers' is different from the character of either of the two-factor 'powers.' When the two-factor 'powers' are followed, in the evolution of religion, by the one-factor 'powers,' the latter is *not* the sum of the former two-factor 'powers': it is a *new kind* of power—a universal factor, a destiny-determining factor, a common religious factor. All individual things, including persons, are, religiously speaking, differentiations of the universal religious factor. This common religious factor is thus identified by means of the rise of this new historical interpretation. Thereafter, among peoples who make the transition from two-factor to one-factor interpretation, the problem which rising religious systems solve, is to point out how such a religious factor actually operates in the world and how man in such a world is to guide his behavior to find adequate adjustment.

3. *Differentiations.* Religions cannot be scientifically classified according to some preordained framework of ideas. They must depend upon their own interpretations of religious experience if they are to find their rightful place in a classification. Historical religions, as bodies of knowledge of the religious factor, vary only in accordance with their own conceptual natures.

Stages in the differentiation of religion follow the range or scope of the religion's interpretations of the religious factor:

(a) Historical religions as a whole divide into natural religion according to their acceptance or rejection of man and nature constituting a unity. Both natural religions have their own interpretations of nature.

(b) Natural religions divide into regional religions according to the differing interpretations of the religious factor in the inhabitable regions of the world.

(c) Regional religions divide into societal religions according to the differing interpretations of the religious factor in the great societies of the world.

What, therefore, is historical religion? What is a definition of a historical religion as a body of knowledge, genetically considered? What is a historical religion in terms of fertile concepts? We find that a historical religion, as a body of knowledge, is a group of

concepts fully fertile among themselves but barred from interbreeding with other groups by the religious factor power which they represent. A cross-fertilization with another group of concepts produces either an incompatibility of religious concepts, or a sterility of the resulting 'hybrids,' or both. Since concepts of the religious factor, which propagate other concepts, can be found to be segregated in history into discrete non-interbreeding groups, this definition, we believe, rests upon a factual basis.

However, this definition of a historical religion defines it upon a simple basis, and history reveals much that is not simple in a world of concepts. We would therefore make room for further definition. The history of religions shows that if groups of concepts are actually separate religions, or are varieties of the same religion, that only the conceptual kinship with the basic interpretation of the religious factor can settle the question as to what they really are.

Concepts involved in the mixtures of interpretations do not function on an all-or-none basis. The isolation of a group of concepts may be incomplete: some subsidiary concepts may actually mix when others do not.

4. *A Natural Classification.* The story of the history of religions is sufficiently clear to make possible a classification of religions on a natural, rather than an artificial, basis; i. e., a consideration of the religions as natural phenomena, and the religion's concepts of the religious factor as evidence of man's actual universal adjustment to the natural world and man himself in it. This makes possible a genetic classification. Such a classification, we believe, must of necessity take precedence over other types which make use of the history of religions as primary data.

Too long the historians of religion have failed to perform the task of discovering the historical criterion which enables one to recognize the 'order' which exists within the materials of the religions of the world. The classification of the religions is first of all *the task of the historian who surveys the field entire*. Only after the historian has performed the task of discovering that order which obtains historically in the field of religion as a whole, is his product ready to be handed over to the philosopher, the psychologist, and others, who would make use of the historical resources of the world's religions.

Thus, in the criterion of *the interpretation of the religious factor as a whole* we believe that we have found that which is able to handle religions as wholes, and not violate their integrity. No claim is made for the completeness nor for the strict accuracy of all parts of the new genetic classification. But we do hold that if the

classification of historical religions in the future is pursued along the lines suggested by our foregoing approach, by our method, and by our outline, that many if not all of the serious scientific objections heretofore lodged against the old classifications, will have been eliminated.

V. The Main Results of the Survey on the Classification of Historical Religion

Through a re-examination of the historical religions' interpretations of the religious factor as a whole, we *discovered*:

(1) In the field of historical religion as a whole there are two interpretations of the religious factor on the basis of *man*, and what for him, is his *nature-as-a-whole*. These two interpretations provide, for the entire field of historical religion, the *primary* differentiation: in one division the human and the non-human religious factors are universally kept apart; in the other division there is but one common religious factor, binding all things. The former sort of religion we name 'two-factor' religion, and the latter, 'one-factor' religion.

(2) Within each of the two divisions there are interpretations of the religious factor which provide for a *secondary* differentiation of such basic or natural religion, into regional religions. One-factor religion has five regional religions; two-factor religion has a greater and an unknown total number of regional religions.

(3) Within the secondary or regional religions there are interpretations of the religious factor, which provide for a *tertiary* differentiation of historical religion, from the regional into societal religions, now commonly recognized as 'systems' of religion in the world today.

(4) Religious 'systems' (societal religions) survive and flourish not only in their native habitat but also in an alien regional religion, providing the native and alien regional religion involved, belong to the same natural religion. But when a natural religion evolves from a two-factor to a one-factor religion, the one-factor religion generates its own regional and societal religions, in time, and all of the regional and societal religions which are historically based on the two-factor religion, die out.

(5) The genetic classification, unlike all other classifications, is not artificial but natural: it is built up from the 'elements of order' found within the religions themselves; and it is fitted together by the historian who surveys the field entire.

APPENDIX I

Bibliography

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SECTION I: ON THE SURVEY OF PAST CLASSIFICATIONS OF RELIGION

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- (B) Greeks and Romans
- (C) Iranians
- (D) Indians
- (E) Chinese
- (F) 'Modern Primitives'
- (G) 'Ancient Civilized'

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APPENDIX II

Graph and Charts

PRIMARY INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR IN THE MAIN BODIES OF HISTORICAL RELIGION

Human→  Non-Human→  Universal→ 




CHART SHOWING AREAS OCCUPIED BY THE TWO 'NATURAL RELIGIONS'



Areas where 'two-factor' religion is dominant.
Areas where 'one-factor' religion is dominant.

Approximate division of the population of the world today:
 Percentage of the population having two-factor religion..... 9%
 Percentage of the population having one-factor religion.....91%

CHART SHOWING AREAS OCCUPIED BY THE FIVE
REGIONAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 'ONE-
FACTOR' DIVISION OF 'NATURAL RELIGION'



- Area where nous religion is dominant.
- Area where ruoh religion is dominant.
- Area where mainyu religion survived to a late date.
- Area where brahman religion is dominant.
- Area where chi religion is dominant.
- Areas where 'two-factor' religion is still
in the ascendancy.

APPENDIX III

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
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